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8With all the polls pointing to a hung parliament 
and the possibility of  a myriad of  potential 
coalition outcomes, the UK General Election of  
2015 was widely tipped to be the most unpre-
dictable election in a generation. Indeed, in 
some ways it was, but not in the way most of  
us predicted. In the end, the polls - consistent 
throughout the campaign - had been wrong, and 
a gleeful David Cameron returned for five more 
years in Number 10.  
In the lead up to the 2015 election cam-
paign, much of  the talk focussed on the (seem-
ingly endless) negotiations over the leaders’ TV 
debates, with Cameron refusing to engage in 
a live televised debate with Labour leader, Ed 
Miliband. In the end, the messy compromises 
consisted of  a grilling from Jeremy Paxman on 
Channel 4 for Cameron and Miliband, a BBC 
Question Time special featuring the three main 
party leaders, and a seven-way leaders debate 
on ITV. The latter was notable for its inclusion 
of  three women on the panel, who provided an 
empowering presence for women at the pinnacle 
of  UK political parties. 
Part of  the reason that negotiations over 
TV debates became so complicated was because 
of  the rise of  the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) in England, and the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) north of  the border. In the end, 
UKIP struggled to set the campaign agenda in 
2015, and failed to make the electoral break-
through they had hoped. In contrast, the SNP 
made spectacular gains, winning 56 of  59 seats 
in Scotland. This represents a seismic shift in 
the UK electoral map and the dynamics of  our 
party politics. 
Of  course, the SNP landslide was one thing 
the polls had correctly predicted. As such, the 
SNP - and their potential partners in any future 
government coalition - became a major ongoing 
story of  the 2015 election campaign. Here, the 
Tories saw an opportunity to represent the SNP 
as an insurgent force who would hold a poten-
tial Labour government to ransom. Ultimately, 
the fear of  this prospect may have swayed many 
English voters away from Labour, in a late surge 
not picked up by the opinion polls. Here, many 
of  the left might feel a particular bitterness to-
wards parts of  the right-wing press for their role 
in the campaign. As well as stoking the fire of  
the fallout of  a potential Labour-SNP coalition, 
they also pursued an intensely vicious personal 
campaign against Ed Miliband. If  the power of  
television (through the televised leaders debates) 
provided a major talking point of  the 2010 elec-
tion, then in 2015 we may reflect on the return 
of  the press to electoral prominence.
But this is a complex process. For example, 
social media provides a platform for citizens 
to push back against press agendas. General 
Election 2015 was notable for memes such 
as ‘Milifandom’ and #JeSuisEd, which were 
citizen-led campaigns to counter press power 
through parody and self-effacement. 
The outcome of  the 2015 General Election 
has led to renewed calls for the first-past-the-
post electoral system to be reformed. A compar-
ison between UKIP, Green Party and SNP share 
of  votes against seats illustrated in a clearer way 
than we’ve ever seen before then inequities of  
the system. Future constitutional challenges 
await post 2015. Alongside calls for electoral 
reform, the UK will face the prospects of  a 
redrawing of  electoral boundaries, a referendum 
on membership of  the EU, increased devolution 
and, maybe, a potential second Scottish inde-
pendence referendum.
Whilst there is undoubtedly an eventful Par-
liamentary term ahead, in this report we pause 
to look back at the 2015 General Election cam-
paign. The aim of  this publication is to capture 
the first thoughts, reflections and early research 
insights of  leading scholars in media and politics 
in the UK; and to use this to contribute to 
public understanding of  the 2015 election whilst 
it is still fresh in the memory and the issues are 
still alive. Here, we are particularly interested in 
what ways different forms of  media, journalism 
and political communication contributed to peo-
ple’s engagement with the democratic process 
during the election - and crucially the relation-
ship between media, citizens, and politicians.
Contributions are short - at least by academ-
ic standards! We have encouraged contributors 
to bring out their expertise - through research 
findings or new theoretical insights - in their 
analysis of  the campaign; to bring readers ways 
of  understanding the election that may not have 
been available through other sources.
Introduction
Daniel Jackson
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Two main conclusions can be drawn from the 
way the news media reported the 2015 general 
election campaign. First, that traditional media 
still count and determine much of  the campaign 
agenda. Second, that polls shaped much of  the 
campaign narrative – which is a particular prob-
lem when they turn out to be wrong. 
The evidence clearly shows the Conservative 
press was very anti-Labour during the campaign 
– even more so than in the 1992 election – un-
dermining Ed Miliband’s character, with regular 
and prominent front page attacks against him. 
But whilst readers might see through the obvious 
partisan influence of  right wing newspapers, there 
were occasions when newspaper coverage shaped 
the wider media agenda, including the evening 
bulletins – still overwhelmingly the primary source 
of  information for most voters. It would appear 
the Conservatives won the election on their 
handling of  the economy – the most prominent 
issue reported in TV news. In contrast, Labour’s 
biggest vote winner was the NHS, but this issue 
was barely covered on the major TV bulletins.
Much TV coverage focused on “horse-race” 
aspects of  the campaign, with the dominant 
narrative shaping the election – that it was neck-
and-neck between Labour and the Conservatives 
and a coalition deal was the most likely electoral 
outcome – supported by polling. In hindsight, this 
was a significant distortion of  campaign coverage.
Cardiff  University conducted a systematic 
content analysis of  evening TV news bulletins 
over the “short campaign”. We examined bulle-
tins on Channel 5 at 5pm, Channel 4 at 7pm and 
at 10pm on BBC, ITV and Sky News in order to 
assess which issues, parties and leaders dominated 
the news agenda and how.
Across the first five weeks of  the campaign, 
less than half  of  election news airtime on all five 
main broadcasters centred on policy, with the 
BBC dedicating the most time – 48.6% – com-
pared with Channel 4’s 43.8% and ITV’s 40.2%.
Sky News spent just 34.8% of  its election 
news covering policy matters, while less than a 
third of  Channel 5’s airtime – 31.1% – was based 
on issues such as health and the economy.
The Conservatives arguably had the stron-
ger showing on TV. Channel 4 and Channel 5 
gave Conservative party voices about a third of  
election coverage airtime in their main news bul-
letins in the first 19 days of  the campaign. Both 
the BBC and Sky News featured Conservative 
sources speaking for longer than those from other 
parties on their flagship news shows. 
However, ITV featured Labour sources 
slightly more often, 26.9% compared with 25.1% 
for the Conservatives.
Channels 4 and 5 gave far less time than 
other broadcasters to the SNP. On both channels 
the SNP accounted for 2.5% or less of  time given 
to party sources speaking. In contrast, BBC, ITV 
and particularly Sky News granted the SNP a far 
greater share of  coverage – between 13.7% and 
18.5% of  airtime.
By the second half  of  the campaign, the 
party fight rather than policy truly dominated. Be-
tween 30 March and 24 April, 43.4% of  election 
news items on the major evening bulletins that 
gave airtime to a party source saw them attacking 
a rival’s policy or personal character. In contrast, 
38.2% of  soundbites were about politicians’ own 
policy agendas.
By week five of  the campaign almost a quar-
ter of  all election TV news – 22.7% – focused on 
the likely “winners” and “losers” in the contest, 
while possible coalition deals became a more 
prominent theme from 13 April onwards.
Perhaps most striking is the minimal coverage 
paid to the NHS. According to Guardian/ ICM 
polls more than two-thirds of  the electorate rate 
the NHS as the single most important issue. But 
despite receiving some attention in the second 
week of  the campaign – 10.7% of  all election 
TV news – the NHS has barely registered on the 
agenda of  the main evening bulletins before or 
after then, making up between 0.7% and 1.1% of  
total election coverage.
Similarly, education – ranked fourth in issues 
most concerning voters – did not even make it 
into the top 10 topics addressed by TV news 
bulletins. Other key policy areas – such as the 
environment, pensions or transport – have also 
been marginalised.
So it’s clear that “horse-race” coverage and 
predictions of  a hung parliament marginalised 
discussion of  wider policy issues through the 
campaign. And extensive discussion of  coalition 
deals and permutations may well have influenced 
how people voted. Just as the Polling companies 
must review their performance in the campaign, 
broadcasters should reflect on the impact report-
ing, what turned out to be misleading, polls had 
on their coverage and how informed – or misin-
formed – it left audiences before voting day.
Research by Richard Thomas, Allaina Kilby, 
Marina Morani and Sue Bisson.
The ‘horse-race’ contest dominated TV news 
election coverage
Dr Stephen Cushion
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Director of MA Political 
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News media performance in the 2015 General 
Election campaign
For most voters the campaign remains a media 
event and one primarily viewed through the 
traditional media. Despite the advent of  social 
media and changing viewing habits, television 
news and the press remained a key outlet for mass 
appeals by parties and the main source of  political 
information for voters. Given this it is impor-
tant to critically assess the media’s performance, 
asking searching questions about its campaign 
coverage. So for example, how balanced was news 
coverage? Did television coverage favour the 
main parties? Given the size of  the Tory press, 
how biased was newspaper coverage? What issues 
did the news media focus on? Were important 
substantive issues overlooked in favour of  the 
campaign itself ?
To address these questions Loughborough 
University Communication Research Centre con-
ducted a content analysis of  national campaign 
news from March 30th to May 6th (see our blog for 
more details about this project). The rest of  the 
article seeks to address the above questions. 
Looking at the quotation time given to the 
rival political actors first, Figure 1 shows the dom-
inance of  the two main parties and the three main 
party leaders on television news. Not only were 
the three main leaders quoted most often but so 
were other actors in their parties. This contrasts 
with the smaller parties where the party leaders 
were quoted less often and were almost the only 
actors that appeared for their parties. 
In press coverage, Figure 2 shows there was 
a clear quotation gap between the Tories and the 
rest. David Cameron and his party benefitted 
from a Tory supporting press in away the other 
leaders did not. 
Next we focus on the extent to which each 
news item had positive or negative implications 
for any of  the political parties in the press (see 
our blog for more details).
Levels of  positive Conservative coverage 
remained stable during the campaign while levels 
of  negative Labour coverage reduced in the final 
days, but still remained high. There was an appre-
ciable increase in the negativity of  SNP coverage 
in the final stages of  the campaign. The Liberal 
Democrats started to register some degree of  
negative coverage in the last sample period (see 
Figure 3).
Finally, we turn to the proportion of  cov-
erage focused on a specific issue. Table 1 shows 
that the electoral process itself  dominated cover-
age. In terms of  substantive issues, the economy 
dominated television and the press followed not 
too far behind by taxation. Constitutional issues, 
particularly concerning devolution and its discon-
tents, gained proportionally more coverage on 
television than the press but were not as visible 
as might have been expected, nor were ‘immigra-
tion/ migration/ race’, the NHS, and Europe. 
Several other significant issues of  public con-
cern registered very little attention, in particular 
education, foreign policy [excluding EU], and the 
environment.
In sum, the press support of  the Blair years 
had evaporated for Labour with coverage fa-
vouring the Tories and being hostile to the other 
parties and their leaders. Although, less skewed, 
television coverage favoured the two main parties 
and the three main party leaders. As with previous 
campaigns substantive issues were overlooked in 
favour of  the campaign happenings and issues 
likely to dominate the next five years, such as 
Europe, were virtually absent. Overall, the big 
winners of  the media coverage were the Con-
servatives. They gained the most quotation time, 
the most strident press support, and coverage 
focused on their favoured issues (the economy 
and taxation, rather than say the NHS).
Prof David Deacon
Professor of Communication 
and Media Analysis, 
Loughborough University.  
Prof John Downey
Professor of Comparative 
Media, Loughborough 
University.   
Dr James Stanyer
Reader in Comparative 
Political Communication, 
Loughborough University.   
Dr Dominic Wring
Reader in Political 
Communication, 
Loughborough University.  
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Figure 1:  Quotation time in national TV news (seconds)
Figure 3: Positivity and negativity of party coverage  
(average scores weighted by circulation)
Table 1: Themes in national television and press 
coverage (30 March - 7 May 2015)
Figure 2: Quotation space in national press (words)
*Positive news items for a party were given a score of  +1, 
negative -1, no clear evaluation coded 0
Notes: Percentages=(number of  themes/total number of  themes)*100. Up to three themes 
could be coded per item. Percentages are rounded.
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This election campaign was almost irrelevant to 
the fundamentals of  voting intention. Full of  
sound and fury it signified nearly nothing. The 
voters who for months and years before have said 
they trusted the Conservatives on the economy 
and leadership ended up turning out for David 
Cameron on the day. The widespread views that 
Miliband was not trusted and Clegg not believed 
were borne out despite conventional wisdom 
during the campaign to the contrary. 
The fact that the pollsters got that wrong was 
not only unhelpful. The way that the daily opinion 
polls showed a close race gave the false impres-
sion that Labour’s (and the Lib Dems’) message 
was resonating. It meant that voters were treated 
to a false narrative by the news media.  
Indeed, the way the campaign was conducted 
and reported was a distraction from any serious 
attempt to have an honest argument about the 
deficit, welfare state, growth and the nature of  
British society.  
It is very simplistic to separate out the dif-
ferent news media because they are all networked 
into each other. However, clearly social media was 
the worst offender in creating a self-referential 
bubble, especially on the Left. In a mirror image, 
the right-wing newspapers who were panicked by 
an apparently close race redoubled their efforts to 
drive home the horrors of  Ed, Nicola and Nigel.
TV was a key broker in this campaign of  
mistaken premises. On the one hand the broad-
casters did try much harder than the newspapers 
and social networks to cover a broad range of  
topics and they did deliver an unprecedented 
slew of  information and balanced analysis. But 
on the other, they went along with the banal the-
atre of  the tightest, most sterile, stage managed 
campaign ever. 
Studies of  broadcasting in this election, in-
cluding by my team at the LSE, indicate that there 
was a valiant attempt to provide facts and debate. 
But as the campaign wore on the broadcasters in-
creasingly focused on the ‘horse race’ as the polls 
appeared to show how close the parties were. 
Certain narrative threads played into this 
creation of  a false sense of  drama. The most 
high-profile was the way that Ed Miliband 
increased his personal ratings after a series of  
appearances where he outperformed expectations. 
His interview with Jeremy Paxman in the first ma-
jor broadcasting set-piece where the yelp of  ‘Hell, 
yes!’ was interpreted as a sign of  his inner passion 
and courage coming to the surface. 
For journalists this was a self-affirming sto-
ry-line that then played into the following ‘leaders 
debate’. Again, because Miliband did better in 
the post-programme polls than expected it was 
seen as a triumph for Labour. But it was Cameron 
who came out on top and Nicola Sturgeon who 
emerged as the most popular new voice.
This pattern repeated itself  through the chal-
lengers’ debate where Cameron and Clegg were 
absent, and the final BBC Question Time where 
the three main leaders engaged with the public in 
what was easily the most dramatic and political-
ly-charged of  all the election broadcasts. Again, 
Cameron came out on top in tests of  audience 
reaction but because the national polls had the 
parties tied, commentators tended to ignore his 
clear personal lead. 
Despite the vast volume of  broadcast materi-
al this was the most stage-managed election cam-
paign ever and the broadcasters (and the newspa-
pers to a degree) were almost entirely compliant.  
Perhaps they were exhausted by their struggle to 
get the (non) ‘debates’ to happen. 
Perhaps it’s just too logistically convenient to 
go along with the endless bland photo-opportu-
nities in factories or fenced off  warehouses with 
activist audiences and camera-ready angles of  
party-coloured sets, placards and balloons.  
It was the TV and radio that produced the 
few rare examples of  off-script insight. The James 
Landale kitchen confession from David Cameron 
that he would only serve one more term, for ex-
ample. The ‘car crash’ Natalie Bennett interview 
with Nick Ferrari. And the ridiculous charade of  
the Miliband’s second kitchen. But the essential 
triviality of  these moments proves how closed 
down this campaign was. 
He was not alone, but Channel 4 News’ Alex 
Thomson deserves credit for trying to peek be-
hind the PR props, while Sky News’ Adam Boul-
ton and the BBC’s Andrew Neil also railed against 
the tight-lipped, cardboard cut-out campaign. 
This was the election where TV dominated 
the space, newspapers harangued voters and 
social media amplified chat, but where virtually 
no-one, including the pollsters, called it right 
and barely anyone landed a punch or opened 
the debate.
Broadcasting: at the centre of the most 
managed election campaign
Prof Charlie Beckett
Professor in the Media 
and Communications 
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twitter as @CharlieBeckett
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The right man for the job: the gendered campaign 
Jeremy Paxman’s question whether Ed Mili-
band was “tough enough” to handle foreign 
policy matters was an early indication of  the 
personalised and masculinised campaign to 
come. Cameron and Miliband dominated the 
news coverage, despite the presence of  three 
women leaders, Nicola Sturgeon, Leanne 
Wood and Natalie Bennett. Political leadership 
is often imbued with traditionally masculine 
characteristics and traits such as personal 
strength, competitiveness and ambition. Many 
of  these traits sit awkwardly with expectations 
about femininity, and women candidates often 
struggle under such conditions.  
Masculine stereotypes were often called 
upon in the news coverage of  the campaign 
to lend credence to, or question, the male 
leaders as credible and suitable political 
leaders. The scrutiny given to the spouses of  
Cameron, Miliband and Clegg is not only a 
means assessing their normality, but also a way 
of  emphasising their virility, and with it, their 
masculine credentials. Various references hint-
ing at their sexual attractiveness and virility, or 
lack thereof, also pervaded the popular press 
in particular. The most obvious examples were 
The Sun’s ‘Oops, I’ve just lost my election’ 
headline after the leaders’ debate, and the 
emergence of  the #Milifandom phenomenon 
on twitter. Emphasising fatherhood can also 
be seen as an attempt to portray the leaders 
as caring, strong patriarchs who are able to 
protect and defend the powerless. Cameron, 
in particular, called upon these ideas to deflect 
criticism of  his commitment to the NHS 
by controversially referring to his late-son’s 
health problems.  
One leader who was especially presented 
as a masculine figure was Nigel Farage. The 
frequent depiction of  him in the pub, with 
pint in hand, plays into his desire to present 
himself  as an ‘ordinary bloke’ who is a polit-
ically-incorrect and straight-talking politician 
who dares to challenge the establishment. 
Whether or not this is a desirable way for a 
party leader to behave is perhaps questionable, 
but it seems unlikely that such an approach 
could be successfully adopted by a woman. 
Calling on masculine stereotypes has its risks, 
for example David Cameron’s inability to 
remember which football team he supports 
perhaps undermined his masculine credentials 
(at least with some sections of  the public). 
Presidential and masculinised campaigns 
are fraught with danger for women leaders. 
The double-binds associated with women in 
politics are well discussed by feminist schol-
ars and partially explain the domination of  
politics by men. The televised leaders’ debates, 
much like Prime Minister’s Questions in the 
House of  Commons, are often seen as highly 
masculine competitions, where leaders can 
pit their intellectual strength and wit against 
one another. It therefore surprised many that 
Nicola Sturgeon was deemed by many com-
mentators to have been the most successful 
performer this time around.  
The Loughborough Communication 
Research Centre’s analysis of  the nation-
al coverage showed Sturgeon was the most 
prominent woman in the campaign coverage, 
appearing in 24.1% of  news items by the third 
week, helped by her unique role as potential 
‘kingmaker’ (the term itself  denoting the 
extent to which politics is still considered a 
masculine sphere). Despite an increasingly 
hostile national press which sought to portray 
her as a threat to British unity and English 
sovereignty, Sturgeon had a strong campaign. 
Conversely, Wood and Bennett struggled to 
make an impact on the national media, appear-
ing in just 3.3% of  items by the same point 
in the campaign. Other prominent women 
politicians, like Theresa May, Nicky Morgan 
and Yvette Cooper were also marginal to 
the campaign coverage. Other voices which 
ordinarily puncture the campaign coverage, 
such as voters and various ‘experts’ were also 
dominated by men. The only category where 
women were prevalent was the category of  
‘politicians’ relative’. 
Nicola Sturgeon’s successful negotia-
tion of  a personalised and male-dominated 
campaign seems to defy the usual narrative 
of  British electoral coverage, whereby women 
are significantly marginalised. The mediated 
representation of  men and women general-
ly, however, serves to reinforce the fact that 
politics and news coverage of  it, continues to 
be dominated by men.
Dr Emily Harmer
Post-doctoral Researcher at 
Loughborough University.
She is also Co-Convenor of 
the PSA Media and Politics 
Group.
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What citizens are entitled to expect from TV 
election debates 
Prof Stephen Coleman  
Professor of Political 
Communication at the 
School of Media and 
Communication, University 
of Leeds.
Dr Giles Moss 
Lecturer in Media Policy 
at the School of Media and 
Communication, University 
of Leeds 
The BBC Question Time programme on 30 April 
was applauded by commentators for finally letting 
the public into the election campaign. Jonathan 
Freedland writes that, “After a campaign lament-
ed for its sterility, vacuum-packing the leading 
candidates in airless rooms a safe distance from 
the voting public, the BBC Question Time special 
forced the men who would be prime minister 
to face the electorate at last”. But for some time 
it wasn’t clear whether televised debates involv-
ing the leaders or similar programmes would 
go ahead at all, as the broadcasters and political 
parties wrestled over the details of  the debates in 
a series of  private negotiations. When debates are 
presented as an opportunity for the public to hold 
their political leaders to account, it seems perverse 
that it is up to political leaders to decide whether 
the debates go ahead and on what terms. But then 
if  election debates were to be designed from the 
perspective of  the public, rather than political 
parties or indeed media organizations, what might 
they look like? 
Building on a study of  the 2010 debates 
(see Leaders in the Living Room), we’ve been 
conducting research to examine what citizens 
themselves want from televised debates and how 
effectively their needs are being met. Through 
a series of  deliberative focus group with voters 
ahead of  the election, and drawing on the capabil-
ities approach developed by Amartya Sen, Martha 
Nussbaum, and others, we’ve identified five key 
democratic capabilities that we argue citizens are 
entitled to expect televised debates to enhance 
(see What do Viewers Want from Televised Elec-
tion Debates?). Citizens want election debates 
to be designed in ways that can help them to: (1) 
be rational and independent decision-makers; (2) 
evaluate political claims and make informed de-
cisions; (3) be part of  democratic cultural events; 
(4) communicate with and be recognized by the 
political leaders who want to represent them; 
and (5) make a difference to what happens in the 
political world. In two concurrent studies, we’re 
examining the extent to which these democrat-
ic capabilities have been enhanced by the 2015 
televised election debates and exploring how they 
could be strengthened in future.  
Our first study investigates the views of  the 
public about the 2015 election debates through 
three surveys with representative samples of  
voters. Like the 2010 study (Leaders in the Living 
Room), the aim is not to determine ‘Who Won?’ 
(the question which dominates much journal-
istic commentary), but to evaluate the systemic 
implications and effects of  the debates for voters 
as democratic citizens. In particular, the study will 
assess how effectively the debates measure up 
against our five key democratic capabilities and 
explore disparities among groups. Our findings 
will be published later this year and we expect to 
have interesting things to say about the different 
ways in which those aged under 30 watched the 
debates compared with other viewers. 
Our second study is exploring how the dem-
ocratic capabilities can be enhanced through the 
imaginative use of  digital media. We’ve assembled 
a multi-disciplinary team of  researchers from the 
University of  Leeds and the Open University, 
involving specialists in information science and 
design as well as political communication, to de-
velop a platform to replay the debates that allows 
both citizens and political analysts to experience 
and evaluate the debates in new ways. Democratic 
Replay includes a range of  forms of  data ana-
lytics and visualization, from fact checking and 
argument maps to social-media analytics. We’ve 
also designed a new app for citizen feedback 
called Democratic Reflection (see screenshot op-
posite), which we tested with a panel of  voters 
during the televised election debates, which asks 
respondents to evaluate the debates in terms of  
their democratic capabilities and so provides a 
more sophisticated way of  judging the democratic 
quality of  the debates than blunt instruments 
such as ‘the worm’.
This was an election campaign characterized 
by a plethora of  televised debate formats. The 
question of  how far these media events shaped 
public thinking and enhanced democratic capa-
bilities is our key focus for research. According 
to David Cameron, the 2010 debates ‘sucked the 
life out’ of  the campaign. It will be interesting to 
explore whether the 2015 debates added to the 
sterility and risk-aversion of  the stage-managed 
campaign that Cameron seemed to want - or 
breathed some democratic life into it. 
 
 
1 This project is being undertaken in collaboration with 
Professor Jay Blumler at the University of  Leeds. 
2 This project is being undertaken in collaboration 
with Dr Anna De Liddo, Dr Brian Plüss, and Harriett 
Cornish at the Open University and Dr Paul Wilson at 
the University of  Leeds.
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If  a week is a long time in politics, five years is 
Mars One and back, passing go but without the 
T-shirt.  I mention T-shirts because for a fantasy 
moment on the day after the first leaders’ debate 
when Nicola Sturgeon was regarded by a num-
ber of  media commentators as being the unex-
pected victor, I imagined some wag would have 
parlayed the surprise hit of  2010 into ‘I agree 
with Nicola’ tees to celebrate her impressive 
performance. Despite Richard Littlejohn’s (Daily 
Mail) signature misogyny in his assessment 
of  the women leaders in the first debate, the 
inescapable fact was that there were now seven 
leaders on the platform and three of  the four 
newbies were on the distaff  side. Given Natalie 
Bennett’s much-publicised ‘brain fade’ during 
that LBC interview in February, and the mostly 
unknown quantity that is Leanne Wood (Plaid 
Cymru), both managed to score some policy 
points - and, together with Sturgeon, demon-
strated that given half  a chance, the girls are as 
good (or otherwise) as the boys, and sometimes 
considerably better. Happily and a little surpris-
ingly – challenging decades of  research including 
my own – news coverage of  the women leaders 
in that first debate was mostly gender-neutral. 
The disastrous twin peaks of  women politicians’ 
media coverage have traditionally been either 
invisibility or trivialisation but their early public 
performance on the leaders’ stage meant that all 
three achieved name recognition from the get-
go. Sturgeon in particular must have been very 
pleased to know that “Can I vote for the SNP?” 
was the sixth most common question on Google 
during the first leaders’ debate, according to 
Google’s own analytics.
The second week of  the election campaign 
ran rather more to type with both Bennett 
and Wood being disappeared by the political 
newsboys and Sturgeon’s media glow heavily 
tarnished by a harsh assessment of  her per-
formance in the two Scottish Leaders’ debates. 
Week two also witnessed the odd spectacle of  
an LBC radio show marketed as the first ever 
‘Women Leaders’ Debate’ but which, perversely, 
excluded the three women who actually do lead 
their parties. Instead, listeners were treated to 
the views of  Harriet Harman (Lab), Nicky Mor-
gan (Cons), Lynne Featherstone (LibDem) and 
Diane James (UKIP). In principle, it’s a brilliant 
strategy for the media to not always focus on the 
party leaders since the politics-as-beauty-contest 
mostly focuses on personality traits, leaving the 
electorate no better informed about actual policy 
positions - but surely none of  these participants 
could really be described as political leaders? 
On the other hand, it was an interesting debate, 
made even more so by an element called ‘Ask 
Me Anything’ in which each participant had to 
answer one (obviously tricky) question put to 
her by each of  her three challengers. It was an 
imaginative tactic and one which could have 
served the electorate well had Auntie Beeb had 
the courage to face-off  the actual party leaders 
using the same strategy.   
Fully into week three came the third leaders’ 
- or what was described as the ‘challengers’ 
-debate, providing an interesting platform party 
with the three women centre-stage, bookend-
ed by the two guys. Once again, a number of  
media commentators deemed Sturgeon the best 
performer although there were also plaudits 
for Wood’s bold dig at Farage and Bennett was 
crowned the sweetheart of  Twitter, polling the 
highest proportion of  positive tweets posted 
during the debate. Week four saw the media all 
over Sturgeon, again, but mostly not in a good 
way. So compelling have been her performances 
every time she gets to her feet, that the Tory 
press and the Tories themselves began to run 
very scared of  Sturgeon, hoping to put the same 
Presbyterian fear of  God into the electorate. 
One Tory poster showed her puppet-mastering 
Miliband; the Sun photoshopped her face onto 
the body of  tartan bikini-wearing Miley Cyrus 
astride a wrecking ball; Boris Johnson described 
her as Lady Macbeth in a piece for the Telegraph; 
and Piers Morgan described her as the most 
dangerous wee [sic] woman in Britain in the 
Daily Mail. In response to the latter, Sturgeon 
said that was the nicest thing the Daily Mail had 
ever said about her. The final weeks of  the cam-
paign continued to be largely a woman-free zone 
apart from Sturgeon’s singular song although 
to be fair, hardly any politicians other than the 
Dav/Ed/Nige combo received much in the way 
of  visibility, such was the Presidential tenor of  
media coverage. 
And finally, the day of  reckoning, a re-
sounding SNP victory due in no small part to 
Sturgeon’s stellar performances, 29% of  MPs re-
turned to Westminster are now female, including 
the youngest MP since 1667, 20 year-old Mhairi 
Black, and women also took over as Party Lead-
er for Labour (Harriet Harman Acting) and for a 
few fleeting days, Suzanne Evans (UKIP). We’re 
not there yet by any means but the direction of  
travel towards gender equality is onwards and 
onwards. Go, girls, go.
Girls on top, who knew? The unpredictability of 
pollsters and publics
Prof Karen Ross 
Professor of Media at 
Northumbria University 
and the foundational editor 
of Communication, Culture 
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Why can’t I vote for a female MP?
When I went to vote, I had a ‘choice’ of  five 
men representing national parties; I could not 
choose to vote for a woman (So I spoiled my 
ballot paper and wrote SNP). But why were 
there no female candidates available for me to 
choose from? Is politics still a ‘man’s game’? 
And how complicit are the media in shoring up 
masculine political power?
Where previous election coverage has 
focused attention on leaders’ wives sadly, not 
much changed in this election. Our research 
shows  that wives of  male political leaders were 
viewed as more important than female politi-
cians: Samantha Cameron still received more 
coverage that Harriet Harman and Teresa May. 
And monitoring by Loughborough showed that 
women politicians featured in less than a fifth 
of  coverage.
Where press coverage of  female politi-
cians was inevitable, for example, following 
the leaders debates, we saw a reversion to 
form: The Metro reported that ‘ Sexy’ Leanne 
Wood has Twitter swooning with her accent; 
Nicola Sturgeon was subject to repeated sexist 
comments and reviled by the Daily Mail as ‘the 
most dangerous woman in Britain’ and had her 
face superimposed on a Miley Cyrus in a tartan 
bikini with the headline ‘Tartan Barmy’ by The 
Sun.  Is this really how we talk about our female 
politicians? As sexist coverage dominates, we 
perhaps need to stop and ask questions about 
the kind of  gendered politics that is being 
conducted. Would we see a headline with ‘Sexy’ 
Osborne has Twitter swooning with his pecs? 
Or a picture of  Cameron’s head superimposed 
over fictional character Ross Poldark’s abs? And 
if  we think that sounds ridiculous in respect 
of  a male politician, than why position female 
politicians in this way?
This issue matters because, not only can 
this kind of  coverage put women off  voting, 
and standing for office, but it also obscures the 
ways in which women’s issues are repeatedly 
marginalised. While economic coverage was the 
second most prominent issue in the campaign 
far less attention was paid to the 88% of  cuts 
that have fallen on women; these women’s voic-
es and their interests are drowned out. 
It is easy to point fingers solely at the 
media; and indeed commentators have made 
a point of  calling the media on their coverage 
and not all media outlets can be tarred with the 
same brush as the Daily Mail. However, what 
has been less widely commented on in this 
context is the way in which political parties also 
play a role in what media cover. Extensive anal-
ysis of  the ways in which politicians manipulate 
the media seems to go out of  the window when 
it comes to this kind of  coverage. Politicians go 
to great lengths to manage media appearances: 
so why are politicians allowing media to get 
away with this kind of  behaviour and leaving 
it to journalists (independent and professional) 
and campaigners such as the #viewsnotshoes 
campaign to monitor this kind of  coverage? 
Rather than challenge media stereotypes, 
politicians themselves have played into them. 
Labour’s ‘pink bus’ was a publicity stunt aimed 
at attracting women voters, yet analysis shows 
that actually there was a 1% gap between men 
and women in the turnout at the last election. 
Gendered stunts are not necessary. We do 
need however: 1) proactive strategies to recruit 
women in to political parties; and 2) for those 
parties to represent women’s issues and 3) for 
media outlets to focus on the policies promot-
ed by female politicians not their appearances. 
These are just three necessary conditions to 
improve women’s descriptive and substantive 
representation in politics.  
Dr Heather Savigny
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Immigration coverage and populist cultural work 
in the 2015 General Election campaign
In the 2015 General Election campaign immi-
gration was a key battleground issue. It featured 
strongly in each of  the main parties’ manifestos 
and attracted a steady volume of  news media 
coverage. Immigration was firmly on the national 
electioneering agenda as if  this were a matter of  
‘common sense’. Perhaps this should not be sur-
prising. The increasing significance of  immigra-
tion at the polls certainly seems clear according to 
successive IPSOS MORI opinion poll data. When 
asked during the 2015 campaign, ‘Looking ahead 
to the next General Election, which, if  any, of  
these issues do you think will be very important 
to you in helping you to decide which party to 
vote for?’ asylum and immigration was 3rd most 
cited - apparently as critical an issue as education 
and outranking previously stalwart areas such as 
law and order/crime. In the more general Issues 
Index poll, immigration consistently ranks in the 
top 5 - overtaking the NHS as the ‘most impor-
tant issue facing Britain today’ in March 2015. 
However, this ‘common sense’ public profile of  
immigration is neither ‘natural’ nor guaranteed, 
but rather, I argue, the product of  populist cultur-
al work to which the main political parties and the 
press contribute. 
During the ‘short’ election campaign, national 
newspapers mentioned immigration daily, al-
though policy was not necessarily always the focus 
of  reports. Polls played an important role in shap-
ing press narratives (assessing public trust in each 
party, support for policies and voting forecasts). 
Celebrity endorsements, policy guides and games 
aimed at informing voting decisions also featured. 
Coverage trailing the televised leadership debates 
and assessing performances was significant, in-
cluding UKIP’s accusation of  BBC leftist bias in 
the composition of  debate audiences. Manifesto 
and campaign launches featured strongly early on 
with headline-grabbing policy announcements, 
especially from UKIP. Labour policy was repre-
sented as defensive with Miliband’s assertion that 
having ‘got it wrong in the past’ Labour would 
now be ‘smart’ on immigration.
Negative campaigning also formed part of  
the narrative with Labour accusing Tories of  
breaking promises over reducing net migration 
and border exit cheques, Tory claims that Ed 
Miliband didn’t care about immigration, the SNP 
condemning UKIP’s David Coburn’s views as 
‘absolutely utterly disgusting’, and Cameron’s 
urge to UKIP voters to ‘come home’. Editorials 
encouraging voters’ allegiance to particular parties 
were also common. Controversies such as internal 
party anxieties over Labour’s ‘controls on immi-
gration’ campaign merchandise mug, and stories 
about UKIP candidates’ far right associations or 
homophobic/racist comments were highlighted. 
On rare occasions comment pieces did cri-
tique the demonization of  migrants. Other unusu-
al stories included a voter survey reporting people 
no longer believed a ‘liberal elite’ disallowed talk 
about immigration, a protestor adding ‘welcome 
mats’ to UKIP immigration posters, and a Polish 
Prince challenging Farage to a sword duel in Hyde 
Park. Coverage of  the migrant crisis in the Medi-
terranean featured too, focusing on the likelihood 
that the UK would be asked to accept a migrant 
quota and Miliband’s suggestion (largely reported 
as an outrageous ‘smear’) that Cameron’s policies 
were partially responsible for the crisis. Other 
comments argued the boat tragedies exposed the 
parochialism of  UK election campaigning on 
immigration. However, overall dominant nega-
tive narratives were not challenged. Most articles 
worked to reinforce the ‘common sense’ notion 
that political parties simply respond to democratic 
demands and that ‘the issue’ should simply be 
taken seriously rather than critically interrogated 
or challenged. 
Arguably, the meaning of  immigration’s 
prominence is not so settled as it might appear 
from opinion polls. Unlike the NHS or the econ-
omy, it is not an issue with which the majority 
of  people living in the country necessarily have 
a direct material experience. Its significance does 
not only come from concerns about current 
global migration flows or EU migration politics. 
It is always already culturally loaded and racialised, 
concerned with the division of  political space be-
tween people ‘who belong’ and those who do not, 
and comes woven through with previous eras’ 
social anxieties and cultural antagonisms. The 
parameters of  ‘the issue’ have long been largely 
fixed, framed within a dominant discourse hold-
ing that stronger border controls and more puni-
tive restrictions upon migrants are almost always 
a ‘good thing’, with the already settled population 
(the British electorate) justified in feeling hard 
done by. The noisy ‘debate’ on immigration is not 
about these ideas, but about parties positioning 
and defending their political identities within 
a populist mainstream. The rise of  UKIP has 
brought this struggle into sharp relief, which par-
tially explains the extraordinary media attention 
they have received. With other parties seeking to 
neutralize UKIP’s populist appeal this political 
ground is protected from question or disrepute 
- there is rarely an accusation of  anti-migrant 
scaremongering or racism in the mainstream. The 
main parties fight very carefully on this terrain to 
protect themselves, but also to avoid compromis-
ing it with the national press largely complicit in 
this populist cultural work.  
Dr Kerry Moore
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Figure 1: Immigration Election National Press Coverage 2015*
*Nexis UK search of  national newspaper headlines, lead paragraphs and indexing using search terms:
immigra! Or migra! Or asylum or refugee! And election Not Clinton or Vikto or Burundi or Le Pen or Netanyahu or Tony Abbott  
or South Africa or Puerto Rico or Obama or Dafur or Eritrea or Malaysia or Kashmir or Republican or Rajapaska or Buhari.
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Winning and losing the ‘Battle for Number 10’: 
a linguistic analysis of the Paxman vs Cameron/Miliband 
election interviews
On the 26th March 2015 the first television 
interviews of  the UK 2015 General Election 
with David Cameron and Ed Miliband were 
conducted by Jeremy Paxman, the notoriously 
savage veteran political interviewer. The media 
accounts of  the interviews and the subsequent 
question-answer session with the studio audi-
ence inevitably searched for a winner and a los-
er, with the Guardian ICM poll putting Cameron 
as the narrow winner with an approval rating 
of  54% in comparison to Miliband’s 46%. Ac-
counts of  the interviews varied, but some held 
that ‘Cameron survived an intense grilling’ and 
that he was ‘mauled’ by Paxman.  
A detailed linguistic analysis of  the Paxman 
interviews is revealing, not least because com-
mentators tend to make two assumptions about 
this event that are not borne out in the inter-
actional detail. Firstly, that Paxman is equally 
combative in his treatment of  the politicians, 
leading to the second assumption that the in-
terviews are comparable and allow a fair assess-
ment of  the politicians’ performance. However, 
on examination of  the interview transcripts the 
differences between the interviews are strik-
ing. Cameron takes 42 speaking turns in his 
18 minute, 26 second interview. The average 
length of  these turns is 70 words and the 
longest turn is 244 words. In contrast, Miliband 
takes 78 speaking turns in his 16 minute 45 
second interview, the average length of  these 
turns is only 29 words and his longest turn just 
96 words. Overall, Cameron utters 2,944 words 
in the interview and Miliband 2,290: Cameron 
speaks 22% more than Miliband.  
In the political interview the inquisitorial 
role of  the interviewer dictates the interactional 
pressure on the interviewee. In the Cameron 
interview Paxman takes 46 speaking turns 
and makes 25 interruptions but in the Milib-
and interview he takes 83 turns and makes 32 
interruptions. This allows an assessment of  
the intensity of  interrogation or degree of  the 
‘cut and thrust’ of  the interview by dividing 
the number of  interviewer turns by the total 
length of  the interview. Using this measure, 
the intensity of  interrogation in the Cameron 
interview is 2.5 turns per minute while in the 
Miliband interview it is considerably higher 
at 5 interviewer turns per minute. It is clear 
that Miliband copes well under this intensity 
of  interrogation. He retaliates by interrupting 
Paxman’s questioning turns 12 times (Cameron 
only interrupts twice), and he gains the upper 
hand by reversing the roles and asking Paxman 
questions. He asks Paxman whether he reads 
media articles about himself, whether Cameron 
was the ‘man on the tube’ who doubted Milib-
and’s effectiveness as a leader, and he questions 
Paxman’s authority in predicting the outcome 
of  the election “You may be important Jeremy, 
but you are not that important” which elicits 
laughter and applause from the audience.  
The ‘Paxo treatment’ is famously adver-
sarial and there are extremely confrontational 
personal attacks in both interviews. However, 
the most personal attacks on Cameron are 
mitigated or softened by Paxman. Just before 
questioning Cameron’s involvement with ‘rich 
people’ he asks “I’m going to be personal if  I 
may for a second” to which Cameron sanctions 
“you may”. Later in the interview Paxman uses 
an apology and a polite formula to launch an 
adversarial attack on Cameron when he says: 
“I’m sorry, I don’t want to be rude but do you 
know and you are not telling us or do you not 
know?” Although the apologetic preface to the 
question can be interpreted ironically, there is 
no evidence that these deferential, polite and 
mitigating moves are duplicated in his personal 
attacks on Miliband who is confronted with a 
forthright “the thing is they see you as a North 
London geek” and “they look at you and they 
think ‘what a shame it isn’t his brother’”.  
Paxman also accuses Miliband of  using ‘likely’ 
as a ‘weasel word’, mocks his use of  the word 
‘consequentials’ and mirrors Milliband’s phrases 
in order to ridicule him. Paxman intervenes 
when Miliband introduces new topics in his 
responses by saying “you are asking yourself  
questions” but allows Cameron to equivocate 
with more freedom, as evidenced by his com-
paratively long speaking turns.  
This analysis shows that while both poli-
ticians are subject to Paxman’s persistent and 
adversarial questioning, Paxman allows Camer-
on to speak more and defers to his authority.  
Miliband is permitted to speak less and is ridi-
culed and undermined more aggressively. It is 
perhaps unsurprising, given the impressions fos-
tered by these differences, that Cameron ‘wins’ 
the approval ratings. However, the metaphor of  
winning and losing seems particularly misplaced 
when the competitors are facing such different 
interactional obstacles.
Dr Sylvia Shaw 
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Hot Dog Politics: Why comfort food makes  
politicians uncomfortable
Whether it’s David Cameron eating a hot dog, 
Nick Clegg tucking into a mince pie, or Ed  
Miliband attacking a bacon sandwich, British 
politicians have a deeply troublesome relation 
with comfort food. More than in any other 
country, the symbolic power of  eating habits 
seems to have become an essential ingredient of  
election campaigns. How politicians deal with 
the awkwardness of  slippery wieners, greasy fin-
gers, oozing fat or ketchup is in Britain a strong 
marker for class awareness. Who on earth would 
eat a hot dog with ‘FORK and KNIFE’ as the 
‘posh’ prime minister did at a BBQ in Poole, 
Dorset? Why is Labour’s leader that uncomfort-
able when putting away a typical ‘working-class’ 
sarnie? In this campaign, the food gaffes of  
both David Cameron and Ed Miliband have 
been extensively discussed in the press, exploited 
for political reasons and made fun of  on social 
media and the internet. 
How politicians consume snacks thus 
becomes a criterion for political position and 
competence, but also for reliability and authen-
ticity. Although poor Ed Miliband argued that 
the “issue of  eating bacon sandwiches, honestly, 
really and truly, is not what politics is about”, 
the incident haunted him like a ghost. The Sun’s 
front page the day before the elections was the 
climax of  the affair. A dazzling word play culmi-
nating in “SAVE OUR BACON. Don’t swallow 
his porkies and keep him OUT” accompanied 
the already notorious full-page picture of  Mili-
band clumsily tucking into his sandwich. It con-
veyed a message of  clear incompetence. “This 
is the pig’s ear Ed made of  a helpless sarnie. In 
48 hours he could be doing the same to Britain.” 
Hot dog politics at its best.
The entanglement of  comfort food and 
politics might to a large extent be a typical 
British phenomenon, just as the open and even 
malicious political campaigning of  the (tabloid) 
press. However, the gaffes also reveal a pro-
found reshuffling of  the communication and 
information infrastructure. Five years ago, the 
Guardian already made a call for the ‘first social 
media elections’ and while this was considered 
exaggerated back then, many expected that so-
cial media would have a leading role in the 2015 
campaign. But when the smoke had cleared, 
commentators like BBC’s Rory Cellan-Jones 
concluded, referring to another notorious Sun 
headline, that “it wasn’t social media ‘wot won 
it’” and that Twitter and Facebook had not 
“become vastly more influential than newspa-
pers in spreading election messages”. It tempted 
Rupert Murdoch too – ironically – tweet: “UK 
poll explodes myth of  social media power. Great 
time for competitive free press”.
This binary thinking of  isolated media 
spheres misses the point. What is far more inter-
esting is the interplay between legacy media like 
the Sun and what happens on social media. While 
publishers and journalists still mainly think in 
terms of  who produces the news, it might be 
more revealing to analyse how news users go 
about it. News use is increasingly social. The 
majority of  the traffic to news websites comes 
via social media and news outlets are increas-
ingly dependent on citizens pushing their news 
through social networks. Journalists ever more 
find their news on social media, always willing 
to exploit a politician’s gaffe on Twitter (just 
ask Labour’s Emily Thornberry), while citizens 
engage with legacy news online. The pictures of  
Cameron eating a hot dog and Miliband strug-
gling with his sarnie have had a large circulation 
on Twitter and Facebook, and have been turned 
into influential memes. This works both neg-
atively, for example when citizens Photoshop 
‘bacon Ed’ in famous film scenes, and positively, 
as became clear when tweeps started posting 
pictures of  themselves struggling with comfort 
food, using the hash tag #JeSuisEd.
Spiral of  Conformation
So, what are the lessons to be learnt for politi-
cians from these food gaffes and what are the 
consequences for political communication? 
The most obvious one is to stay away from 
consuming comfort food in public. It might 
get candidates into trouble, whether they eat it 
with cutlery or with your hands. Spin doctors 
will most probably advise them to find other 
ways to engage with the public and expose their 
authentic selves. After all, there will always be a 
photographer around, either from a professional 
news organization or a random citizen who uses 
his smart phone to quickly catch an awkward 
moment and put it online. As we have seen in 
the past, these ‘funny’ pictures run like wildfire 
and it quickly becomes impossible to control the 
message and minimize political damage. 
However, the most damaging effect for de-
mocracy in this destabilized power structure of  
political communication is that slowly but surely 
politicians get trapped in a spiral of  conforma-
tion. The main aim of  election campaigns then 
more and more shifts from conveying political 
views and persuading citizens to engage with 
clear ideological visions, to avoiding gaffes and 
clear positions. When trivial sayings and awk-
ward incidents have severe unforeseeable and 
uncontrollable political effects, avoiding sponta-
neous situations and saying as little meaningful 
as possible might be the most effective strategy 
for politicians.
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The kitchen as the new campaign battleground: 
changing notions of masculinity
In this election the fiercest battles have been 
staged in the most unlikely of  places: the 
kitchen. This trend started when Ed Miliband 
became widely known as ‘Two Kitchens Ed’ 
after it emerged that the kitchen in which the 
Milibands were filmed for a BBC interview on 
March 10 was one of  two in their home. Sarah 
Vine – Michael Gove’s wife – quipped in the 
Daily Mail that the kitchen was “bland, func-
tional, humourless, cold and about as much fun 
to live in as a Communist era housing block in 
Minsk.” It subsequently emerged that the sec-
ond – and superior – kitchen was mostly used 
by the live-in nanny.
David Cameron added insult to injury by 
giving The Sun exclusive access to his gleam-
ing Downing Street kitchen. The paper filmed 
the prime minister making a sardine sandwich 
with a dash of  mayonnaise, and subsequently 
eating it in style. A blow-by-blow account in 
the Independent described how he “flawlessly 
takes a bite, masterly holding the slice while 
controlling his jaw muscles, his eyes focused on 
the task at hand.”
Subsequently, the main scoop of  the 
campaign was delivered in the kitchen. In an 
interview with the BBC’s deputy editor James 
Landale, carried out largely in David Cameron’s 
constituency home kitchen, the PM dropped 
the bombshell that he would not be seeking a 
third term. Cameron talked about the ‘very high 
testosterone’ atmosphere of  Prime Minister’s 
Question Time while chopping up lettuce, the at-
tention of  the camera squarely on the high-end 
salad spinner, with some lingering glances at 
his absolutely massive fridge. The message: he 
knows how to make love and war. And a simple 
ham salad for dinner. Of  course, Cameron has 
a long-standing track record of  using kitchen 
appearances for moments of  heightened politi-
cal drama. He famously opened his Webcamer-
on videolog series doing the washing up after a 
porridge breakfast. 
Finally, Ed Miliband struck back by taking 
to alternative news channels to advance his 
message, in the face of  what was often relent-
lessly negative coverage in the mainstream me-
dia. He did this by agreeing to an interview with 
Russell Brand for his YouTube show, the Trews, 
in his kitchen. Following on from the interview, 
Brand endorsed Labour and encouraged his 
viewers to vote for the party, going against his 
long-held opposition to electoral politics – a 
decision he later came to regret.
So, how do we make sense of  this emerging 
kitchen politics? First of  all, it seems, politi-
cians are hell-bent on showing off  their culi-
nary skills and sparkling appliances. Secondly, 
however, in an era of  increasingly personalised 
politics, the kitchen as campaign battleground 
signals access to the domestic, intimate and 
private spaces the politicians inhabit; away from 
the cynical and calculating world of  politics. 
Seeing politicians scrape porridge off  break-
fast plates, in other words, makes them appear 
more authentic – more truthful and sincere, less 
performed and rehearsed.
The flurry of  politicians in their kitch-
ens demonstrates broader shifts in the norms 
of  masculinity. Politicians are now not only 
required to show themselves as decisive leaders, 
but also loving fathers and husbands who 
contribute to domestic work, including cooking 
and child care. 
It would have been unthinkable to see Win-
ston Churchill doing battle with the dirty dish-
es, but today’s successful leader has to demon-
strate peak performance with a kitchen sponge. 
According to this new paradigm of  political 
masculinity, hard work in the private sphere of  
the kitchen is entirely compatible with victory 
in the public sphere of  politics.
For today’s male political leaders, the ter-
rain on which elections are fought is more likely 
to be their kitchen than the House of  Com-
mons. That is because the former gives them 
more of  a chance to show off  their fine-tuned 
masculinity than the latter. Now more than 
ever, the personal is political.
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2 Voters, Polls and Results
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Given the blanket media coverage of  national 
politics before, during and after 2015’s unexpect-
ed parliamentary election result, the proverbial 
visitor from Mars could be forgiven for missing 
a perhaps equally important set of  elections that 
took place. But before looking at the English local 
elections I have to commit the same sin as the na-
tional media and concentrate on the ‘big’ election. 
The result was just so surprising. 
Who’d have thought it? When I saw my 
former academic colleague (and PhD supervisor) 
Colin Rallings open that exit poll envelope on 
ITV I simply refused to believe the contents. I 
was not alone; the massed ranks of  politicians 
and political analysts on all channels scoffed in 
collective disbelief. And one branch of  “political 
science” is going to have to take a hard look at its 
methods following the failure of  the opinion polls 
in the six months before this election. Anything 
that weakens Peter Kellner & Co’s influence must 
be a good thing. For far too long, the polls have 
dominated popular coverage of  electoral politics 
to the detriment of  the things that really matter.  
I was covering the election for the local 
BBC radio station and spent the weeks before-
hand commenting in all the local and regional 
media. One requirement of  this sort of  coverage 
by academics is the fiction that one is ‘unbiased’, 
so a certain detachment needs to be cultivated. 
It isn’t hard for me, by the way. My wife was a 
candidate in these local elections, which seemed 
to concern the BBC more than it did me.Unlike 
(as far as I can tell) virtually all of  my friends 
and colleagues in the political studies commu-
nity, I have no allegiance to any party, although 
Conservative political scientists seem thin on the 
ground. It’s always fun to watch colleagues going 
puce at the mere mention of  Michael Gove. I 
duly delivered a relatively dispassionate analysis 
in the studio all night.  
But attending the local count the next morn-
ing gave me a radically different perspective.  
The voyeuristic nature of  the process is 
similar, but the closeness to (especially) political 
failure really brings home the sickening thump 
which rejection by the electorate delivers to politi-
cians. There’s a certain degree of  sadistic pleasure 
in watching Ed Balls or Esther McVey lose their 
seat on the telly; this disappears when direct-
ly contemplating the distress of  hard-working 
Labour and LibDem councillors losing their seat 
largely because of  national factors. Tears were 
not uncommon, as was the realisation that their 
much-touted “personal vote” was a chimera.  
In Stoke-on-Trent, where Labour votes are 
generally taken for granted, local Labour politi-
cians were quite clear when talking to me. They 
laid the blame for their loss of  control of  Stoke’s 
unitary council firmly on two factors. Firstly, the 
electorate’s judgement of  Ed Miliband as lacking 
leadership qualities and, secondly, the fear of  a 
Westminster minority Labour government being 
ruled by the SNP’s anti-English hordes.  
On the other hand, the Independent coun-
cillors who made gains were keen to stress local 
issues, and the unpopularity of  Labour’s leader 
and his chief  executive after a number of  conten-
tious and costly decisions were mostly cited. As 
ever, the truth is more complex than such snap 
judgements allow for.  
Overall, the local election results broadly 
reflected the national mood, but there were differ-
ences across the country, which demonstrates that 
maybe our conventional view of  national issues 
dominating local elections needs reappraisal.  
Multi-party, fractionalized and regionalised 
politics has rendered Robert McKenzie’s simple 
swingometer redundant. And it may be that the 
electorate are becoming increasingly likely to split 
their vote when national and local elections are 
held on the same day. In the south-east and the 
midlands the Tories made gains but Labour won 
control of  Cheshire West and took a clean sweep 
in Manchester. Of  course, everyone gained from 
the LibDems. 
Brighton most clearly suggested a more tacti-
cal electorate. The Greens held on to the parlia-
mentary seat while losing their minority control 
of  the council to Labour. 
But to conclude with the opinion polls. There 
will be an “independent inquiry” into how they all 
got it so wrong. We might hope that one conse-
quence will be our media become less obsessed 
with the horse race and more concerned with 
examining the respective claims of  the parties. 
But don’t hold your breath.  
Here’s my advice to the electorate - and look 
away now Kellner, Curtice, Rallings, Thrasher, et 
al. Let’s make a national sport out of  lying to the 
pollsters about our views and voting intentions. 
With no idea who is ‘ahead’, we might not only 
have equally exciting election nights every time: 
we might also get parties not cravenly tailoring 
their wares to the supposed wishes of  the unde-
cided voter.
Lies, damned lies and opinion polls
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Watching the results in 2015 felt like 1992 all over 
again. A consistent pattern of  polling throughout 
the campaign was completely overturned at 10pm 
on election night, when the exit poll results were 
revealed. Far from the tight and equal contest that 
had been predicted for weeks, the projection was 
suddenly one of  Tory triumph, which of  course 
the unfolding results later confirmed. Peter Kell-
ner, the President of  YouGov and responsible 
for many of  those ‘dead heat’ predictions, spent 
much of  the night eating his words. How could 
this error have happened?  
After 1992 there was much talk about ‘shy 
Tories’ - voters who supported Conservative 
candidates in the privacy of  the polling both, but 
who were coy about admitting they were going 
to support what is often seen as the ‘nasty party’.  
This tallies with another familiar concept in social 
science - the ‘spiral of  silence theory’ - where 
certain groups will not voice openly opinions 
that they fear might be seen as unpopular. The 
argument went that expressing preference for 
a party associated with selfish individualism, as 
opposed to one that supported increasing taxes 
for the wider public good, might be perceived 
as embarrassing for some voters. So when asked 
about voting intentions those people instead 
told pollsters that they were ‘don’t knows’ - even 
though they were highly likely to vote Tory when 
the moment came. A very similar thing happened 
in 1970, long before the days of  sophisticated exit 
polling. Throughout the campaign the pollsters 
were uniformly predicting a Labour victory, but 
the reality on the morning after was Conservative 
Party leader, Edward Heath, in Downing Street.  
In the years that followed 1992 the pollsters 
discussed the ‘shy Tory’ problem and claimed that 
they were able to correct for it in their modeling 
and analysis. There was still a general tendency 
to under estimate Conservative support (as in 
2010) but this remained within the margins of  
error. Now in 2015 Shy Tories have again become 
a major distortion and overturned expectations. 
Interestingly this is a phenomenon observed in-
ternationally where support for Conservative and 
right wing parties is underestimated in polling. In 
the recent Israeli elections the pollsters repeatedly 
predicted a dead heat between the two largest 
parties, Labour and Likud, just like they did in the 
UK. But on election night Binyamin Netanyahu 
received a decisive lead of  6 seats over his Labour 
rivals. In the post-match analysis the pollsters 
pointed to the problem of  voters who refuse to 
answer, frequently because they are ashamed to 
admit who they are voting for, another version of  
‘shy Tories.’ Crucially, the usual rule in polling and 
surveys, that people who don’t answer behave the 
same as people who do answer, does not apply in 
politics. ‘Don’t know’ may be a cover for some-
thing else. This makes political polling much more 
tricky and is a reason why some polling compa-
nies stay away from politics entirely and stick with 
commercial customers. It is much easier to ask 
questions about kinds of  soap powder.  
One further lesson that pollsters need to 
digest from 2015 is the disparity between online 
and telephone polling. The vast majority of  the 
(inaccurate) polls were done online, consistently 
predicting a dead heat for the main parties. There 
were far fewer telephone polls, but they in the 
end were much closer to the correct result. In the 
final weeks face-to-face and telephone polls were 
predicting a steady 3% lead for the Conservatives. 
Online polling is obviously much cheaper and 
easier but on this occasion it has failed to capture 
an accurate picture.   
How could the polls have been so wrong?
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Using social media to predict the General Election?
While public polls showed the two main parties 
consistently neck and neck in the run up to the 
2015 General Election, social media suggested a 
more divided level of  support. In this short piece, 
I look for patterns in an admittedly retrospec-
tive-fitting and cherry-picked selection of  online 
data to show how we might have otherwise better 
predicted the General Election outcome. 
The traditional method of  predicting votes 
and seats: public opinion polls
The BBC’s Poll of  Polls on the 6th May 2015 (the 
day before the election) had Labour on 33 per 
cent and the Conservatives on 34 per cent. The 
actual share of  the vote was 36.9 per cent for 
the Conservatives and 30.4 per cent for Labour. 
Although seat projections varied a little more than 
vote percentages for the two main parties (partly 
due to the ups and downs of  support for smaller 
parties like UKIP), pre-election forecasts typically 
suggested a hung Parliament with the Conserv-
atives marginally ahead of  Labour in terms of  
seats. Election Forecast, for example, predicted 
that the Conservatives would have 278 seats com-
pared with 267 seats for Labour (545 seats com-
bined). In short, there was much prediction of  a 
close vote, and a close fight for seats between the 
Conservative and Labour parties. 
 
An alternative social media method of  pre-
dicting votes and seats: Facebook interactive 
metrics
Facebook calculate an engagement metric that 
considers levels of  interaction (a compendium 
measure including likes as well as more engaged 
activities such as posting, sharing, and comment-
ing). Between 1st January 2015 and 1st May 2015, 
analysis of  this Facebook compendium metric 
showed that there were 12.2million interactions 
involving the Conservative Party compared to 
9.7million interactions involving the Labour 
Party. Compared to each other, the Conservatives 
received 55.7 per cent (12.2m/21.9m) of  the total 
two-main party interactions on Facebook, while 
Labour received 44.3 per cent (9.7m/21.9m). If  
we contrast this with the two-main party vote 
share (Conservative and Labour ratio only), we 
find that the Conservatives ended up with 54.8 
per cent of  the two-party vote ratio share (36.9 
per cent/67.3 per cent combined share) and 
Labour 45.2 per cent (30.4 per cent/67.3 per cent 
combined Lab/Con share). The contrasts suggest 
that Facebook interactive metrics were within plus 
or minus one per cent of  the actual ratio of  vote 
share for the two main parties. 
If  we follow the same logic for seat share 
for the two-main parties (again, Conservative and 
Labour ratio only), we find that the Conservatives 
ended up with 58.8 per cent of  the two-party 
seat ratio share (331 seats/563 seats combined 
Lab/Con share) and Labour 41.2 per cent of  the 
two-party seat ratio share (232 seats/563 seats 
combined Lab/Con share). If  we then contrast 
this with the Facebook metrics (55.7 per cent for 
the Conservatives and 44.3 per cent for Labour – 
see above for calculations), we find that although 
the data is only just beyond the plus or minus 
three per cent typically considered the acceptable 
margin of  error in polling it was arguably a better 
predictor than many predictions derived from 
opinion polls. If  we contrast this with Election 
Forecast pre-election predictions (see above), 
for example, we see that their ratio was 51 per 
cent Conservatives (278/545) and 49 per cent 
Labour (267/545).  
As for activity on Twitter, while Nicola 
Sturgeon came out on top, of  the main parties 
fielding candidates across Great Britain, David 
Cameron received more mentions than Miliband 
(and Clegg and Farage). Although the majority 
of  these were negative, Cameron received more 
positive than negative tweets (compared with 
Miliband, Clegg and Farage).  
Health warnings
Am I saying that social media causes election 
results? Not with this data, but patterns in figures 
might be useful to help us predict, particularly 
if  patterns hold true over a number of  cases. 
Am I retrospectively fitting the data? Yes. Am 
I cherry-picking? Yes. For instance, the model 
does not hold for many of  the other parties at 
all. Facebook data reveal that UKIP, for example, 
had the largest online presence at 15.6 million 
interactions. While the plurality election system 
might explain why this did not translate into seats, 
other interpretations might explain the lower vote 
share, possibly that not all of  these interactions 
were positive or supportive in tone.  
Dr Mark Shephard
Senior Lecturer in Politics, 
University of Strathclyde. 
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One of  the most popular journalistic narratives 
to emerge following the election has been the 
failure of  almost all opinion polls to correctly 
predict the result. The polls typically predicted 
that Labour and the Conservatives would get 
about 32-35% of  the vote each, that UKIP and 
the Liberal Democrats could expect around 13% 
and 8% respectively, and that the Greens and 
the SNP would return around 5%. Much of  this, 
including the predicted vote share for the Liberal 
Democrats and UKIP, actually turned out to be 
correct. However, on the crucial question of  who 
would win the election, the polls predicted a hung 
parliament rather than a Conservative majority. 
Unsurprisingly, it is this that most journalists have 
focussed on.
A number of  things could have caused the 
polls to get it wrong. There could have been a 
last-minute swing to the Conservatives that the 
polls were unable to detect because their field-
work had already stopped. The polls could have 
been distorted by the responses from so-called 
‘shy Tories’ – a form of  social desirability bias 
that results from people being embarrassed to ad-
mit they might vote Conservative when asked. Or, 
there could be another as yet unidentified flaw in 
the underlying survey methodology.
Together with researchers at the University 
of  Warwick and the Centre for Research and 
Technology, Hellas (CERTH), we also tried – 
with similar levels of  success - to predict the 
result. However, our approach, which was based 
on the automated identification, collection, and 
analysis of  around 160,000 tweets per day, also 
allows us to paint a more detailed picture of  the 
election than the national polls imply. It allows us 
to spot the more subtle fluctuations that averaged 
national polls might have papered over, as well 
as giving us a window onto what just before the 
election when much traditional opinion polling 
had stopped. 
What does this data reveal? During the early 
part of  the election period, the Conservatives 
were more commonly referred to than any of  
the other parties, with around 40% of  all tweets 
about the election referring to them in some way. 
Labour were in second place with around 30%. 
This pattern held until the beginning of  May, 
when Labour overtook the Conservatives for the 
first time. As our charts show, this shift coincid-
ed with the broadcast of  the BBC’s Question 
Time: Election Leaders Special, and occurred 
shortly after Ed Miliband was interviewed by the 
comedian and activist Russell Brand. At the time, 
we thought that this might lead to a late swing 
towards Labour, but as we can see, this surge 
disappeared before polling day. What’s more, by 
May 6th the trend showed signs of  going in the 
opposite direction, and thus appears to chime 
with the ‘last-minute Conservative swing’ theory.
Of  course, parties can be referred to in both 
a positive and negative sense, so just looking at 
the number of  tweets may be misleading. Using 
an approach based on automated sentiment anal-
ysis, we are also able to look at just those tweets 
that express positive sentiment.
If  we do this, we see that the rise (and then 
fall) in the total number of  tweets mentioning 
the Labour party was driven by positive senti-
ment towards them. This appears to have been 
a genuine Labour surge. In contrast, the number 
of  positive tweets mentioning the Conservative 
party remained fairly steady. This suggests that if  
there was a late surge towards the Conservatives, 
evidence for it probably can’t be found on Twit-
ter.  What seems more likely is that the greater 
salience of  the Labour Party in the last week 
of  the campaign ultimately led to a decrease in 
positive sentiment towards Labour.  So it could be 
that differential turn-out, a reduction in Labour 
supporters who actually turned up at the polling 
both, might be a better explanation of  the result.  
Although social media can provide clues to the 
final share of  the vote, there is clearly the need 
for further investigation of  why the polls got it so 
wrong, and how more detailed analysis of  social 
media trends could help improve the precision of  
any election vote-share predictions.
Can trends in social media explain why the 
opinion polls got it wrong?
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Engaging young people is a perennial theme of  
UK elections, updated for the social media age 
but carrying long-standing assumptions. How 
‘youth voice’ is articulated in specific practices, 
and on whose terms, is complex, especially in 
the ‘micropolitical’ social media age, but there is 
little space or time for this in either party cam-
paigning or ‘old media’ analysis. 
The BBC debate with young voters in 
Birmingham covered the given ‘core issues’ – 
immigration, the NHS, the ‘economic plan’, 
focused on pertinent aspects (eg teenagers’ 
mental health) but failing to go beyond the 
campaign discourse.  Apathy or Antipathy? mused 
The Guardian in a feature on under 25s’ feelings 
of  alienation. Owen Jones tried harder, guest 
editing The Big Issue and co-opting Paloma Faith, 
Cat Boyd and the archetype of  radical disen-
gagement Russell Brand - “I’m just calculating 
what I would like to endorse”.  Joylon Rubin-
stein satirized the “silent war on the young” to 
call on first time voters to take arms at the ballot 
box. Brand’s later calculated endorsement of  Ed 
Milliband followed a more frivolous credibility 
endowed by the ‘Debate me’ vine and ‘Millifan-
dom’. 
On the day, the voting intentions expressed 
by under 25s in the YouGov data – predicting 
almost 40% of  first time voters for Labour, were 
as misleading as the rest of  the poll. 
So, what of  the ‘civic imperative’? Jamal 
Edwards, ‘Youtube mogul’ and Bite the Ballot 
campaigner, gets closer to the complexity of  the 
socio-cultural framing of  public sphere prac-
tices for young people  – “It’s a cultural shift, 
you’re trying to say to people, you’re a citizen 
before you’re a consumer”.  Hoping to impact 
on this, our Spirit of  13 project - supported by 
Sixteen Films, the BFI and Media Education 
Association, invited under 25s to make short 
films responding to Ken Loach’s documentary 
about the welfare state, to ‘give voice’ to their 
generation’s views on contemporary issues of  
social justice. A screening event at the British 
Film Institute featured a panel of  the young 
film-makers, Loach and people appearing in 
his film. Elsewhere, we have applied the ‘civic’ 
strand of  Unesco / EU Media Literacy frame-
works to the outcomes and we’ve theorised them 
as a ‘third space mediaptation’ (whereby media 
and educational practices are ‘dual adapted’). 
But eighteen months on, we re-connected with 
the participants to find out if  they voted and to 
look for evidence of  any broader ‘democratic 
engagement’ around the election fostered by 
their involvement. 
With a small sample, we’re hesitant to 
overstate the impact of  this project, but our 
participants revealed a degree of  engagement 
in political/civic issues that they were able to 
relate to the Spirit of  13 project, although they 
didn’t necessarily formalise this engagement in 
conventional terms. The fact that only half  the 
respondents voted was a negative indicator of  
engagement, but the reasons tended to be logis-
tical, for example, failing to register for a postal 
vote or being overseas on the day. Similarly, 
most respondents resisted the self-definition of  
‘politically active’, some simply answering “no” 
to that question, and others recalibrating the 
term to include “discussions about politics”. 
Despite this apparent avoidance of  an explicit 
‘political identity’, there was evidence of  enthu-
siastic engagement with political issues via social 
media: “Most of  what fills my news feed is 
recommended articles and videos about politi-
cal issues that my friends have ‘liked’” said one 
respondent. Another said “Social media helps 
me to understand what my peers think about a 
certain political issue. It’s also the fastest way 
to get hold of  news (Twitter)”. The reverse was 
true of  traditional media, with most respondents 
suggesting that the press, TV and radio played 
a minor role, if  any, in their media diets, which 
suggests that, for this generation, there is, at 
least, a correspondence between new technol-
ogies and political engagement. Regarding the 
project itself, we elicited some clear statements 
about the relationship between filmmaking 
practice and political awareness: “Gave me the 
framework to express already existing political 
ideas and provided the opportunity for a short 
discussion with younger students I wouldn’t have 
otherwise met to discuss social issues”; “Spirit 
of  13 opened my eyes to how much of  everyday 
life is politics and how some of  it is controlled”; 
“Making films is going from thought and theory 
to action in a way that resembles field research”. 
This data was generated with some urgency 
for this piece – we re-connected with the partici-
pants on the morning after the election and gave 
them the weekend for a response. It’s possible 
to claim, tentatively, that Spirit of  13 provided a 
stimulus for a constituency of  young people to 
explore stories and issues to promote reflection 
on the meanings of  politics and social engage-
ment. But the conversion of  such reflexive ‘me-
diaptation’ to direct civic action – at the polling 
station – appears to have slipped away. 
Mediaptating the ‘civic imperative’
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As early talk of  abolishing the Human Rights 
act begins, this piece takes a look at the 
anomalous mass that has been referred to as 
‘the electorate’ and ‘the public’ in the last six 
weeks. My specific interest is in briefly exam-
ining how members of  the electorate were 
portrayed in election coverage and what this 
might tell us about contemporary democratic 
politics in the UK.  
Based on close observation of  the ma-
jor broadcasters coverage of  election news, I 
detect five dominant strands that characterise 
how the electorate were used and given a role.  
Firstly, reminiscent of  black & white foot-
age of  elections in the 1950’s, there was a cli-
mate of  reverence; only now this was afforded 
to potential voters rather than those standing 
for office. Being rude to candidates might have 
been ‘par for the course’ but no matter how il-
logical, how poorly articulated or how factually 
incorrect the voice of  the electorate, they were 
showered with shallow veneration.  
Secondly, out of  the unwarranted defer-
ence came an infantilising (at times I won-
dered if  I was watching CBBC), soft questions 
verging on the juvenile, little follow up to seek 
justification of  comments made and an abso-
lute absence of  interrogation of  the expressed 
views elector’s expressed no matter how 
self-contradictory they were.   
Third, reinforcing this idea of  the elector-
ate as gullible was the patronising ‘help’ offered 
in the form political games. This took several 
forms including ‘pin the policy to the party’ 
and a version of  matchmaking of  party leaders 
(with an emphasis on ‘matches’ made in hell 
rather than heaven).  
A fourth powerful characteristic of  how 
the electorate were used in election media 
coverage was as pliable audience in a national 
beauty contest. There is little new in this asser-
tion as it has been part of  the personalisation 
of  politics and presidential approach to elec-
tions noted for over twenty years. Two points 
worthy of  note here; the audience no longer 
questions the appropriateness of  adopting this 
role – the leaders personalities do matter as they 
are expected to perform as ‘Presidential Prime 
Minister’. Expressed emotional attachment (or 
its lack thereof) felt by members of  the elec-
torate towards the leaders, was far more easily 
expressed, captured and thus reported on; they 
frighten me, they fill me with loathing, I like 
her... is sufficient to be the story.  
Finally, this is of  course like no other 
beauty contest; when individual members of  
the electorate are offered the ‘privilege’ of  
direct mediated dialogue with the contestants 
a powerful sense of  altercating is introduced 
to frame dramatic effect. Thus in the set-piece 
leadership debates a somewhat cleansed ‘bear 
pit’ mentality pervades where the electorate act 
to object, disagree, boo, stick to their original 
point (however narrow and ‘context light’ it 
might be) and avoid at all costs, entering into 
open minded dialogue or being reflective.        
The overwhelming traits observed when 
members of  the electorate were included in 
the election coverage illustrate well that are of  
course talking about human beings. Thus there 
was much inconsistency and contradiction, 
little grasp of  the detail and a sense of  per-
mission to drift in and out of  being bothered 
or taking it that seriously. Rather than being 
challenged about this state of  affairs, they were 
treated like ‘minor royalty’ - allowed to ‘get 
away’ with uttering the first thing that came 
into their head, no responsibility being ascribed 
for their limited and limiting contributions.  
One outcome of  this depiction of  the 
electorate ‘as seen on TV’ suggests we need to 
rethink the point and purpose of  asking the 
electorate to ‘tell us what they think’ during 
election campaigns. This initially seems counter 
intuitive, anti-democratic even. However, if 
current practices help create liars, and bullies, 
and if existing modes of  coverage brings out 
child-like qualities in the electorate (such as not 
being asked to take responsibility for their star 
of  confusion or their poorly justified opinions 
and actions), and if the electorate’s main role in 
this Media spectacle is to be infantilised, then 
I argue there is merit in calls for a reappraisal 
of  the place afforded to individual members of  
the electorate in election coverage.
Liars, bullies, confused and infantilised... and that’s just 
the electorate: the roles ascribed and the portrayal of 
members of the electorate in election TV coverage
Dr Richard Scullion 
Head of the Corporate and 
Marketing Communications 
Department (CMC) within 




One of  the prominent features of  recent general 
elections has been decreasing rates of  turnout 
amongst young voters. Turnout among young 
people (here, 18-24 year olds) has fallen from 
over 60% in the early 1990s to an average of  40% 
over the previous three general elections (2001, 
2005 and 2010). My own research finds that the 
youth turnout rate in the UK is the lowest of  
all the 15 members of  the old European Union. 
Voters aged 18 to 24 in Sweden turn out to vote 
at double the rate of  their peers in the UK.  
This disillusionment extends to public policy, 
where young people have borne the brunt of  cuts 
in public spending: from the abolition of  the Ed-
ucation Maintenance Allowance, to the tripling of  
university tuition fees, to the removal of  housing 
benefits for young adults, to the closure of  local 
youth centres. However, young people in the UK 
are active in many alternative forms of  civic and 
political engagement that have meaning for their 
everyday lives, including: volunteering for com-
munity projects; signing petitions; and, participa-
tion in demonstrations and occupations.  
In this context, it is worth considering the 
extent to which political parties tried to connect 
with youth politics in the 2015 general election. 
How was this reflected in their political platforms 
(as laid out in their manifestos)? What were the 
outcomes in terms of  party support amongst 18 
to 24 year olds? 
The manifestos paint an interesting picture. 
A brief  content analysis, searching for the term 
‘young people’, ranked the parties in the order 
shown in Table 1.
The Green Party manifesto included a be-
spoke section on youth issues providing a number 
of  key pledges, including: free higher education, 
free local transport, votes at 16, and investment 
in youth services. Youth issues were integrated 
into all parts of  the Labour Party manifesto, for 
example: education (vocational training), employ-
ment (zero-hour contracts, apprenticeships), and 
constitutional reform (votes at 16). Outside the 
main manifesto, Labour also produced a youth 
manifesto and a promise to reduce student tuition 
fees to £6,000. The Conservative manifesto was 
clearly less youth-oriented, and focussed on the 
issues of  apprenticeships and youth involvement 
in the ‘big society’. 
Why did the Greens focus so much on young 
people and UKIP so little? Party strategists knew 
that Green supporters were more likely to be 
young whilst UKIP supporters were more likely 
to fall into the older age brackets. Perhaps, the 
lack of  Liberal Democrat focus on young people 
reflected an unwillingness to concentrate on is-
sues that could highlight their U-turn on universi-
ty tuition fees.  
Therefore, the Greens and Labour were the 
two parties with a clear focus on bringing out the 
youth vote. How was this reflected in the vote 
itself ? Despite the advent of  the Individual Voter 
Registration system that saw 800,000 people – 
disproportionately young people – fall off  the 
electoral roll, turnout amongst the 18 to 24 year 
old age groups increased significantly from the 
2010 election – from 52% to 58%. The closeness 
of  the election and voter registration drives by 
organisations such as BitetheBallot, and possibly 
the Green and Labour focus on the youth issues 
(remember the MilliBrand interview!) all proba-
bly had an impact. According to Lord Ashcroft 
Polling on 7th May: see Table 2.
Although it is true that parties focus their 
policy appeals on parts of  the electorate where 
they are already strong, it is still interesting that 
the parties that paid most attention (in policy 
terms) toyoung people also scored better amongst 
that group. It is also interesting to note the large 
increase in young Labour voters (+10), the de-
crease in young Conservative voters (-6), and the 
collapse of  the LibDem youth vote (-22) since the 
2010 general election. 
Political parties target certain segments of  
the population to win votes, but age is a unique 
phenomenon. Young voters will become older 
voters. And, research tells us that voting habits are 
likely to stay the same (so the increased turnout 
rate is encouraging), and there is a better than 
good chance that their party affiliations will also 
remain. The second point will hopefully give po-
litical parties and policy-makers food for thought. 
Within our ageing population, bringing out the 
youth vote should be a key long-term strategy.
Bringing out the youth vote? Young people and 
the 2015 General Election
Dr James Sloam 
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Green Party    35 mentions
Labour Party   30 mentions
Conservative Party  21 mentions
Liberal Democrats  11 mentions (adjusted downwards due to length of  manifesto)
Scottish National Party              9 mentions (4 for ‘young people’, 5 for ‘young Scots’)
UK Independence Party              5 mentions
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A transitional parliament
Despite a relatively uneventful campaign, the May 
7th election both signifies and facilitates a series 
of  profound shifts in Britain and in Europe. The 
result obviously constitutes a huge win for the 
Conservatives, however this will not necessarily 
be a ‘One Nation’ government as David Camer-
on proclaims he wants it to be. His party is still 
fundamentally divided – not just on Europe but 
on other issues, too – and right-wing voices have 
been hard to control at the best of  times. With a 
slim majority in the Commons, backbench MPs 
will also play a crucial role in the stability and 
direction of  the government so this may prove 
to be a tough balancing act of  the 1992-97 type. 
We should not be surprised if  we see a string of  
hard-right policies balancing some more ‘one 
nation’ ones. 
It will now also be interesting to compare the 
new Government’s legislative agenda to the co-
alition Government’s track record. The fact that 
the Conservatives will be governing alone will 
give us some indication about any impact that the 
Liberal Democrats actually had in containing the 
more radical right-wing elements within the Tory 
party. In the long term this could work in the Lib 
Dems’ favour: if  the Conservatives go ahead with 
a radical agenda, they could then present that as 
evidence that they did in fact play in active role 
in stopping that from happening in the previous 
parliament. However, the Liberal Democrats have 
been electorally obliterated at a national level and 
in the short term will have to find ways of  sur-
viving as a noticeable and relevant political party. 
While the swing against them was mostly fuelled 
by opposition to Nick Clegg personally, and to 
the party going back on key promises such as 
top-up fees, it may also have a profound effect on 
the reach and influence of  local councillors and 
grassroots organisations.
The election was determined by the two 
factors that almost always determine elections in 
the UK: the economy and the personality of  the 
leader, and Labour lost on both counts, and they 
lost massively. The fact that Ed Balls lost his seat 
means that Labour now have the opportunity to 
draw a line in the sand and have a clean break 
from the past – a past which they seem to not 
have properly reflected on or made their peace 
with. The Labour Party seems unsure about 
which things it got right and wrong in the past 
and this is actually the case with other centre-left 
or social-democratic parties in Europe. They have 
not come up with a convincing alternative to 
austerity and have failed to cultivate a new genera-
tion of  dynamic and ambitious leaders that are in 
touch with key demographics. By favouring mass 
participation in the selection of  the party’s leader, 
and by creating complex and inflexible processes 
of  leadership challenge, they have made leaders 
less accountable, not more, and have undermined 
the organic checks and balances that operate 
within party elites.
Beyond party politics, this election is an in-
dication of  tectonic shifts both domestically and 
in Europe. It is a de facto recognition of  an in-
creasingly inevitable break-up of  the Union. What 
will the legitimacy of  the British government be 
in an SNP-dominated Scotland? And what will 
the relevance of  SNP MPs be in Westminster de-
bates? This feels like a transitional parliament and 
this is partly due to the main UK parties having 
legitimised this division over time through piece-
meal but symbolically important actions, such as 
creating separate Scottish-branded parties. 
Finally, in conjunction with a belligerent and 
disorganised Greek government that in its present 
form is not willing or able to pass and implement 
reforms that can adequately restore Greece’s 
position in the Eurozone, the fact that the UK 
will hold a referendum about its future in Europe, 
means that the EU has now itself  officially en-
tered a transitional phase. Whatever the outcome 
in either country, it is quite clear that the EU of  
2020 will be very different from the EU of  today. 
My bet – and at this moment one can only guess 
– is that we will eventually see a core of  western 
European countries integrating further, while 
various configurations of  integration and disinte-
gration emerge depending on perceived national 
interest and domestic pressures. This may prove 
to be inadequate to address complex and pressing 
global challenges (insecurity and conflict, climate 
change, immigration, Russia’s attitude, energy, 
organised crime, terrorism, global governance 
deficits etc) so the fact that, rather than talking 
about these issues and how to overcome them in 
a committed way, we will be discussing whether 
the UK should be part of  the EU in the first 
place, certainly weakens the EU itself  regardless 
of  the referendum’s actual outcome. 
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Former Shadow Chancellor Ed Balls makes a speech after losing his Morley and Outwood seat to Conservative Andrea Jenkyns by 
18,776 votes to 18,354 - a majority of 422 - after a recount. (Picture by: Dave Higgens / PA Wire/Press Association Images)
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Opinion poll failure and the unexpected  
Conservative majority revived memories of  the 
1992 election for many commentators. But, 
from the perspective of  political communica-
tion, 1987 is a more useful comparison. 
Then, as now, the centre-piece issues were 
economic competence (Conservative) versus 
trust to run the NHS (Labour). Then, as now, 
Labour was led by a young, new leader, regard-
ed by the Tories as a fatal weakness, but who 
managed to spearhead a surprisingly impressive 
campaign. Then, as now, the election ended in 
crushing defeat for Labour following a blitz 
of  fear messages from the Conservatives and 
their battering-rams in the press. Ed Miliband 
endured the kind of  Tory tabloid brutality not 
seen since Neil Kinnock led Labour.
There is at least one significant twist 
though. The 1987 campaign marked the emer-
gence of  Peter Mandelson, and the start of  the 
professionalisation of  Labour campaigning, 
culminating under Tony Blair with the most 
sophisticated and thorough political marketing 
seen in Britain yet. 
By contrast, Miliband’s tenure seemed 
almost contemptuously disregarding of  mod-
ern campaign wisdom: emotional connection 
with voters, clear political branding, and the 
importance of  news management and instant 
rebuttal. For almost five years it had been 
tough to work out what Labour’s national com-
munication strategy was, or even if  one existed. 
Occasionally, some messages seemed to gain 
traction for a while - one nation, the “squeezed 
middle” - and now and again individual Labour 
proposals briefly captured the agenda. Miliband 
had his moments, he occasionally flared with a 
bright light only to descend back to darkness 
for long periods. Weeks, sometimes months, 
seemed to pass with scarcely a memorable 
intervention from any Labour spokesperson 
as the coalition provided both the government 
and the opposition. 
Above all, Miliband’s team seemed not 
to have learned the key lesson that Kinnock’s 
campaigners drew from 1987; that oppositions 
have no chance unless they can engage gov-
ernments in at least a relatively close fight on 
the question of  economic competence. Team 
Miliband did little to rebut the accusation that 
Labour had created the deficit crisis and left the 
Tories to clear up the mess. Neither did it pres-
ent a clear and coherent strategy for growth. 
It was never clear if  a Miliband government 
would be willing to borrow or not, and if  not 
how would growth be achieved? The kind of  
opinion-former, media, academic and business 
endorsement so important to building percep-
tions of  New Labour competence were almost 
entirely absent for Project Miliband. Instead, 
as Owen Jones put it (Mirror, May 9) “random 
policies were flung into the ether” only to land 
as “incoherent mush” - “people didn’t know 
what Labour stood for”. 
In the end, it was Labour in the squeezed 
middle; assailed as Tory-lite by the boldly 
anti-austerity Scottish Nationalists, and as Red 
Ed reckless big spender by the Conservatives. 
Miliband had been bullied by the Tories, said 
Nicola Sturgeon; he would be bullied by SNP, 
said the Tories. Sturgeon captured the mantle 
of  the ‘progressive’ political brand, and the 
Conservatives held the badge of  competence. 
Miliband’s flurry of  policies, despite some re-
vival of  New Labour slogans, offered too little, 
too late to create identity.  
It seemed possible on the morning of  May 
7 that Ed Miliband might be the next prime 
minister. Had that happened this piece would 
have been more intriguing to write because the 
normal rules of  campaigning communication 
would have been shattered. It would have been 
a paradigm shifter. A sign that the usual chan-
nels of  brand-building and news management 
had been supplanted by new, different and 
perhaps Arnie Graf-inspired direct means of  
community engagement. 
By Friday morning, it seemed that the old 
rules still applied. The Conservative campaign, 
straight from the tried and trusted Lynton 
Crosby textbook, combined relentless attack 
on Labour’s weak points with strong core vote 
messages. It was not pretty and it lacked the 
warmth of  David Cameron’s modernising, 
compassionate conservatism of  2010. Even if  
it looked desperate at times, the basic underly-
ing focus on economic competence and fear of  
Labour, propped up by the SNP, was consist-
ent, comprehensible and apparently resonant. 
Across the country the political tectonic plates 
may have shifted, but this was political commu-
nication as usual. 
Extraordinary election, political communication 
as usual
Dr Margaret Scammell
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Confucius once opined that “signs and symbols rule 
the world – not words nor laws”. Nowhere is this 
more true than in contemporary electoral campaigns.
Symbolic language has always been a part of  
public political life, but recently its importance has 
multiplied. The 2015 General Election was saturat-
ed with symbolic constructions of  nationhood and 
identity, expressing and appealing to imaginations 
of  what it does and does not mean to be “British”. 
In recent decades this symbolic construction of  
nationhood has been confined to fringe nationalist 
groups with limited media exposure and appeal, 
but the recent Election demonstrated a growth 
in definitions of  community which are expressed 
through symbols. These symbols increasingly 
express an ominous concept returning to British 
political discourse: ethnic nationalism. 
Political communication – posters, pamphlets, 
the occasional bit of  flag-waving – has of  course 
always involved symbols, but under decades of  a 
dominant two-party system these symbols focused 
on mundane economic and political elements of  
life: symbols, images, and text endlessly repeating 
the old mantra of  schools, hospitals, and wages. 
Yet the 2015 campaign was markedly different due 
to two developments. 
First was the surge in expressions of  national-
ist identity, either pro-independence or pro-Union, 
surrounding the Scottish independence question. 
The old symbolic paraphernalia of  ethnic nation-
alism – flags, anthems, emotional appeals to a 
collective glorious history as independent Scots or 
unified Britons (collective histories which never 
really existed) – was dusted off  by both sides and 
triumphantly returned to public spaces. This surge 
in nationalist sentiment carried on into the Elec-
tion, influencing the symbolic communications 
of  parties across the UK in an electoral campaign 
more reminiscent of  Victorian populist jingoism 
than twenty-first century apathy.
The second development was the shift 
towards digital democracy in the form of  the 
televised Leaders’ Debates; not quite new, but 
groundbreaking in that for the first time we 
saw equal mass exposure in the Election for the 
Greens, UKIP, SNP, and Plaid Cymru. And with 
the exception of  the Greens, whose logo of  the 
entire planet communicates a vaguely transna-
tionalist ideology, these smaller parties preach the 
virtues of  what Benedict Anderson identified as an 
imagined community: appeals to a national identity 
which does not really exist but which is construct-
ed and communicated (often fiercely) through 
symbolic language sodden with expressions of  
who does and who does not, and who should and 
who should not, belong. 
The consequence of  these two developments 
was a seismic shift in symbolic communication 
from the traditions of  two main parties denounc-
ing each others’ dry manifestos to campaigns in 
which parties appealed not to rational policies but 
to irrational, emotional identities. While Labour 
simply recycled used images, other parties appealed 
to nationalist emotions. Conservative leaflets 
showed crudely-doctored images of  Ed Miliband 
and Alex Salmond embracing outside Downing 
Street. SNP posters unconvincingly changed the 
upholstery in the House of  Commons from drab 
green to gaudy tartan. UKIP posters awkward-
ly juxtaposed the White Cliffs of  Dover with 
escalators, while Plaid Cymru pamphlets brazenly 
detached the map of  Wales from the rest of  the 
UK altogether (for recent party literature, see 
Electionleaflets.org). The party propaganda of  
2015 appealed directly to symbolic constructions 
of  nationhood, expressing who does and does not 
belong to these various imagined communities 
which are defined not by any chosen affiliation but 
by inherited ethnicity. Fostering nationalism is a 
dangerous game to play, yet such is the power of  
symbolic communication that it has been reck-
lessly deployed to appeal to our hopes and fears, 
swaying voters from policies to feelings. For the 
very power of  nationalist symbolism is its appeal 
to raw emotion.
The Referendum and Election have provided 
a foundation for ethnic nationalism to creep back 
into British politics under the guise of  progressive 
politics, ostensibly legitimised through association 
with established parties. Those same parties are 
already preparing for the next test of  nationalist 
sentiment – do we want to be ‘European’, and 
yet again, do the Scots want to be ‘British’? These 
campaigns will see an even greater surge in the 
symbolic language of  flags, emblems, manufac-
tured histories, and fierce visual rhetoric surround-
ing our ethnic identities; enflaming and appealing 
to emotions which inevitably overwhelm rationalist 
thought in a tsunami of  ethnic symbolism. 
As we approach new referenda in which we 
are asked to choose our national identity/ies, sym-
bolic language will become even more significant. 
When the next leaflet is pushed through your 
letterbox, gaudily decorated with flags and icons 
and pithy proclamations that we must stay together 
or we must go our separate ways, don’t be too 
quick to display it in the window or toss it in the 
bin. Consider the power that those symbols have 
over your emotions, your identity, and ultimately 
your choice of  vote. What exactly about it stirs 
your feelings? Is it the words and policies, or signs 
and symbols? Perhaps Confucius was right after all. 
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The two inter-linked aspects of  this election cam-
paign I found most noteworthy were i) the extent to 
which the main parties, particularly Conservatives 
and Labour, insulated (protected) their leaders from 
direct contact – including depictions in the media 
– with members of  the public, and ii) each parties’ 
success in avoiding the central questions about their 
policies upon which an informed choice depended.
In an effort to avoid the kind of  ‘Gillian Duffy 
moment’ that sank Gordon Brown, this time 
around, the main parties went to great lengths to 
ensure that, whenever and wherever party leaders 
Cameron, Miliband and Clegg appeared in front 
of  photojournalists and television cameras, they 
were seen in carefully controlled and stage-managed 
settings against a background of  smiling supporters 
enthusiastically waving party signs and placards. 
The backdrop or ‘set’ against which a politician 
is seen has a subtle – but powerful – influence on 
our perceptions and therefore on our interpreta-
tions of  the event (have you noticed, for example, 
how often automobile advertisements are filmed 
in natural and idyllic surroundings – rather than in 
traffic jams or suburban sprawl?). Employing many 
of  the same visual communication strategies used 
to shape audiences’ attitudes towards consumer 
products, the organisers used these ‘pseudo-events’ 
to symbolically suggest the leaders’ popularity 
among the various ages, social and ethnic groups 
represented by the assembled crowds of  Conserva-
tive supporters, Labour supporters, and Liberal 
Democrat supporters.
And of  course, through the careful selection of  
those in close proximity to their leaders, the parties 
were also able to ensure that their leaders were not 
pressed – especially in the presence of  cameras 
and journalists – for answers to the questions (to 
the Conservatives: Where will the promised £12b 
reductions in social spending be made? To Labour: 
What is the projected cost of  your spending pro-
grammes?)  they consistently refused to provide and 
which voters required to make an informed choice 
about the direction and priorities of  UK society.
By carefully controlling the way in which the 
leaders were presented to the media, the parties 
made use of  an insight offered by Walter Lippmann 
(1922) on shaping public opinion:
“In order to conduct a propaganda [sic] there 
must be some barrier between the public and the 
event. Access to the real environment must be 
limited [in order to control] where they look, and at 
what. […]It is often very illuminating, therefore, to 
ask yourself  how you got at the facts on which you 
base your opinion.”
Comparing the various photographs made 
from different vantage points of  a Conservative 
rally in Wadebridge, Cornwall Isabel Hardman 
writing in the Spectator ably demonstrates a 
basic principle of  ‘visual syntax’ regularly used by 
newspaper photo editors: that when a photograph 
is tightly framed around a small group, it gives the 
impression of  a much larger crowd. 
The Conservative party’s Australian strategist, 
Lynton Crosby has clearly learned valuable lessons 
from American image consultants such as Michael 
Deaver whose work for US Presidents Ronald 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush included orches-
trating scenes for televised events that left powerful 
symbolic images in people’s minds. According to 
The New York Times, Deaver was responsible for 
“Reagan’s most memorable photographic back-
drops for public consumption”.
Reporting on the use of  such visual stagecraft 
to shape US public perception of  President George 
W. Bush’s economic plan, Elisabeth Bumiller of  The 
New York Times wrote:
“The White House has stocked its communi-
cations operation with people who are experts in 
lighting, camera angles and the importance of  back-
drops. At a speech promoting his economic plan, 
White House officials [asked] people in the crowd 
behind [the President] to take off  their ties […] so 
they would look more like the ordinary people the 
president said would benefit from his tax cut.”
Now, how many of  us had naïvely assumed 
that, shown against a background of  supporters 
while making his (certainly scripted) plea for the 
chance to carry out the next step of  the Conserva-
tives’ economic plan, Cameron appeared with rolled 
up shirt sleeves only because he was ‘pumped up’?
With ever greater control exercised by image 
consultants over the increasingly stage-managed 
appearances by politicians – whose public personas 
are already mediated through television and pho-
tojournalism, and whose every utterance will soon 
be vetted by continuous response measure (‘worm’ 
graphs) and focus groups – we will increasingly 
find (or worse, not notice) that we can no longer 
have confidence in the bases on which we make 
judgements about the character of  those standing 
for office. 
Coupled with the refusal to engage with the 
questions to which the public desperately wanted 
answers, these trends will only further exacerbate 
both the real and symbolic ‘distance’ between us 
and the politicians who claim to understand and 
represent our interests. Regrettably, these trends are 
likely to only gather momentum in future cam-
paigns. Caveat emptor.
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Political consultants, their strategies and the importa-
tion of new political communications techniques  
during the 2015 General Election
Political consulting – part of  a global, multi-bil-
lion dollar political communications industry – is 
an integral part of  contemporary election cam-
paigning. While overseas consultants, mainly from 
the United States, have assisted the Conservative 
and Labour parties in British general elections 
since the 1980s and 1990s respectively – helping 
them to shape campaign messages, strategies and 
tactics – the 2015 General Election witnessed 
them playing a much more prominent role.
The Australian Lynton Crosby was engaged 
by the Conservatives in 2012 and was joined the 
following year by Jim Messina from the Barack 
Obama campaign team. Crosby directed the Con-
servatives’ unsuccessful 2005 General Election 
campaign and Boris Johnson’s successful 2008 
and 2012 London Mayoral election campaigns. 
The American David Axelrod – who, along with 
Messina, engineered Obama’s successful 2008 
and 2012 presidential campaigns – was hired by 
Labour in 2014. The Liberal Democrats employed 
the South African Ryan Coatzee in 2012 to serve 
as special advisor to Nick Clegg and, in 2015, 
strategic director, while Ruwan Kodikara, from 
the Quiller consultancy, assumed the role of  head 
of  media and branding.
The Conservative campaign, tightly con-
trolled by Crosby, communicated three main 
messages: that Labour had ‘crashed the economy’, 
that only the Conservatives had a ‘long-term 
economic plan’, and that Ed Miliband was not a 
credible alternative. These themes were enthusi-
astically amplified by much of  the British press 
– evidenced by the Loughborough University 
Communication Research Centre and Open 
Democracy-Avaaz. Furthermore, a negative, 
highly personalized and sustained attack on 
Miliband was launched which surpassed that 
inflicted upon Neil Kinnock in 1992. Cros-
by’s 40-40 strategy involved targeting 40 seats, 
particularly those held by the Liberal Democrats, 
and defending a further 40 seats against Labour. 
Crosby conducted private polling in these 80 
constituencies, providing candidates with detailed 
information, while Messina, drawing upon the 
successful Obama model, used this information 
to construct a new database and voter profiling 
system. For much of  the campaign, opinion polls 
failed to show a Conservative lead and the Crosby 
approach was widely criticized. Having presciently 
advised masterclass students to ‘ignore the opin-
ion polls’, the expression of  such doubts may 
have been a controlled and diversionary tactic to 
suggest that the campaign was failing when, in 
reality, there was a ‘Team 2015’ force of  100,000 
volunteers assisting constituency activists in the 
target seats. The Conservatives deployed another 
effective tactic, known as wedge politics, which 
involves finding an issue that can be exploited to 
prise off  your opponent’s traditional supporters. 
Towards the end of  the campaign, the Conserv-
atives warned that a vote for rival parties would 
deliver a coalition or a minority government that 
was dependent upon the Scottish National Party. 
This would threaten the future of  the union and 
would result in higher public spending and debt. 
The deployment of  fear was effective and the 
Crosby strategy was an unexpected success; the 
Conservatives gained 28 seats and secured an 
overall majority of  331.
The Labour campaign, assisted by Axelrod, 
communicated two key messages: that Britain 
only succeeds when working people succeed – 
the so-called economic recovery having failed 
to solve the cost of  living crisis – and that the 
Conservatives constituted a threat to the National 
Health Service. Minimalist in nature, the Axelrod 
strategy was predicated on mobilizing Labour’s 
core supporters and thus gaining the 35 per cent 
of  the popular vote deemed necessary to deliver 
a majority. The party targeted 106 marginal seats 
with an army of  300 paid activists who helped 
to achieve Labour’s objective of  five million 
doorstep conversations; effectively used its 
Contact Creator database and new Nation Builder 
software to organize and support these activists; 
and, drawing upon the Obama model, attracted 
149,000 donations during the campaign as part 
of  a £2.7 million crowdsourcing operation. Al-
though hailed as the victor in the ‘ground war’ to 
encourage voter turnout, the party was ultimately 
defeated. The Axelrod strategy was an unmitigat-
ed disaster; Labour secured only 232 seats (24 less 
than in 2010).
The Liberal Democrat campaign, devised by 
Coatzee, emphasized their record as part of  the 
Coalition Government and communicated three 
main messages: that the Liberal Democrats, as 
Coalition partners, had moderated Conservative 
excesses, that the Liberal Democrats had, and 
would continue to, deliver economic competence 
and stability, and that the Liberal Democrats 
offered a centrist alternative to their rivals who 
were lurching to the left and right. This strat-
egy, of  splitting the difference, was predicated 
on defending existing Liberal Democrat seats. 
Tactically, the Liberal Democrats neglected to 
convey their liberal vision and instead presented 
themselves as a potential future coalition partner. 
The Coatzee strategy was an unmitigated disaster; 
the Liberal Democrats won only 8 seats (49 less 
than in 2010).
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For decades there has been a warning for view-
ers that it’s time to switch channels or to go and 
make a cup of  tea. 
From Anthony Eden batting away rehearsed 
questions, to John Major visiting his childhood 
home, and Tony Blair: The Movie; the messages 
were cosy, bland and uninspiring. They rarely 
made an impact unless as objects of  derision.
However, for this election the political 
parties have reinvented their use of  video and 
sought inspiration from the much maligned sta-
ple of  US Presidential elections: the attack ad.
Political advertising is forbidden under the 
UK’s broadcasting laws but by using YouTube 
and social media the parties have transmitted 
video messages to millions of  people. 
The Conservatives set the pace. One of  
their key theme was the danger of  allowing the 
SNP to prop up a weak Labour government. 
On March the 22nd, just before Parliament was 
dissolved, they published a polished animation 
showing Alex Salmond returning to Westminster 
to make Ed Miliband dance to his tune. It was 
short, smart and targeted – and, at the time of  
writing, it has been watched more than a quarter 
of  a million times on YouTube. 
The Tories have clearly learned lessons from 
their use of  poster and billboard advertising. 
A single strong image dominates their most 
successful video, the delicate mechanism of  
a clock being smashed by a sledgehammer. A 
heavy handed metaphor for Labour wrecking 
the economy but it has been viewed more than 
400,000 times on YouTube. 
In general Labour’s tone was more positive. 
There were highly produced celebrity endorse-
ments by actors such as Steve Coogan and 
Martin Freeman, and motivational videos ex-
tolling the virtues of  voting Labour. These were 
similar to the traditional PEB although, perhaps, 
with higher production standards. But Labour 
also made use of  short, sharable videos for 
social media. One that was particularly effective 
showed interviews with several Conservative 
ministers being evasive about plans to cut the 
top rate of  income tax. 
The parties’ video themes can broadly be 
broken down into three categories: attacking 
your opponents, positive message reinforcement, 
and endorsements – from both celebrities and 
“real” voters. Humour, as ever, played well. The 
Greens’ “Change the Tune” film featuring the 
other party leaders as a boy band racked up 
nearly 900,000 views on YouTube and more than 
9,000 likes. 
The use of  Facebook and Twitter is allow-
ing politicians to get their message straight to 
voters, cutting out the media middle-man. David 
Cameron’s Twitter account has more than a mil-
lion followers. A huge audience for videos such 
as the one he tweeted showing Alex Salmond 
joking he would write Labour’s budget speech – 
that was retweeted more than a thousand times.
Why is this happening now? It’s the con-
junction of  several things:  high levels of  smart-
phone use and ease of  access to video editing 
software, the extensive reach of  YouTube, Twit-
ter and Facebook, and the change in copyright 
law to allow humorous or satirical mash-ups has 
created a more permissive environment. 
With the unexpected success of  the Con-
servatives at this election, all the parties will 
want to draw lessons from a campaign that 
effectively delivered both positive and negative 
video messages directly to voters.
There now follows a party election broadcast
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The slow shift to the digital campaign: 
online political posters
In the 2010 election, despite some minor forays 
into emerging social media, the predominant tool 
of  choice for the parties was the by-then distinct-
ly old-school e-mail. UK elections have clung 
to traditional campaign tools like Party Election 
Broadcasts, and have seemingly been reluctant 
to fully embrace new developments like televised 
debates. The inclusion of  online campaigning into 
the electoral toolbox has been gradual and one of  
many techniques entering the mix has been online 
political posters. 
Posters in one form or another have been 
a feature of  election campaigns in the UK and 
elsewhere for over a hundred years. During this 
time their significance has shifted from being 
a toolof  direct persuasion and mobilisation to 
one of  media agenda setting. Conspiring to 
have billboard images reproduced on television, 
online news sites and in newspapers for free is a 
more cost-effective way of  getting the message 
out than paying for pricey billboard sites. In the 
2015 campaign posters were seemingly even less 
prominent, leading to claims of  the death of  the 
campaign poster. But while wide scale traditional 
print posters might be less attractive, the idea of  
the poster as a campaign tool has not disappeared 
and has re-emerged online, particularly through 
party presences on social media. So far, the use 
of  online posters has not drawn widespread 
attention, aside from the brief  furore surrounding 
Grant Shapps’ “beer and bingo” poster pub-
lished on Twitter in the wake of  the 2014 Budget. 
Nevertheless, they have quietly become a routine 
part of  party communication over social media.  
Oline political posters offer a potentially 
fruitful communication channel for parties, being 
comparatively cheap to produce and quick to 
distribute compared with traditional posters. The 
potential for online posters to go “viral” through 
social media, spreading exponentially as they 
are shared between users, is likely a big draw for 
political parties. Online posters often include ex-
plicit invitations to like and “share if  you agree”. 
Although online posters are sometimes straight 
digital reproductions of  existing billboards, or 
heavily influenced by traditional poster styles, 
they also have their own forms and styles. Most 
common are photographs, often of  party leaders, 
combined with simple slogans or statements; 
infographic images with charts also feature, as do 
images with text-only slogans. A series of  online 
posters based on Ed Miliband’s response to 
Jeremy Paxman’s Channel 4 interview question of  
whether he was tough enough to be Prime Min-
ister, proclaiming “Hell Yes, I’m voting Labour”, 
were a feature of  Labour’s Facebook page up to 
and including polling day. 
We have been tracking online political posters 
on Facebook since September 2013 up to polling 
day as part of  an ongoing study focusing on the 
main three parties plus UKIP, the Greens, Plaid 
Cymru and the SNP. From September 2013 
to polling day the parties released collectively 
approximately 2400 posters; 1018 of  these were 
posted between 1st March 2015 and 7th May 2015 
alone. On just one day (2nd April 2015) Plaid 
Cymru published over 80 posters in English and 
Welsh. Trends around the Scottish Independence 
Referendum and 2014 European Elections were 
less pronounced. Nonetheless, the permanent 
campaign is a reality online with online posters 
appearing nearly daily, even outside of  election 
periods and with a distinct increase before the 
General Election. 
Despite party efforts, both in implicit poster 
designs and through explicit appeals to share, we 
found little evidence so far that online posters 
frequently go viral, with shares in the thousands 
at most. Interestingly it has been online posters 
from UKIP and the Greens that have done best, 
averaging significantly more likes and shares than 
the traditional parties. Whilst still not a level play-
ing field, to a degree some of  the minor parties 
are outperforming the major parties on social 
media (if  not at the ballot box). 
The purpose online posters serve in con-
temporary digital campaigns remains unclear. 
Their failure to spread widely suggests they do 
not contribute much to persuading undecided 
voters. However, the continual presence of  online 
posters, even outside election periods, suggests 
they do play some kind of  ongoing role. They 
may be tools for agenda setting through message 
repetition over time, in a way not possible with 
traditional posters. Alternatively online posters 
could be more inward looking, communicating 
messages to strengthen the identity of  existing 
supporters. At a time when online supporters are 
rivalling and even outstripping the numbers of  
traditional party members, online posters may of-
fer a tool for parties to communicate ideas quickly 
and simply with supporters, as well as a conven-
ient way for supporters to express their own poli-
tics over social media by sharing party content. In 
that sense, online posters may have less in com-
mon with billboards and more with the humble 
constituency campaign window poster.
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Online persuasion at the 2015 General Election
This was the fifth UK General Election campaign 
at which the Internet has played a part, and given 
the proliferation in social media use since 2010 
many commentators expected it to play a key 
role.  The consensus of  most research has sug-
gested that the role of  web technologies has been 
primarily to offer information about the candi-
dates and parties. One respected web campaigner 
once said to me the Internet would not deliver 
the Holy Grail of  winning votes. So does this 
mean that party websites do not seek to change 
voting behaviour? I looked at 42 party websites to 
see if  they deliberately sought to use their website 
as a persuasive tool, to change behaviour, or 
merely to inform.
In recent years commercial companies have 
started to look at the application of  gamification, 
namely to apply aspects of  gaming to enhance 
relationships with web visitors. In the 2015 UK 
general Election gamification played no role with 
one important exception, the Conservative Party.  
They operated a points scheme, Share the Facts, 
designed to encourage interaction with their 
campaign. The scheme encourages supporters 
to share posts with others, those who sign up 
get points when they share posts, others click 
on their posts and if  people react to their posts.  
Every fortnight the top twenty point scorers 
on their leader board win a prize. Turning the 
campaign into a game with a competition and 
rewards is designed to convert their supporters 
into online active campaigners enhancing the 
Party’s official online campaign. Gamification has 
clearly not taken off  yet, but it will be interesting 
to see if  this one example becomes the norm 
for parties as they seek a competitive edge, or is 
largely forgotten?
Another example of  where parties have 
sought to apply the latest trends has been crowd-
funding. In October 2014 The Green Party 
announced that it was working with Crowdfunder 
to raise money from small donations to secure 
£50,000 to ‘bankroll’ 75 candidates. By the be-
ginning of  the election campaign they had raised 
nearly £75,000. In March 2015 the Scottish Na-
tional Party (SNP) similarly announced that it was 
turning to crowdfunding to support 21 election 
‘projects’, including Alex Salmond its previous 
leaders’ campaign to win a seat.  Both parties are 
seeking to capitalise online in the surge of  interest 
and support offline. 
A different approach to persuasion was 
provided by the Labour Party. I received an email 
about halfway through the campaign which in-
cluded the following:
“I’ve just put together a list of  everything our 
organisers will need to expand their operations. 
By my calculations, they need £111,300 for the 
penultimate week — and we need to raise that by 
midnight on Thursday if  we’re going to get the 
money out to the organisers in time. 
Nigel, if  there ever there was a time to join the 
20,388 others who’ve donated this month, this is 
it. Do your bit to help our campaign win as many 
votes as possible in the final two weeks of  this 
neck-and-neck election — it takes two minutes to 
donate.”
This appeal features a number of  well-used 
persuasion techniques. By using a very precise 
figure, £111,300, they are implying very clear 
costings, and also pique my interest. They provide 
a very short timeframe suggesting an urgency to 
act. And then they use social norms with 20,388 
already donating. This suggests that I will not be 
alone, rather following something many others 
have already done and so these numbers encour-
age compliance as something normal. Looking at 
this appeal as a whole I see a very clear persuasive 
message: there is a real problem, that there is a 
solution, that I can help to solve it and there are 
few barriers to stop me doing so. 
Of  course these reflections of  the 2015 
General Election campaign are only a snap shot 
of  the process of  online persuasion, they cannot 
offer an assessment of  what their effect has been. 
However, I would argue that UK political parties 
have sought to deliberately apply at least some 
persuasion theory to how they use their online 
presence, typically to mobilise supporters rather 
than change voters’ minds. I would expect this 
trend to increase in future campaigns.
Dr Nigel Jackson




Marketing the 2015 British General Election:  
the invisible campaign?
Writing this as the election contest closes and 
the results are announced, we might be forgiv-
en for asking if  the election campaigns have 
actually launched yet, or if  the leaders will ever 
address the problems facing our country? 
And so to the 2015 election marketing 
campaigns. At this point I click for my folder of  
campaign materials. This is normally bursting 
with content. This time the folder is anorexic. 
I am even struggling to remember the election 
marketing messages. The 2015 campaigns rep-
resent everything that is wrong with the market-
ing-politics marriage. Not because of  the under-
lying tensions between the use of  the marketing 
to sell democracy; but simply because marketing 
was so inexpertly applied. You would think that 
the parties’ campaign advisors would have a 
very good understanding of  marketing. Some 
of  them – such as David Axelrod and Lynton 
Crosby – were brought in from abroad for their 
strategic acumen. But as far as the application of  
marketing goes, they fell well short. 
Marketing politics is not like selling soap 
powder, it is different. Would detergent manu-
facturers launch their offerings on fuzzy strategy 
or hide or sideline their key offerings from 
consumers (voters)? Would they launch key mar-
keting messages and rapidly hide them on social 
media – away from enquiring minds of  ‘normal’ 
consumers?  Actually, would they learn how to 
(effectively) use social media first? Would they 
aim to shrink the marketplace to gain competi-
tive advantage, rather than focus on convincing 
consumers they are ‘the best’? Would they prem-
ise their marketing on who consumers should 
distrust the least, rather than whom they trust 
the most? If  this is unlikely for soap-powder, 
why it is deemed effective for the more cerebral 
choice-making of  voting? 
Of  course we all expected the respective 
campaigns to be digital. This election should 
have showcased expert and effective use of  
digital technology to engage all creeds within the 
electorate. We should not have had to hunt for 
party campaign messages. And this raises anoth-
er problem - the lack of  thought given on how 
to encourage the electorate to visit these digital 
sites to interact with the messages; if  indeed 
this was wanted, given demobilising opponent’s 
voters is a key strategic priority and not trust-(re)
building as claimed. 
Considering the campaign advisors attached 
to each party, and the predictions surrounding 
this election, we should have witnessed a more 
innovative and strategic use of  this technolo-
gy to convey rapid-fire reflexive, credible and 
visible messages that offer hope for the future. 
We saw shades of  this in the party’s ad execu-
tions on their digital TV channels, particularly 
from The Conservatives, but also in the PEBs 
from Labour and their pre-leadership debate ad 
accusing David Cameron of  hiding. 
While many commentators argue advertising 
is no longer useful or relevant to election cam-
paigning, it can crystallise fundamental messages 
and leader persona in a way that no other com-
munication technique can, thus setting the mood 
of  the campaign. It was this clarity of  mes-
sage that was invisible in the 2015 campaigns.  
Instead the campaigns were very noisy with 
debates, interviews and media commentary. The 
central election issues were hijacked by peripher-
al concerns; they were ‘slow’ and ‘off-message’. 
Of  course there were attempts to present these 
distilled messages, for example:
Conservatives: “Your worst nightmare… 
just got worse. The SNP would prop up Ed 
Milliband meaning chaos for Britain”.
LibDem: “£825 tax cut delivered to working 
families. Promise kept. Look left, look right, 
then cross.”
There were few examples of  simple single sen-
tences that said “this is who we are, this is what 
we stand for, this is what we offer and this is why 
you should vote for us”. So the core messages 
remained hidden. 
The 2015 campaigns will not become part 
of  each party’s mythology. “Demon Eyes” and 
“Labour isn’t working” still rule as magnifi-
cent examples of  the unique contribution of  
advertising. The spoof  election ads and the art 
student’s election ad poster competition illus-
trate there is a rich talent available to create the 
inspirational campaign messages of  the future. 
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‘Oh what a circus’: reflecting on the 2015 UK 
General Election as an event
It is not common those interested in the study of  
‘events’ to cast their attention towards elections. 
Common faire for their considered gaze tends to 
be large scale sporting, nation branding or cultural 
occasions such as the Olympic Games, Global 
Expos and the European Capital of  Culture. That 
may be, but general elections are highly significant 
events. They are, or at the very least should be, 
the defining event of  a representational democra-
cy. So how was this one?
As an event it was one that had a clearly 
anticipated scheduled performance. Following 
the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 we could all 
see this one coming from a long way off. More 
recently the provision in the Electoral Registra-
tion Administration Act 2013, brought into force 
in April last year, to dissolve parliament earlier, 
extended the joy of  the campaign by more than 
a week.  
The campaign itself  was very slick. Great 
election faux-pas of  the past were relegated to 
history in what was a smoothly delivered piece of  
extended performance art. In place of  the staged 
baby-kissing of  previous years, and party lead-
ers’ slightly awkwardly choreographed manoeu-
vres with the public, generating the slightly less 
awkward but mostly twee photo-ops by which we 
have previously been entertained, we were given 
selfie; social media savvy, viral marketing opportu-
nities combined with the odd sprinkling of  grand 
gesture posing. 
For the Conservatives the event opportunities 
began early, a good year before the election, with 
David Cameron challenging the media’s previous 
election debate proposal, which was planned to 
mirror their 2010 election coverage. The to and 
fro of  that debate with broadcast media only 
reaching agreement on the 21st March, five days 
before the first television debate. Cameron’s con-
tinuing brinkmanship doing a wonderful job of  
keeping media attention on his party, with subtle 
resonances of  the Conservatives being a party 
that could call the shots. Such pseudo-events, 
events that take place purely for their capacity to 
have their message reproduced, were to prove to 
be a central element of  this campaign.
Writing this on the day of  the election, the 
first TV debate’s title, ‘The Battle for Number 10’, 
which was watched by around 3 million viewers 
in the UK, now seems hollowly ironic - though at 
the time it felt slightly anachronistic as the media 
maintained a strong narrative that Britain was 
now in an era of  coalition government. Apart 
from the Question Time special on the 30th April 
the other debates sustained the rumour that the 
future government would be more patchwork 
than single hue. 
That impression of  precarity was not 
helped by party gestures towards line in the sand 
pseudo-events. The Liberal Democrat’s red lines 
being the first off  the starting blocks, but quickly 
followed by the Conservatives declaring legisla-
tion to lock-in various manifesto pledges. Gesture 
politicking hit some strange kitsch high, or is that 
low, with Ed Miliband’s stone tablet and its 6 
carved commitments. Whether you see that piece 
of  limestone as some form of  biblical metaphor 
or, as I did, an obscure reference to the monolith 
in 2001 A Space Odyssey, it was possibly one of  
the most surreal events of  the campaign. 
Crucially what was missing from the election 
was solid content. One could argue the headline 
‘acts’ were too similar. What few bursts of  colour 
there were came mainly from the supporting 
‘bands’. Elections, as I suggested at the start, 
should be the defining events of  a representa-
tional democracy, they are the opportunity for 
a political organisation to articulate a coherent 
and singular vision for how to address the issues 
they consider key to the future of  the nation 
and its people. However, the campaign was less 
event and more pseudo-events; beyond gesture 
it contained little by way of  coherent vision and 
argument. Macbeth’s comment that life is “but a 
walking shadow […] full of  sound and fury, sig-
nifying nothing” comes to mind. The form of  ar-
gumentation that dominated was of  the abductive 
variety; y will happen if  you vote x - if  you don’t 
want y, vote z. Such retro-reflexivity may make for 
a memorable rhetoric, but it is at the expense of  
policy exposition. 
As the final result is announced the Conserv-
atives have a working majority of  just 12 MPs, 
around a quarter of  that which John Major had 
in 1992. It would appear, that this defining event 
of  our representational democracy has a closing 
ceremony that is far from over.
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How do the former partners in a coalition 
government defend their record and, at the same 
time, reassert their distinctive identities? This 
process begins months before the general elec-
tion, of  course, but it intensifies during the short 
campaign and requires considerable rhetorical 
skill – especially for the smaller party, whose 
influence and achievements are often less visible 
to the public.  
David Cameron’s campaign rhetoric centred 
on the choice between competence and chaos. 
Drawing on the Conservatives’ reputation for 
sound economic management, he argued that his 
government’s policies were “getting the country 
on the right track”. Cameron marshalled factu-
al evidence to support this, claiming they had 
created two million jobs and halved the deficit 
while maintaining investment in the NHS. He 
also invoked the narrative of  the “fiscal mess” 
the government had inherited and expressed his 
eagerness to “finish the job that we’ve all started”. 
Here Cameron recalled the “we’re all in this 
together” mantra, with its echoes of  the ‘Dunkirk 
spirit’, and so sought to unite the public behind 
his party in a shared mission. He thus projected 
an image of  governing competence and strong 
leadership, while his acknowledgement that “it’s 
been a very difficult time” implies that the sac-
rifices made to secure the recovery must not be 
allowed to go to waste. 
Alongside this display of  competence, Cam-
eron fuelled fears of  a minority Labour govern-
ment held to ransom by the SNP. Again drawing 
on the deficit narrative, he warned of  a “coali-
tion of  chaos”, with “the SNP acting as the chain 
to Labour’s wrecking ball, running right through 
our economic recovery”. Indeed, he continued, 
“it will be you who pays the price […] with job 
losses, with massive tax rises, and an economy 
back on the brink of  bankruptcy”. The destruc-
tion metaphor heightened the emotional impact 
of  Cameron’s words, and so enhanced the persua-
sive power of  his claim that only a Conservative 
government would ensure the recovery contin-
ued. While the Party was criticised for a lacklustre 
campaign, the fusion of  its economic narrative 
with the ‘politics of  fear’ enabled it to confound 
expectations and win an overall majority.
The Liberal Democrats, meanwhile, em-
phasised their centrist credentials and their 
achievements in government. Thus, Nick Clegg 
expressed concern that the economic recovery 
would be threatened either by the Conservatives’ 
“ideological cuts” or by Labour’s allegedly irre-
sponsible borrowing, and argued that “we need 
to remain anchored in the centre ground so that 
we can finish the job of  balancing the books, but 
do it fairly”. To demonstrate the efficacy of  this 
approach, he reminded the electorate that the 
Liberal Democrats had, for instance, raised the 
income tax threshold and introduced the Pupil 
Premium, and so had helped to “create a stronger 
economy and a fairer society”. Indeed, if  given 
the opportunity to act as kingmaker in a subse-
quent coalition, the Liberal Democrats would 
“add a heart to a Conservative government and 
a brain to a Labour one”. Rather like the Wizard 
of  Oz, Clegg’s party would give their potential 
partners the qualities they needed to govern well, 
but which they currently lacked. 
Although the Liberal Democrats’ belief  in 
fairness was at the forefront of  their 2010 cam-
paign, it was soon subordinated to the Conserva-
tives’ deficit reduction strategy. In 2015 the Party 
revived this commitment in a bid to re-establish 
their distinctive identity, while appealing to their 
audience’s sense of  justice. To this end, they 
prioritised deficit reduction on the ground that 
it is unfair to burden future generations with the 
debt, and sought to distance themselves from 
the Conservatives’ approach. In particular, Clegg 
criticised their proposed £12 billion reduction in 
welfare spending as “very unfair”, asking Cam-
eron: “What are you going to do? Who are you 
going to hurt? Who’s going to bear the pain?”. 
However, this attack failed to convince due to the 
Liberal Democrat leadership’s capitulation to the 
Conservatives’ austerity programme, while Clegg’s 
efforts to present himself  as a principled politi-
cian sat uneasily with his U-turns on tuition fees 
and the ‘bedroom tax’. These apparent contradic-
tions gravely undermined the Liberal Democrats’ 
credibility and were surely a key factor in their 
crushing defeat on 7th May. 
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From the vantage point of  May 8th, the ‘Green 
Surge’ seems to have evaporated even more 
quickly than it appeared. Green Party member-
ship began to increase in April 2014 in the run 
up to the European Parliamentary election and 
then spiked in three waves between October 
2014 and January 2015, spurred on by the 
broadcasters’ initial plans to exclude the party 
from the TV debates. An Ofcom consultation 
published on January 8th denying the Greens 
major party status appeared to annoy sections 
of  the public enough to massively boost ap-
plications from new members, who signed up 
in their thousands the following week, at one 
point at a rate of  one every ten seconds. As 
well as putting Green Party membership ahead 
of  that of  UKIP and bringing much needed 
campaign revenue, public support climbed 
to new heights with an opinion poll in Janu-
ary putting Greens on 11 per cent, demoting 
Liberal Democrats to fifth place. The ‘What are 
you afraid of  boys?’ poster campaign of  19th 
January clearly touched a nerve amongst broad-
casters and political opponents with the smiling 
faces of  Lucas and Bennett used to mock the 
‘old boy’s club of  Westminster’. Within four 
days, the seven party TV debate had been 
announced, paving the way for two of  the most 
ideologically varied and gender balanced leader 
debates yet seen in UK politics. 
However, while the Green vote on May 
7th was the highest ever at over 1.1 million - a 
fourfold increase on 2010 - the party still only 
polled enough to win one MP, with just 3.8% 
of  the national vote. Indeed there was relief  
when Caroline Lucas held her seat (with a 
hugely improved majority) in Brighton Pavilion. 
While all the polls were over-optimistic about 
anti-Tory parties’ levels of  support(a trend 
which pollsters seem unable to learn from), 
Greens will be wondering what happened to 
the promise of  an electoral breakthrough.  
The media have made much of  two poor 
media performances by Natalie Bennett. Her 
‘brain fade’ on LBC radio, in particular, stood 
out and dogged her ability to shape the agenda 
positively. YouGov polling had identified a de-
cline in support by March after these interviews 
and many Green supporters no doubt mourned 
the lack of  a more seasoned and charismatic 
party leader, such as Caroline Lucas who stood 
aside in 2012. However, Lucas had been mod-
est enough to know she could not take on the 
task of  holding on to her Brighton seat, whilst 
leading a membership drive that involved tour-
ing the country and constant media attention. 
Indeed, the Green Party has been grateful to 
former Guardian Weekly editor Bennett for the 
Party’s leftward turn towards clearly articulated 
social justice and anti-austerity positions which 
sucked support from disaffected Liberalsand 
Labour supporters. Bennett showed that the 
Greens were not just about the environment, 
a perception that had been widely prevalent, 
especially amongst young voters. In fact, 
Bennett’s conscious strategy to challenge this 
led some scientists to hit out at the Greens in 
the final weeks of  the campaign for not saying 
enough about climate change. 
The Greens will learn from the election 
campaign, especially around the need to pre-
pare for tough media interviews. They now 
have more natural allies with the SNP and Plaid 
Cymru in the Commons and may help to form 
a stronger, more vocal anti-austerity block. 
They clearly stand to benefit from any further 
drift to the right by Labour and by the collapse 
of  the Liberal Democrats, and may be able to 
inflict more serious damage to both Parties at 
the next election.
Did the Green Surge make any difference?   
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The Conservative Party’s wholly unexpected 
election victory invites us to take stock of  the two 
significant  competing  structures  staged  in  the  
2015  General  Election  campaign:  those  of  
ordinariness and authenticity. 
In one of  his last campaigning events as lead-
er of  the Labour Party, the BBC Party Leaders’ 
Question Time (April 30th, BBC1), Ed Miliband 
referred to his Conservative counterpart, David 
Cameron, as “the other bloke.” Amid a per-
formance peppered with glottal stops, this was 
clearly an  attempt  by  Miliband,  a  man  known  
principally  for  his  “weirdness”,  to  sound  or-
dinary. Tellingly this use of  the term “bloke” was 
echoed by the self-styled revolutionary, Russell 
Brand, who exhorted his followers to vote Labour 
stating “this bloke will listen”. 
The delicate tightrope of  ordinariness is per-
haps best demonstrated by the brief  furore that 
ensued around Ed Miliband’s kitchen in March 
this year. At first, the Miliband decor was derided 
by the Daily Mail’s Sarah Vine as a “mirthless” 
vision of  utilitarian drab that foretold the Stalin-
istintent of   any potential Labour  government.  
However,  when it  emerged  that  the  kitchen  
in question was the smaller of  the two in his 
Kentish Town household, the same newspaper 
was quick to deride “two kitchens Miliband”. 
In stage-managing the photo shoot to portray the 
less opulent of  these rooms, the former Labour 
Leader was, they claimed, hypocritical in pur-
porting to  represent  the  interests  of   “working  
people”,  yet  seeming  to  enjoy  a  considerably  
more comfortable existence than most.  
The Conservative  party, too, have attempt-
ed to construct  themselves  as the  “true party  
of  working people.” Despite widespread public 
knowledge of  David Cameron’s privileged past, 
the Prime Minister has sought in some fashion to 
portray himself  as “one of  us”. This has included 
name-checking West Ham as his football team 
of  choice, when he supposedly favours the other 
claret-and-blue squad, Aston Villa, and getting 
pink-faced about how “pumped” he is about 
his chances at the ballot box. In turn, George 
Osborne was despatched around the country to 
visit a series of  businesses, typically relating to en-
gineering or low-level manufacturing. Fortuitous-
ly, these premises typically require their visitors to 
don fluorescent jackets and hard hats, allowing for 
a  variety  of  photo opportunities of  Osborne  
briefly  assuming  the identity of   the hard-work-
ing folk whose interests he claims to represent.  
Haunting the ordinary, of  course, is its brash-
er cousin, the authentic. The former, particularly 
when it goes awry, can be seen as a patronising 
attempt to debase oneself, to be “just like you.” 
By contrast the authentic creates a sense of  being 
what one appears to be, where the image present-
ed accords with public knowledge of  that person’s 
life experiences. In this regard Boris Johnson,  
the  current  Mayor  of   London,  and  now  also 
elected  Member  of   Parliament  for Uxbridge 
and South Ruislip emerges as among the most 
“authentic” of  politicians. Thus, when he accom-
panies Osborne on one of  his factory jaunts, his 
unease in the requisite fluorescent apparel, and 
bluster makes clear that the high-vis jacket has 
never found its way to the Johnson wardrobe. 
The tug-of-war between ordinariness and au-
thenticity that has occurred throughout this elec-
tion campaign bespeaks two different conceptions 
of  the role of  Prime Minister. With the UK’s 
(duly opulent)  constitutional  monarchy,  ordinar-
iness  is  built  into  the  role  of   Prime  Minister. 
Considered the first among equals, she or he sits 
in a House of  Commons, while the ermine-clad 
Lords recall Britain’s feudal past in more lavish 
surroundings. In contrast, authenticity is the mo-
dus operandi of  celebrity, wherein the celebrity’s 
sole offering is the force of  their personality and 
the fraught labour of  “being themselves.”  
As television election events gain in impor-
tance, politicians are increasingly required to 
assume the role of  authentic celebrities who are 
also sufficient ordinary to maintain credibility. For 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats, licking their 
wounds as they assess their losses, they will need 
to track down an authentically ordinary figurehead.
Ordinariness and authenticity in the 2015 
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Scottish nationalism in the 2015 UK General Election
While one of  the great mythologies of  recent 
Scottish political identity has been its ideological 
difference from the rest of  the UK, few elections 
can have been so sharply divided along national 
lines as this one. Much of  this stemmed from 
the claims and accusations around nationalism – 
Scottish and English, civic and otherwise – that 
permeated the various party campaigns. Such 
discourses gathered impetus from misplaced 
predictions of  a minority administration, with the 
attending threat of  a resurgent Scottish National 
Party holding the balance of  power over Labour, 
or a minority Conservative administration at the 
mercy of  UKIP. A longer analysis would attend 
to the role of  Plaid Cymru in Wales, but within 
the space and scope of  this short piece, I offer 
the suggestion that 2015 gave us two discrete 
campaigns, one centred in England and anoth-
er in Scotland, and these were joined in their 
fixation with the Scottish National Party. So how 
did the prominence of  the SNP impact upon the 
campaign, and are there lessons we can draw?  
Several pieces of  interim research are signif-
icant in understanding the place of  the SNP in 
this election. One major election study, being un-
dertaken by Loughborough University Communi-
cation Research Centre, reports that coverage of  
the SNP in UK-wide media was significant in vol-
ume and generally negative in tone. Much of  this 
UK-wide coverage confirms recent expectations 
on the personalisation of  politics, and points 
to the agenda-setting capacity of  the televised 
leaders’ debates: attention has centred on leader 
and Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, who 
polls suggested performed strongly in the tele-
vised debates, even drawing clichéd comparisons 
with Margaret Thatcher. While she was high in 
public esteem, the representation of  Sturgeon as 
a powerful leader was interpreted less approvingly 
across much of  the UK newspaper coverage, 
producing contrasts such as that between UK Sun 
newspaper’s mock-up of  a tartan-clad Sturgeon 
on a wrecking ball, against the Scottish edition’s 
later portrayal of  Sturgeon as Star Wars heroine 
Princess Leia. 
Another timely piece of  marketing research 
looked at levels of  political engagement within 
Scotland. This study, from the Keller Fay Group, 
found that the SNP inspired significantly more 
public conversation than other parties. Even 
removing the SNP and their Sturgeon factor, this 
research found that those in Scotland were more 
likely to be discussing politics than elsewhere in 
the UK. This was borne out by the voter turn-
out rates at the election itself: just over 71% in 
Scotland, compared with under 66% in England 
and Wales. Other findings, written up by Green 
and Prosser of  the British Election Study, further 
propose that this engagement was shaped by the 
Scottish independence question, contributing to 
arguments that issue-based politics may bring 
their own forms of  alignment, and that these 
may be every bit as entrenched as the tribal party 
politics to precede them. 
In sum, this one-time focus on Scotland 
across the UK can be explained by the erroneous 
anticipation of  a hung parliament, coupled with 
the novelty of  Sturgeon.  But in just what ways 
do the intensive levels of  participation in Scotland 
result from last year’s independence referendum?  
There is, of  course, a residual and substan-
tial commitment to Scottish independence: the 
“emphatic rejection” of  unionist political rhetoric 
amounted to 45% support. But more than this, 
across social media, and to a lesser extent in 
party campaign communication, the incongruous 
2014 party alliances of  “Better Together” versus 
“Yes Scotland” continue to colour individual and 
party profiles. The chief  victims of  this have 
been Scottish Labour, who, amongst their target 
electorate, suffered gravely from their association 
with the Conservatives. The political discourse of  
Scotland has a tradition of  such malign associa-
tions – the SNP as “Tartan Tories” and Labour as 
the “Red Tories” – and while a genuine Labour/
Conservative pact was an unusual alliance, the 
mutations of  political pragmatism cast up by 
referenda may yet emerge in different forms over 
the parliament to come. 
As well as tracking the impact of  issue 
politics on party perception, research into this 
and future elections might look more at the 
division of  the election at the sub-state level. One 
compelling distinction has been the divergent 
formations of  nationalism, articulated with the 
political right in England and the political left in 
Scotland and Wales, making vivid the contrasting 
conditions within which strands of  discussion 
may be interpreted and translated into political 
affiliation. To account for localised formations 
more fully, future accounts should certainly ex-
tend research across and within the nations of  the 
UK to include a more sophisticated account of  
regionality: continuing the process of  devolution 
within political communication itself.
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7th May 2015 was the second time in just over seven 
months that the people of  Scotland visited the poll-
ing booths. The General Election rapidly followed 
the Scottish Referendum on Independence, which was 
held in September 2014 and in which the majority 
of  voters rejected the notion that Scotland should 
be an independent country. GE2015 saw a huge 
swing to the SNP, leaving the three unionist parties, 
The Conservative, Labour and Liberal  
Democrat parties, with only one Scottish seat each. 
The General Election Campaign was as 
robust and rigorously discussed on social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter – indeed 
it was the most discussed topic on these plat-
forms in the approach to 7th May – as Scottish 
Independence had been a few months previously. 
Social media have much to offer politicians as 
they enable the political parties to control their 
representation and campaign messages in a way 
that is not possible on offline platforms such as 
television and newspapers. They also have much 
to offer voters, particularly a means of  connect-
ing not only to the parties, but also fellow voters 
– and not only those who share support for the 
relevant party.
Both the Scottish Referendum and 2015 
General Election campaigns saw politicians and 
political parties make great use of  page and ac-
count visitors by inviting them share posts and to 
adopt party and campaign logos as their personal 
profile image thus encouraging them to become 
online canvassers. The adoption of  political logos 
and sharing of  campaign posts ensured that 
these political messages reached wider audiences 
through Twitter and Facebook user’s networks of  
friends and followers, including those who were 
not perhaps politically engaged. As Castells (2007) 
notes, information no longer flows only vertically, 
but also horizontally on new media platforms.
As such, social media can be a double-edged 
sword for political campaign. For parties, activists 
and engaged citizens can do much of  the ‘work’ 
of  persuasive communication on their behalf. But 
a campaign also can lose control of  the message 
when in the hands of  the public. My on-going 
analysis of  the Facebook and Twitter accounts 
of  the political parties in General Election 2015 
found that they were not only home to messages 
of  support, but also of  trolling, condemnation 
and abuse from supporters from the various other 
political parties contesting the General Election. 
On the SNP page, much of  this abuse was based 
on the election campaign messages from op-
posing parties. For example, some claimed that 
Scotland is financially dependent on the rest of  
the United Kingdom and therefore ‘ungrateful’ 
to their union masters. Others pleaded solidarity: 
that as a progressive party the SNP would split 
the Labour vote in Scotland, and that votes for 
the SNP would result in a Conservative govern-
ment. These comments were representations of  
the focus on the SNP by the three main opposi-
tion parties, whose campaigns were heavily critical 
of  the nationalists. While this could be expected, 
the unionist parties’ and supporters’ campaign 
messages bore a close resemblance to the Better 
Together Campaign in the approach to the Ref-
erendum vote. Whilst these messages did enough 
to keep the union together in the 2014 Referen-
dum, they utterly failed in 2015.
Party Facebook pages thus allow for more 
unfettered access and interaction between rival 
political activists. Here, we see some perhaps 
predictable trends. Alongside the parroting of  key 
campaign messages, we also see citizens talking 
past each other (much like party leaders do). But 
party pages are intensely political spaces. Move 
beyond these and you begin to see less heat and 
more light. Studies of  political behaviour on 
Facebook demonstrate that political discussion, 
engagement and action can emerge here, but 
often between the cracks of  political spaces and 
everyday ones. The key for political campaigns is 
to master the latter. 
From the Scottish Referendum 2014 to the  
General Election 2015 
Dr Margot Buchanan 
Teaching Assistant in 
Communications, Media 
and Culture at the School 
of the Arts and Humanities, 
University of Stirling. 
55
For many months before the election those 
of  us surveying the political scene in Scotland 
had stopped asking if  there would be an SNP 
surge and had instead, been asking how big 
it would be. On the night of  the election the 
biggest exit poll predicted 58 seats for the SNP, 
Telegraph editor Alan Cochrane said he would be 
‘astonished’ if  this was the outcome and even 
the SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon tweeted that 
the exit poll needed to be treated with ‘HUGE 
caution’. Scotland is a traditional Labour Party 
heartland and the decimation of  their contin-
gent of  41 MP’s seemed scarcely believable.
On the night, the Labour Party in Scotland 
was reduced to a single parliamentarian. Ian 
Murray who was defending one of  the slimmest 
majorities in the election emerged victorious in 
Edinburgh South. Murray, now the Labour Par-
ty’s sole representative for Scotland in Westmin-
ster for the Labour Party, has previously broken 
ranks with his Party on the issue of  Trident 
renewal, which, like his SNP adversaries, he op-
poses. Stopping the renewal of  Britain’s nuclear 
deterrent is a key issue for the SNP and the 
political slogan ‘Bairns not Bombs’ resonates 
with the Scottish electorate. 
As the election night unfolded the SNP 
won 56 of  the 59 available seats in Scotland, 
an incredible result which left only a single MP 
for the Labour Party, Conservative Party and 
the Liberal Democrats. The real losers on the 
night were Scottish Labour and their demise 
was ultimately underpinned by a growing lack 
of  trust in the media and political classes which 
has been exacerbated by conflicting messages as 
journalists and politicians tailor their arguments 
to differing electorates in Scotland and England.
During last year’s Independence referen-
dum Alistair Darling the leader of  the ‘Better 
Together’ campaign,  argued that the NHS was 
not in danger of  privatisation and that not even 
Margaret Thatcher would dare to go so far. 
Meanwhile in England, Shadow Health Secre-
tary Andy Burnham was campaigning against 
the privatisation of  the NHS by the Coalition 
Government. The NHS was portrayed by the 
Labour Party as being safe in Scotland yet 
under threat of  privatisation in England. This 
background meant that Ed Miliband’s strategy 
of  ‘weaponising’ the NHS was greeted with 
incredulity by many voters north of  the border 
during the General Election campaign.
This pattern of  conflicting messages from 
the Labour Party continued throughout the 
general election. As the polls looked increasing-
ly desperate, Scottish Labour leader Jim Murphy 
attempted to fight the SNP from the left by 
promising to protect Scotland from spending 
cuts. However when this topic was broached in 
England, Chuka Umunna, the shadow business 
secretary, responding to fears about the poten-
tial influence of  the SNP in a Westminster coali-
tion, stated plainly that ‘the leader of  the Scot-
tish Labour Party will not be in charge of  the 
UK budget’. Labour attempted to appear fiscally 
responsible to English voters while promising 
Scottish voters that they would oppose spend-
ing cuts. These mixed messages emphasised 
a fundamental breakdown in trust between 
the Labour Party and the Scottish electorate, 
particularly amongst ‘Yes’ voters who had not 
forgiven the Labour Party for campaigning with 
the Conservatives during the referendum.
This breakdown in trust also extended to 
the pro-Unionist media, during the referendum 
Alan Cochrane, the political editor of  the Scot-
tish Daily Telegraph was asked by Alistair Darling 
to spike a story which might damage the ‘No 
campaign. Cochrane argued that ‘It’s not really 
good journalism but what the hell does jour-
nalism matter? This is much more important’. 
This blatant partisanship amongst journalists 
also led to mixed messages North and South 
of  the border. The English edition of  the Daily 
Express warned during that referendum cam-
paign of  a ‘Pension shock for millions’ while 
the Scottish edition tweaked the same story 
under the amended headline ‘Pensions safer 
within the UK’. 
During this election campaign The Sun has 
also produced contradictory campaigns arguing 
in Scotland that the SNP will safeguard Scots 
interests while insisting in England that the SNP 
would force England into ‘five years of  misery’. 
This partisan campaigning by the press has led 
to a situation whereby:
‘Half  of  Scotland has simply stopped 
believing anything they read in the papers, even 
if  it is true’.
This partisan coverage has also driven the rise 
of  a counter movement of  pro-Nationalist me-
dia in Scotland. However this is equally partisan, 
one columnist for the National, the new pro-In-
dependence newspaper in Scotland was one 
of  the 56 newly elected SNP MP’s. This raises 
some serious questions about journalists’ failure 
to provide voters with a ‘fourth estate’ and 
strategic questions for the Labour Party about 
how they can tailor separate campaigns to both 
the Scottish and English electorate in the age of  
social media.
One nation and two messages: how Scotland has become 
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Northern Ireland in the 2015 General Election
With the unprecedented surge in support for 
SNP, and Plaid Cymru leader Leanne Wood’s 
strong performance in televised media debates, 
Scotland and Wales received a great deal of  
attention in the 2015 election. Less so Northern 
Ireland: left out of  the leader’s debates, and large-
ly under the radar for most of  the campaign, the 
province’s parties also failed to be of  interest to 
any potential coalition given the ultimate Con-
servative majority. 
For the vast majority of  Northern Ireland, 
it was business as usual, with only two of  the 18 
seats changing hands. On the unionist side, an 
election pact between the UUP (Ulster Unionist 
Party) and the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party) 
saw only one candidate fielded from the two 
parties in each of  four constituencies – North 
Belfast, East Belfast, Fermanagh and South 
Tyrone, and Newry and Armagh. This appears to 
have worked well, with Tom Elliott winning the 
UUP Fermanagh and South Tyrone from Sinn 
Féin’s Michelle Gildernew.  
Elsewhere, the DUP lost South Antrim to the 
UUP but regained East Belfast from Alliance to 
ultimately retain 8 Westminster seats. A popular 
MLA (Member of  the Legislative Assembly at 
Stormont), Danny Kinahan UUP, scored a nar-
row victory over the DUP’s Rev. Willy McCrea, to 
win South Antrim for his party. This is a strong 
showing for the UUP and now puts them back at 
Westminster, having lost their one potential MP 
in 2010 following her defection from the party to 
stand independently. 
Alliance’s sole MP, Naomi Long, fondly 
referred to in her tightly fought election campaign 
in East Belfast as the “Ginger Ninja”, won her 
seat in 2010 from Northern Irish First Minister 
and (then) DUP MP, Peter Robinson. Robinson, 
whose private financial affairs led to him being 
referred in the press at this point as a member of  
the “Swish Family Robinson”, was punished at 
the ballot box by an electorate that saw him as out 
of  touch. This was a bitter defeat for the DUP, 
and winning back East Belfast was a key target for 
their campaign this time around. Former Belfast 
mayor, Gavin Robinson of  DUP, now represents 
the constituency. 
Nationalist politics were generally quieter. 
The loss of  Fermanagh and South Tyrone for 
Sinn Féin will smart, but as the party traditionally 
do not take their seats in Westminster, it is less of  
an issue for them. The SDLP (Social Democratic 
and Labour Party) retained their three seats. Lead-
er Alisdair McDonnell’s victory in South Belfast 
means that there will now be a by-election for his 
MLA seat in the same constituency, as parties’ 
commitment to ending double jobbing (acting as 
both MP and MLA) is phased in.  
Despite one or two upsets, Northern Irish 
politics look set to continue as normal. There are 
some interesting points, however, which will be 
important for the larger British parties to note. 
Cameron’s majority is slim, and DUP/UUP votes 
could help him on certain policies; equally, DUP 
Eurosceptics could team up with rogue Tory 
backbenchers to cause him problems. Whilst 
the Scottish lion may indeed have roared, it is 
important to think about what this might mean 
for nationalism (of  various hues) in Northern Ire-
land. Sinn Féin are currently set to make big gains 
in the Irish Daíl elections within the next year: if  
they do well, will that embolden the party to make 
calls for a referendum on the constitutional ques-
tion in Northern Ireland? Equally, with the UUP 
back at Westminster, is this a sign that moderate, 
centrist unionism might be making a comeback 
in the face of  a long period of  DUP dominance? 
As in Scotland and Wales, next year’s election for 
the devolved Assembly at Stormont will be a key 
litmus test. 
BBC coverage of  election night failed to 
make substantive reference to any Northern Irish 
parties, largely lumping them all together in the 
category of  ‘Other’. Had the polls been correct, 
and Labour and the Tories been neck and neck 
in terms of  seats, then perhaps more interest 
might have been paid to the DUP’s fortunes, and 
Northern Ireland more generally. As it is, the 
province’s MPs look set to remain largely irrele-
vant to mainstream arguments and central votes 
in this parliament. For the province, plus ca change, 
plus c’est la meme chose.
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Wales: Plaid Cymru and Labour’s media 
message fails in target seats
As in the rest of  the UK, both the left-wing 
parties’ own data and media messages failed to 
properly gauge the mood of  the voters in Wales 
before Election Day.
It had been expected that Labour would 
possible gain three seats, with Arfon, Cardiff  
North and Cardiff  Central all in the mix.
As it happened, they gained Cardiff  Cen-
tral due to the Liberal Democrat collapse but 
fell further behind in the other two, as well as 
losing both the Vale of  Clwyd and Gower to 
the Conservatives.
It wasn’t simply that seats these seats 
changed hands, but rather their symbolism 
– particularly on the Gower, which had been 
under Labour control for over 100 years.
In terms of  the actual share of  the vote, 
there was little movement on five years ago, 
apart from a large swing towards UKIP and the 
Liberal Democrat collapse.
Unlike in England, YouGov’s generic poll-
ing was within the margin of  error in Wales, 
but inclined towards slightly the Conservatives 
on Election Day.
It seems rather that it was within the par-
ties’ own internal data, regarding where these 
votes would go, that the failure to predict the 
outcome was most acute.
Labour attacked unwinnable seats when 
they should have been on the defensive. Plaid, 
too, got it wrong, ploughing resources into in-
creasing already healthy majorities in Arfon and 
Carmarthen East and Dinefwr in the belief  that 
they were being threatened by Labour.
They also spoke with confidence of  gaining 
Llanelli and Ceredigion, while never coming 
close, while striking a more pessimistic tone on 
Anglesey where they came within 200 votes.
This confusion regarding where to best de-
ploy their resources suggest neither are making 
best use of  the voter identification data now 
available to them. 
The Conservatives, in the meantime, 
launched their campaign on Gower – a seat 
most media commentators considered beyond 
them – and prospered.
In the meantime, the election will throw up 
further questions about the importance of  so-
cial media and the mainstream media as ends in 
themselves towards ensuring election success.
Plaid Cymru have long bemoaned the fact 
that they have not received as much coverage 
as their competitors, a situation partly rectified 
this year by leader Leanne Wood’s inclusion in 
the leader’s debates.
They were also inordinately busy on social 
media; their candidate in Ceredigion, Mike 
Parker, produced slick Facebook videos for 
each of  the communities he had visited. Their 
combined efforts produced less than a percent-
age point rise in the vote on the last election.
Labour also struggled in this regard. Their 
general, UK-wide messages about the bedroom 
tax and incomers increased already huge major-
ities in the valleys, but did not have the desired 
effect in their relatively prosperous target seats.
The popular leader of  Welsh Labour, 
Carwyn Jones took a back seat, while unfamiliar 
rising star Owen Smith, MP for Pontypridd and 
the shadow Welsh secretary, lead the campaign.
Perhaps both parties will come to the con-
clusion that it is what they say and how they say 
it, rather than how many people it reaches, that 
matters in the long run.
For the result of  the Wales has challenged 
many assumptions as to where the country 
stands on the political spectrum.
The Conservatives may well use their mod-
est triumph to argue that Wales and Scotland 
are a different kettle of  fish - between them the 
Conservatives and UKIP managed 40.8% of  
the vote.
Tuesday morning’s (12th May) Western Mail 
front page – ‘Home rule out’ says Welsh Secre-
tary Stephen Crabb – suggests that may well be 
the case.
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It was a tweet from a local woman at 9.45am on 
Friday 8th May that best captured the scene: “A 
multicolour city retaining its multicolour reputa-
tion...green, red and blue!”  
In the end, Brighton and Hove’s Left couldn’t 
manage its hoped-for clean sweep. On a night 
when Labour’s UK-wide trouncing defied all pre-
dictions, the city’s easterly constituency, Brighton 
Kemptown, clung tenuously to the Conservatives. 
Yet none of  this stopped its two other seats, 
Brighton Pavilion and Hove, delivering a defiant 
two-fingered salute to the Tory tide engulfing the 
rest of  southern England.   
The distinctive three-marginal nature of  
Brighton and Hove had made it a focus of  La-
bour’s ‘ground-war’ in the months running up to 
7 May. Given the city’s status as Britain’s  leading  
Green  stronghold  (until  48  hours after  the  
general  election,  it boasted  the  party’s  only  
council), Labour  always  faced  a  tricky  tactical  
voting mission, as it sought to portray a Green 
vote as an expensive luxury in Kemptown’s tight 
two-horse race. Indeed, on Albion Hill – a ‘muesli 
mountain’ street sliced down the  middle  by  the  
constituency’s  northern  boundary -  there  was  
evidence  of  confusion among some residents 
and campaigners right up to polling-day, with 
‘Vote Green’  posters  endorsing  Caroline  Lucas  
(incumbent Pavilion  candidate)  being pushed 
through letter-boxes, and decorating some win-
dows, even on Kemptown’s side of  the road. With 
YouGov’s UK Polling Report quoting ground 
intelligence from UKIP signalling its growing 
popularity among ‘disgruntled Labour voters’ in 
working-class Whitehawk, Labour’s approach to 
addressing any misunderstandings about electoral  
boundaries  (and  margins)  became  ever-more  
unorthodox. On  28  April, stalwart  Labour  war-
rior Tom Watson  tweeted  a photo of  himself  
and his  party’s Kemptown hopeful, Nancy Platts, 
promoting ‘Green voting Labour’ posters they 
had printed to recruit anti-Tory voters determined 
to advertise where their true loyalties lay.  More  
controversial  was  the  initiative  shown  by  one  
over-zealous  Labour volunteer, who was publicly 
disowned by Platts for posting letters through 
the doors of  Kemptown homes displaying Green 
Party posters warning them that ‘Greens and Lib 
Dems split the left-leaning vote’ in 2010, allowing 
Conservative insurgent Simon Kirby to win, and 
‘only Labour’ had ‘a realistic chance’ of  clawing 
the seat back. Yet no  amount  of   effort  could  
prevent  Kirby  clinging  onto  Kemptown,  a  
patchwork constituency fusing the cosmopolitan 
‘pink pound’ terrain of  Kemptown Village with 
a strip of  true-blue coastal suburbs – albeit with 
his lead over Labour halved to 690. That this gap 
could so easily have been compensated for by the 
857 extra votes the Greens gained on 2010 or the 
6.6% jump in share that delivered UKIP a boost 
of  3,062 only rubbed salt into Platts’ wounds.  
Labour’s crumb of  comfort in the small 
hours came from Hove, where it defied the 
script steadily being inked in through defeats up 
and down England to stick to the earlier draft 
prepared in the long months when polls placed it 
neck-and-neck with the Tories. The departure of  
single-term Conservative MP Mike Weatherley, 
combined with anecdotal evidence from YouGov 
that 2010 Liberal Democrat defectors were re-
turning to Labour, inched Peter Kyle to a slender 
1,236-vote victory.   
But the biggest story, as ever, came from 
Brighton Pavilion: Britain’s sole existing Green 
fiefdom and the city’s signature seat, carving a 
swathe from the seafront up through  its  north-
ern  and  western  suburbs. Back  in  the  days  
when Labour still enjoyed a steady six-point lead 
in UK-wide opinion polls, this was one of  its 
targets. With Brighton’s ‘super-Thursday’ looming 
closer (the vote to re-elect or remove its increas-
ingly unpopular Green council set for the same 
day), the two-way ground-war seemed to have en-
tered a confused final phase. On residential streets 
close to the city-centre, some voters’ conflicted 
intentions were all-too evident: a common sight 
was Labour and Green posters displayed side-by-
side in the same front window. In one, a scribbled 
note explained that the householder(s) supported 
Lucas but backed the reds ‘for the council’. Lucas 
herself  – boosted mid-campaign by an open letter 
of  endorsement signed by, among others, Joanna 
Lumley and Sir David Attenborough –  could  
be  found  until  Wednesday  evening  canvass-
ing  outside  schools  in  her Hanover  heartland  
(which  duly  returned  two  of   the  Greens’ 
eleven  surviving councillors). And a home-
made cardboard sign propped against a chair 
on one local street urged passers-by to re-elect 
Lucas - reminding less-informed citizens they had 
four votes, not one, on polling-day. By Friday, it 
had been replaced by a similarly makeshift affair 
thanking locals for delivering her ‘increased ma-
jority of  c.8,000’.  
What ‘multicolour’ Brighton and Hove 
has told us, then, is that, politically, it is unlike 
anywhere else in the South. By Sunday, an image 
was going viral on social media depicting the city 
as a stubborn red-green stain on an otherwise 
unblemished blue carpet. As one  (much-‘liked’)  
poster joked  on Facebook: “You are now enter-
ing Brighton and Hove. Please have your pass-
ports ready.”
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Green Party leader Natalie Bennett (left) with Brighton Pavilion parliamentary candidate Caroline Lucas during the launch of the 




Civil society is generally not party political (with 
the exception of  the trade unions and arguably 
the growing nationalist movement), but address-
es political issues. News coverage of  election 
campaigns, in contrast, has long, though perhaps 
increasingly, been focused more on the horse-
race than the political substance. What’s more, 
voting is assumed to be individual, and therefore 
predominantly a pragmatically self-interested act. 
There would seem to be little room, then, for or-
ganised citizens taking action to express a public 
opinion (acknowledging multiple publics and not 
just a simplistic aggregation), or to place pres-
sure on parties to accommodate those concerns 
in their manifestos. Instead, election reporting 
is dominated by opinion polls and voter panels 
constituted to be representative of  a local – but 
not a policy or issue-based – constituency and are 
asked only to respond to what they are offered by 
the politicians and to judge their performances.  
However, over the course of  the previous 
parliamentary term, civil society organisations, 
associations and protest groups have been cred-
ited with some policy influence: notably Citizens 
UK over the end to detention of  immigrant 
children and UK Uncut on the introduction of  a 
General Anti-Abuse Rule to tackle corporate tax 
avoidance. Protests during the campaign simi-
larly opposed specific policies of  the previous 
government and demanded their reversal, such as 
ending the bedroom tax and other public sector 
cuts, more social housing, and more effective tax 
avoidance measures.  
Nonetheless, protest was given predictably 
little attention during the campaign, and rarely 
portrayed as an expression of  public opinion on 
formal politics or policy proposals. In the rare 
instances where the press made reference to the 
anti-austerity movement it was as an alternative 
form of  engagement with politics, contrasted to 
voting. For instance, UK Uncut were mentioned 
just three times during the election, despite a 
relatively popular social media campaign. In 
one, Armando Inannucci reports how he urged 
young people at a school event not to reject vot-
ing in favour of  single-issue politics, in a second 
Guardian columnist Zoe Williams is criticised 
for suggesting in her latest book that, since the 
mainstream parties are locked in a fight for the 
centre ground, we should look to civil society for 
political change. Owen Jones, however, makes 
a more specific argument that both those who 
say that protest doesn’t work and those who 
say voting is pointless are wrong, arguing that 
activists won Labour Party commitments on tax 
avoidance, the bedroom tax, zero-hours contracts, 
and reversing privatisation in the NHS, which 
were both testament to the power of  protest and 
reason to vote Labour.   
Indeed, in as far as the anti-austerity agen-
da was prominently addressed in the media, it 
was overwhelmingly via politicians, not least in 
relation to the leader debates – but it was the 
minority parties that made these representations, 
and SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon’s invitation/
challenge to Miliband that drew all the attention.  
Of  course the Green Party has emerged from civil 
society, and yet further in the margins, other civil 
society organisations fielded candidates, including 
the Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition and 
even anarchist Class War, though only The Daily 
Politics interviewed them.  
Where protest did make headlines, it was as 
part of  the ‘SNP threat’ newsframe, using the 
aggressive heckling of  Scottish Labour leader 
Jim Murphy by nationalist campaigners to smear 
the party by association. However, it is in the 
wake of  the result that the conservative press 
has returned to traditional delegitimisation of  
protest. Despite giving UK Uncut some credit for 
raising the issue of  tax avoidance, and displaying 
begrudging tolerance of  Occupy LSX, the Daily 
Mail now warns of  “left wing fanatics”, “rabble 
rousers” and “extremists”, the latter apparently 
referring to all 45,000 people who have joined the 
Facebook event page for The People’s Assembly 
anti-austerity protest.  
The more formal and sober Citizens UK, 
however, did receive some favourable attention 
(25 newspaper articles) though mostly in The 
Guardian, Observer, Independent and Mirror.  Since 
Cameron’s refusal to take part in an election 
debate with Ed Miliband was a big story before 
the formal campaign had even started, his refusal 
to take part in a Citizens UK hustings event at-
tended by both by both Clegg and Miliband fitted 
the news agenda, much as in 2010 when the same 
event attracted attention for hosting Gordon 
Brown’s first and only well-received speech of  the 
campaign. However, the discussion format was 
rather different from the TV debates, with politi-
cians asked to respond to the policy agenda set by 
Citizens UK’s member organisations (mostly faith 
groups, trade unions, schools and university de-
partments), followed up by working parties tasked 
with developing policy proposals, whilst others 
provide testimony of  the issues at hand. This sub-
tle challenge to the way election politics is done 
was given more recognition this time round, and 
may be one to watch in 2020. 
Election news coverage and civil society
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‘A storm of groans and shouts’:  
the media and hustings 
In Charles Dickens’ The Pickwick Papers (1836), 
a hustings in Eatanswill between the indefat-
igably opposed Buffs and Blues is conducted 
among “a troubled sea of  heads [...] from 
whence arose a storm of  groans, and shouts, and 
yells, and hootings that would have done honour 
to an earthquake.”
Having contested two Parliamentary elections 
I have taken part in many hustings. None have 
been so riotous that “an uproar reduced him to 
the necessity of  expressing his feelings by serious 
pantomime” as one candidate is forced to do in 
the book.
In his history of  hustings, Jon Lawrence 
(2009) says that despite efforts to tame poli-
tics, the election meeting flourished with lively 
encounters, particularly during the Edwardian pe-
riod. After the First World War, while technology 
allowed candidates to be better heard, meetings 
also became more ordered.
The hustings I have participated in have all 
been organised and taken place in churches; so 
are naturally sober. The opinions expressed may 
be vehement and booing and heckling does hap-
pen, but there is no loss of  control.
The ritual at these events is the same. The 
candidates shake hands and exchange pained 
jokes. They are given the rules by the chair and 
asked to abide by his (it is always a he) command. 
A selection of  questions submitted in advance 
are read out and each candidate given a couple 
of  minutes to answer. From the sitting MP to 
the pub landlord who stood as an afterthought, 
everyone is treated equally. The audience is 
packed with supporters but also with genuinely 
interested residents.
This is Habermas’ public sphere in operation. 
The rules in these hustings are simple because 
underlying them is a complex set of  unspoken 
social norms and moral guides.
Consider instead the 2010 leader debates 
which were ordered by a 76-point document 
that addressed everything from audience selec-
tion to cutaways.
Similarly, if  less comprehensive, the last of  
my hustings had been organised by Malmesbury 
Abbey and was then chosen to be recorded by 
the local BBC radio. The BBC arranged for for-
mer Channel 4 political editor Elinor Goodman 
to chair. 
Candidates were emailed, without debate, bul-
let points on procedure. Among its requirements 
was: “If  you wish to interject, ensure you make 
this clear to our presenter – talking over each oth-
er will not work on radio.” We were also told that 
we may be cut short if  we spoke more than others 
and therefore breached BBC guidelines.
Meanwhile people could not just turn up but 
had to apply for tickets in advance and state their 
political allegiances.
The questions themselves were interspersed 
with a “quick fire section”. A woman who was 
just about to turn 18 had the burden of  rep-
resenting the first time voter. She picked out 
questions from a hat which we had to answer in 
one sentence.
One question was: “Does social media help 
freedom of  speech?” and Goodman asked me 
why I “looked as if  I was sucking on a lemon”. 
I pointed out that as a journalism lecturer we’d 
spend more than a sentence considering such a 
question – but I stilled bowed to the demands 
of  the event.This appears to be the very notion 
of  the colonisation of  the political sphere by the 
media sphere. 
The hustings, an arena where politicians are 
neither filtered or screened, has been reduced to a 
pseudo event. It masqueraded as a public meeting. 
When I asked if  I could respond standing up as I 
normally do, the BBC production team were hor-
rified. The microphones would not pick me up I 
was told. This in a building designed a thousand 
years ago for public addresses.
And most irritatingly; it was the most 
informative hustings I attended. Primarily this 
was because Goodman chaired it very well. She 
probed candidates who made superficial com-
ments. Rather than let each person respond with 
a shopping list of  promises she elicited a range of  
answers to draw out political and ethical ideas. 
Just as media logic dictates leader debates are 
now part of  the general election ritual, hustings 
may be going the same way.
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When David Cameron  took  office  in  2010,  
the  new  government  introduced a  change  
of  direction by proclaiming a new relationship 
between the state and voluntary organisations and 
charities  which  was  promoted  as  the  ‘Big  So-
ciety’.  While  the  initiative  had  been described 
as being visionary by some, other critics claimed 
that the idea was not new at all. Five years later, a 
report published by the think tank Civil Exchange 
acknowledged that the ‘Big Society’ project had 
failed to deliver most of  its promises. A survey 
carried out in June 2014 found that, overall, 
charities appeared to be ‘disillusioned’ with what 
politicians and the ‘Big Society’ had brought 
them. Another study claimed that four in five 
voluntary sector workers are of  the opinion that 
charities have not been given enough attention in 
the run-up of  this year’s election. 
The bottom line here is that this election is 
exceptionally important for charities who want 
to speak out on behalf  of  the people they work 
for and demand policy changes for the future. 
Campaigning and advocating are important ways 
for non-profits to raise awareness of  the issues 
that are essential to them. However, major barri-
ers had been put into place in January 2014 that 
significantly affect non-profits’ ability to carry out 
both activities. 
The ‘Transparency of  Lobbying, Non-party 
Campaigning and Trade Union Administration 
Act 2014’, better known as the ‘Lobbying Act’, 
was imposed to restrict campaigning of  chari-
tableorganisations on regulated activities, such 
as political campaigning for policy change, in a 
constituency during a regulated period. The act 
has by some been named the ‘Gagging Law’. It 
sparked outrage amongst charities which felt that 
this could have a ‘chilling effect’ on their cam-
paigning activities. Charities also feared it could 
make it impossible for them to build coalitions to 
tackle larger issues such as climate change because 
the act remains somewhat imprecise as to what 
falls within its legislation, making an unintended 
infringement of  the law more likely. 
What did charities do during the general 
election? Using social media such as Twitter was 
vital for charities in this year’s election. Mak-
ing social media an integral part of  campaigns 
allowed them to directly engage with the public 
and parliamentary candidates and make their issue 
the subject of  discussion and debate. Charities 
were able to raise awareness and strengthen  their  
visibility  by  using  clever  ideas. By  jumping  
onto  the  #GE2015  hashtag bandwagon and 
sharing pictures and videos, charities created a 
buzz around their causes which made some of  
those campaigns tremendously effective and suc-
cessful. And there are some exceptional examples 
of  how to do this best. For example, the ‘100 
stories in 100 days’ campaign by  Scope  UK  
used  #100days100stories  in  combination  with 
#GE2015  to  give  a voice to disabled people. By 
letting them tell their own stories, the campaign 
encouraged people without disabilities to better 
understand them. Another example is the ‘Hear 
my voice’ campaign of  Mencap UK, which had 
already been running for a few months with the 
purpose  of   drawing  attention  to  people  with  
learning  disabilities.  The  campaign,  which 
spread via #hearmyvoice, allowed people to con-
tribute their own stories but also gave them the  
opportunity  to  email  their  MPs.  As  a  result,  
a remarkable  number  of   parliamentary candi-
dates  have  signed  up  to  the  campaign  thus  
far.  This  year’s  best-practices  for campaigning 
have also seen a squirrel called Bob standing for 
election as part of  an attempt to advocate the 
protection of  wildlife. To date 1,098 politicians 
have signed Bob’s petition and 120,819 support-
ers have voted for him - a stunning victory for a 
small squirrel.  
What  are  the  effects  of   these  social  
media  campaigns?  Of   course,  they  only  work  
if  politicians stick to their pledges. Therefore the 
election could only be the beginning for social 
change, and charities and the public will have to 
hold politicians accountable if  they don’t keep 
their promises. Given the vague interpretation 
of  the act, this will not be a simple task. Early 
analysis of  the consequences of  the Lobbying Act 
revealed that some charities have toned  down  
their  campaigns  thus  curtailing  the  debate  on  
marginalised  issues.  Others, however, did not 
roll back from their proactive approach. What 
is certain is that the new legislation has fuelled 
uncertainty over the extent to which certain activ-
ities are allowed and has also increased bureaucra-
cy for charities. With a new Conservative gov-
ernment ruling Britain for the next five years, it 
is unlikely that the Lobbying Act will be revoked 
soon, which leaves  charities  unsure  about  the  
possibilities  for  their  campaigning  strategies  
in  the aftermath of  the election. Nevertheless, 
social media sites such as Twitter allow charities 
to speak up in favour of  those not able to do 
so - both during and outside of  election periods. 
Therefore,  charities  should  be  able to  advocate 
for their causes  and  thus  make the ‘Big Society’ 
more responsive, prolific, and engaging.
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Data journalism and the 2015 UK General Election
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Unlike the US – where Nate Silver became a post-
er boy of  data journalism during the last election - 
the genre has had minimal impact on UK election 
coverage. Instead, it could be argued that the 
biggest impact has come from outside journalism: 
the ‘civic tech’ movement of  MySociety, Tweet-
minster and Democracy Club.
Although MySociety tools were used by 
Channel 4 as early as the 2005 election in 2015 
dozens of  Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) 
have had a significant presence inside and outside 
of  news coverage across the board. Matthew 
Smith, creator of  the VAA Fantasy Frontbench, 
believes the 2015 election campaign has been “the 
first where Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) 
have reached a level of  maturity where their use 
can no longer be said to be insignificant.”
Many of  the tools built by users of  Democ-
racy Club – a mailing list for civic coders - have 
built the foundations that journalists and pub-
lishers then used in their coverage, including for-
mal partnerships between VoteMatch and Verto 
with the Telegraph, Huffington Post and Independent.
Trinity Mirror’s ‘Find My Seat’ widget, for 
example, allowed readers of  their regional titles to 
find out their local candidates and swing needed to 
change MP - but also facts on the local economy, 
cost of  living, immigration, health and pensions.
Data journalism has also proved an irresisti-
ble method for explaining the complexities of  co-
alition-building to audiences: the BBC, Guardian, 
FT and Sky all created interactives or calculators 
for users to ‘build their own majority’. 
Social media itself  has been a key source 
of  data in a number of  news organisations: The 
Mirror’s Tweetometer showed the top performing 
tweets from politicians’ accounts, Sky’s ‘Social 
Election’ tracker monitored a range of  metrics, 
and the  ‘Twitter Worm’ was used by the Sun, 
LBC, ITV, BBC and others. All of  these raise 
concerns about how representative Twitter users 
are of  the wider population, how accurate senti-
ment analysis is, and how well news organisations 
are communicating these issues to users. 
In 2010 the only branded factchecking op-
eration was Channel 4’s FactCheck but in 2015 it 
was joined by the Guardian’s Reality Check and the 
BBC’s identically-named project. Notably this was 
integrated into the corporation’s live online cov-
erage of  the leaders’ debates and Question Time. 
Elsewhere the Media Standards Trust’s Election 
Unspun, and FullFact played key roles.
Trinity Mirror’s establishing of  a central data 
unit in 2013 has been pivotal, providing the re-
sources to create innovative data driven coverage 
at a local level such as the My Manifesto project 
and data-driven reporting on key claims, gender 
representation, campaign spending. The Guardi-
an’s hiring of  Alberto Nardelli from Tweetmin-
ster to run its data team was a significant move 
and has contributed to particularly sophisticated 
(both editorially and technically) election coverage 
from the newspaper. And in the broadcasting 
sector a combined data and visual unit has helped 
to position BBC as a leader when it comes to 
interactive election coverage.
Elsewhere the influence of  Nate Silver on 
political and financial publishers such as the New 
Statesman, Economist and FT has been striking, 
with many shifting to a more informed analysis 
rooted in data, alongside tools that are useful to 
its audiences.
So was this the data journalism election? No. 
Instead the emphasis has been largely on social 
and mobile. In that sense, it has been the ‘so-
cial media election’. Perhaps next time, with the 
coders firmly in place, we will truly see the first 
data-driven election.
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Life as a Member of  Parliament can be a 
dangerous business. Not only do our elect-
ed representatives have to deal with their 
demanding constituents, while avoiding the 
wrath of  their party whip, but they also have 
to repel thousands-upon-thousands of  zom-
bies. These are not the undead looking to feast 
on the flesh of  parliamentarians, but members 
of  the political activist movement, 38 Degrees, 
who Simon Burns MP accused of  “frightening 
people and getting them, almost zombie-like, to 
send in emails”. 
This critique, made in response to their 
campaign to halt the reorganisation of  the 
National Health Service (NHS) in 2011, has 
stuck to 38 Degrees. Widely known for their 
use of  mass email and online petitions, the 
movement is often dismissed by journalists 
and politicians as being ‘online only’. Oscar 
Rickett has argued that these seemingly easy 
and low-cost forms of  engagement are largely 
ineffective. They create an illusion that one is 
having a meaningful political impact without 
bringing substantive policy change. However, 
as their activism during the general election 
campaign shows, this is a misinterpretation. 
In January the staff  at 38 Degrees 
launched an online poll, asking for the input 
of  their members into the formation of  their 
campaign strategy. Over 135,000 members 
took part. The results underlined the NHS as 
the most important issue for their member-
ship in the upcoming election. Rank and file 
members were also involved in tactical deci-
sion-making, highlighting that efforts should 
be concentrated on raising voter awareness on 
these important issues. 
What became known as the ‘Save Our 
NHS’ campaign took a number of  forms. 
As is typical for the movement, the internet 
played an integral role in its strategy. For 
example, two videos were shared on social 
media, one which featured the actor Michael 
Sheen, and the other amplifying 38 Degrees 
members’ own experiences of  the NHS. With 
over 900,000 views, these viral videos were an 
effective way of  both encouraging people to 
register to vote whilst also sharing the prior-
ities of  38 Degrees. An e-petition was also 
created for each of  the 650 constituencies. 
These localised e-petitions marked a key turn-
ing point in switching the spatial focus from 
the national to the local-level.
Through the use of  an online election 
hub, members were given the tools to organ-
ise meet-ups and plan campaign activities 
within their constituencies. While the central 
team provided videos and materials to as-
sist in the formation and running of  these 
groups, they were otherwise independently 
managed and autonomously run. On April 
25th a national day of  action was held. While 
the majority of  38 Degrees activists did take 
part from the comfort of  their computer 
screens, over 11,000 members took to high 
streets the length-and-breadth of  Britain to 
advocate their cause. The staff  of  38 Degrees 
intentionally design their campaigns in this 
staggered manner to enable members to select 
their level of  involvement based on their own 
personal context.
The organization also used phone-banks 
to talk to voters in marginal constituencies. 
Volunteers were recruited, online and offline, 
with emphasis placed on involving those with 
links to the health services. Members were 
not canvassing for candidates, given that the 
movement is nonpartisan, but instead were 
informing voters about what different parties 
stood for on key issues related to the NHS.
Therefore, it is important to recognise 
that 38 Degrees is not an online-only cam-
paigning organisation. Given their success in 
mobilising citizens online, they are labelled as 
such. But this reductionist approach masks the 
real-space actions that the movement organ-
ise. The ‘Save Our NHS’ campaign illustrates 
how digital communication supports a diverse 
repertoire of  political actions. With a network 
of  over 2.5 million disaffected ‘zombies’, 
expect 38 Degrees to play a prominent role in 
opposition to the Conservative government 
and in politics more generally over the next 
five years.
Zombies on the high street:  
38 degrees and the ‘Save Our NHS’ campaign
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The Independent heralded 6th May 2010 as ‘the 
people’s election’ – the election which would 
exploit media platforms to return democracy to 
the people. It is not clear this was achieved. On 
7th May 2015 the same paper, less ambitiously, 
went simply with ‘Over to you’.
Hansard’s 2014 Audit of  Political Engage-
ment noted that only seven per cent of  Britain’s 
electorate felt social media offered ‘an effec-
tive means of  holding politicians to account.’ 
Nevertheless, key interests in the 2015 campaign 
argued that social media would revitalize popular 
democracy. On 2nd November 2013 Labour 
strategist Douglas Alexander had told The 
Guardian that social media would represent a 
‘priceless’ tool in the campaign; seventeen days 
later BBC News had suggested that social media 
might make 2015 the ‘first really digital general 
election in the UK’ – a message the corporation 
echoed on 10th February 2015 when they asked 
if  Britain was about to witness its ‘first social 
media election’. This would (as The Guardian had 
said four days earlier) be ‘the first election when 
social has reached higher user penetration within 
the UK than traditional media.’ 
The following month, Twitter’s Head of  
News, Government and Elections announced 
this would be the UK’s first ‘Twitter election’ 
– predicting three-quarters of  young tweeters 
would vote. As The Guardian reported, Twitter’s 
data suggested that ‘one in three 18-to-34-year-
old users changed their vote from one party to 
another based on what they’d seen on the site.’ 
It was unclear, however, whether these shifts in 
political allegiance would persist as far as the bal-
lot box. The previous October Darren Lilleker 
had reminded The Independent that (if  the election 
were, as the paper had suggested, ‘the first to be 
dominated by social media’) we might note the 
paucity of  ‘serious political comment’ in Twitter 
responses to political events. 
In February 2015, Saatchi & Saatchi’s chief  
strategy officer supposed the political impact of  
social media was ‘massively overrated’ and the 
following month YouGov’s founder declared 
social media strategies remained woefully 
monological: ‘parties are using social media to 
deliver leaflets.’
So why the hype? Why, as reported in 
February, were the Conservatives spending 
£100,000 a month on Facebook – especially 
when, as the Chairman of  Public Affairs at 
Weber Shandwick told Total Politics, ‘it looks a 
bit like the johnny-no-mates big political parties 
looking to buy friends’?
Had this emphasis on social media come 
from those in the media, politics and political 
marketing who stood most to benefit by the no-
tion that elections would be won on Twitter? In 
considering the impact of  social media upon the 
election (and in the absence of  quantitative data 
as yet uncollated, unpublished and undisputed) it 
seems worth pausing to note some of  the head-
lining social media stories of  the campaign.
April 2015 saw UKIP’s Steve Latham de-
scribe Islam as an ‘evil cult’ on Facebook – but 
that seemed par for the course for a party whose 
glitterati had over the previous year tweeted that 
Westminster Cathedral was a mosque, that Islam 
bore comparison with the Third Reich, that 
Muslims were ‘devil’s kids’ and that immigrants 
in general were ‘scum’. The day before the poll, 
however, it became clear that UKIP candidates 
did not need social media to disseminate views 
as damaging as racially motivated death threats 
against a potential future Prime Minister.
The #BBCdebate hashtag was used more 
than 400,000 times on the night of  the opposi-
tion debate – making it briefly Twitter’s trendiest 
topic. By then, the SNP’s hashtags had proven 
the most popular in Twitter’s elections streams, 
a popularity barely dented when David Cameron 
tweeted footage of  Alex Salmond boasting he 
would write Labour’s budget.
A senior Scots Labourite caused embar-
rassment when he tweeted that Labour voters 
should vote tactically for other parties. Nick 
Griffin bolstered SNP support when he tweeted 
a photo suggesting they favoured black Scots-
men wearing kilts. Ed Miliband’s popularity was 
boosted when Sun columnist Katie Hopkins 
tweeted she would emigrate if  he were elected, 
and when, amidst other hashtag confusions, 
teenaged girls took #milifandom viral. By the 
end of  April David Cameron had achieved 
the honour of  beating social media celebrity 
Cameron Dallas to being Twitter’s most men-
tioned Cameron, allegations had arisen as to a 
senior Tory’s Wikipedian shenanigans, and Nick 
Clegg’s wife had revealed her family’s secret 
cookery blog on Mumsnet.
With #DogsAtPollingStations trending 
above #Democracy, what difference did all 
this trivia make? Four days before the election 
the BBC’s Brian Wheeler suggested that ‘the 
ceaseless torrent of  updates on social media’ had 
made ‘it more difficult to focus on the bigger 
picture.’ Had social media fostered interactive 
nation-building consensus or merely trivialized, 
personalized, fragmented and negativized the 
deliberations of  public sphere? As the BBC’s 
Nick Robinson blogged the day before the poll, 
‘it wasn’t meant to be like this…’
The politics of social media
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There were some notable social media events in 
the election of  2015. Party election broadcasts 
such as the Green’s ‘Changing the Tune’ or 
the Labour Party’s ‘What’s the Choice in this 
Election?’ gained significant second audiences 
online. There was also the rise of  ‘Milifandom’, 
which – depending on your perspective – was 
slightly peculiar cult of  personality around Ed 
Miliband or a serious critique of  the bias of  the 
traditional print media’s coverage of  the Labour 
leader.  Additionally, Labour was able to use the 
web to raise relatively large sums of  donations 
from supporters. 
These examples and others that could be 
cited point to a couple of  important issues about 
the role of  social media in the 2015 election. 
First, as Andrew Chadwick has argued on his 
work on media hybridity, the idea that this was 
to be a social media election to the exclusion of  
other forms of  media is misplaced. Rather, old 
and new media co-exist, feeding off  each other. 
Older formats, such as Party Election Broad-
casts, find a second life online, while online phe-
nomenon such as Milifandom are turbocharged 
by television and newspaper coverage.
A second point is perhaps the most obvious 
one, given the ultimate outcome of  the elec-
tion: throughout the campaign, Labour seemed 
to have a significant dominance in the online 
space, at least in terms of  the very crass metrics 
employed by some marketing firms. On April 
27th for example, Media Week said “The La-
bour Party is winning the social media election 
battle with its policymakers broadcasting nearly 
double the number of  posts as Conservatives.” 
However, such efforts did not, as it turned out, 
transform into any kind of  electoral success 
(although it should be noted that the story was 
rather different in Scotland, where the SNP’s 
landslide was underpinned by a vibrant online 
effort. Even here though, it is not clear to what 
extent this changed the course of  the election).
The Media Week quote points to a significant 
problem with election-related social media met-
rics – companies, organisations and researchers 
producing this work invariably have “skin in the 
game”, and are often seeking to raise the profile 
of  products they want to sell to the private 
sector or government. Thus they have a vested 
interest in talking up the “social media election” 
narrative. Furthermore, since the analysis is 
frequently done using proprietary datasets and 
tools, the methodology employed is rarely trans-
parent and subject to external examination. 
There is also a broader epistemological 
problem with social media monitoring. Very little 
consideration has actually been given to what is 
being measured, and how it fits into theories of  
public opinion. It may be, as Ben O’Loughlin 
and I have argued in a recent article, that analy-
sis of  social media environments such as Twitter 
should not be treated like polling data that can 
be divided into percentages indicating support. 
Rather, there needs to be much more thought 
as to what the unit of  the analysis is (whether 
it is individual comments, individual users or 
conversations?). Historic parallels provide useful 
ways of  thinking about social media data, which 
might be less like opinion polls and more akin 
to older manifestations of  public opinion, such 
as town hall meetings or the mass observation 
survey. An important next step to thinking in 
this way is to consider what the results of  social 
media monitoring means for an election. It may 
not – as appears to be the case in 2015 – be a 
good way of  predicting the result. But it might 
offer us other, equally valuable types of  insights.  
However, we should not dismiss the role 
of  social media in the election. Like an iceberg, 
we would be misled if  we only assessed what is 
visible. In contrast to our knowledge about very 
public online activism (especially that organised 
by Labour), we know far less about so-called 
micro-targeting. Micro-targeting involves iden-
tifying very specific sections of  the electorate 
required for overall success and then commu-
nicating with them in a highly personalised way. 
Conservative victories in the South West, for ex-
ample, where what was once a Liberal Democrat 
stronghold was completely overrun, suggests a 
highly effective targeting of  resources. 
In order to practice micro-targeting effec-
tively, political parties need to combine huge 
amounts of  data. As well as their legacy canvass-
ing databases, they will also, if  they can afford 
it, purchase corporate databases such as Mosaic. 
Additionally – also at a cost – they now have a 
powerful new source of  information: data har-
vested from social media sites. Combining these 
datasets creates a potent tool for segmenting and 
targeting the electorate. There will need to be a 
lot more research to find out exactly what role 
such analytics played in the outcome of  the elec-
tion. But it is possible, in this way at least, that it 
really was a social media election. 
Was this the ‘social media election’? We don’t 
know yet
Dr Nick Anstead
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Citizen engagement in the dual-screened  
election campaign
Citizens’ engagement with politics is evolving 
due to the growing popularity of  dual screening: 
the bundle of  practices associated with using an 
internet-connected device, such as a laptop, tablet, 
or smartphone, to access social media, particularly 
the popular microblogging platform Twitter, to 
find out about and discuss live broadcasts. Over 
the last five years dual screening has become 
widespread across a range of  television genres 
but it is most significant during what Daniel 
Dayan and Elihu Katz (1992) once termed “me-
dia events”: live broadcasts of  culturally-resonant, 
ritualistic, defining moments in the evolution of  
a national or transnational community. Today, the 
analysis of  how audiences experience political 
media events such as televised candidate debates 
and high profile interviews must incorporate 
discrete media but also their hybrid articulations 
and recombinations. 
Dual screening is an unusual and still 
emergent set of  social practices in which pub-
lics combine consumption and commentary, so 
explaining its significance for political behavior 
requires methodological innovation. During the 
2014 European Parliament campaign and the 
2015 UK general election campaign we conducted 
fieldwork focusing on television as the “prima-
ry” screen and social media, particularly Twitter 
and Facebook, as the “second screens” in a dual 
screening context. For the 2015 general election, 
we developed a unique research design organized 
around the most significant of  the party leaders’ 
debates—ITV’s unprecedented live two-hour 
show on April 2 involving all seven party leaders. 
Our approach combined the extraction of  a 
large dataset of  tweets (N=516,484) containing 
hashtags related to the televised debate with the 
identification of  a sample of  Twitter users whom 
we recruited to a custom-built, two-wave panel 
survey (N=2,352 for the first wave, with the 
second wave still in the field at the time of  this 
writing). Using a range of  quantitative and qual-
itative techniques, we will explain how, why, and 
to what extent the affordances of  dual screening, 
particularly the interactions between broadcast 
media and Twitter, might reconfigure how citizens 
engage with politics.
Our overall aim in this study is to locate 
dual screening’s position in the complex array of  
enablers and constraints on individuals’ political 
engagement in a system where interdependencies 
between older and newer media logics now deci-
sively shape political outcomes (Chadwick, 2013). 
Dual screening is an important part of  what we 
term hybrid media events—classic broadcast me-
dia events whose significance for media profes-
sionals, politicians, and citizens is being reconfig-
ured by the growth of  social media. We conceive 
of  dual screening in a relatively expansive sense: 
it is a bundle of  practices that all involve integrat-
ing and switching across and between broadcast 
media and social media. For example, individuals 
may use social media platforms to read about a 
broadcast as it unfolds. They may go one step 
further and comment on social media about a 
broadcast. They may also be exposed to infor-
mation about broadcast events on social media in 
advance of  the broadcast and then switch across 
to the broadcast when it occurs, even in the mid-
dle of  a show. It is possible that many individuals, 
especially those who are relatively uninterested 
in politics and who would choose not to watch a 
broadcast of  a political debate, might encounter 
information about the debate serendipitously 
while using social media for other purposes, such 
as entertainment or catching up with friends. 
No existing academic or commercial survey data 
captures this bundle of  dual screening practices as 
they relate to political engagement, which is why 
we designed our own.
As we conduct our analysis and publish our 
results in the coming months, the big picture here 
is how and under what conditions dual screen-
ing practices might become drivers of  political 
engagement. We are guided by the hypothesis 
that there may be something unique to the media 
affordances involved in the hybrid mix of  broad-
cast media and social media that leads to greater 
levels of  engagement and/or different forms of  
engagement. Thus we are concerned with dual 
screening practices both as forms of  political 
engagement in themselves and as potential drivers 
of  other forms of  political engagement that may 
be expressed with and within digital media as well 
as in face-to-face settings. Our data will allow us 
to explore how citizens behave within this hybrid 
environment and how this might affect the styles 
and intensity of  their political engagement.
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All major parties promote their social media 
platforms and encourage supporters to join so 
they can be targeted with a range of  mobiliation 
requests. As such their social media performance 
represents a means to gauge how each channel 
was used and the reach the parties gained. The 
data, supplied by SoTrender (sotrender.com) 
provides insights into usage, audience size and 
audience activity which we can explore for paral-
lels with electoral support of  each party. 
YouTube has become a free television chan-
nel where parties upload promotional videos that 
can be shared within viewers’ networks. The data 
from YouTube (Table 1) shows the amount of  
videos uploaded during the campaign, number 
of  subscribers and reach (views of  main or most 
popular campaign video). 
The data shows the Liberal Democrats and 
Green Party produced a vast amount of  videos, 
Labour, Plaid Cymru an average amount and 
UK Independence Party and British National 
Party going for a few, clear position videos. 
The Greens managed to produce the single 
viral video of  the campaign, parodying the four 
male party leaders (Cameron, Clegg, Farage and 
Miliband) as a boy band and calling for voters to 
‘Change the Tune’. The Conservative’s negative 
‘Its working, don’t let them wreck it’ video also 
gained significant popularity across the online 
network while Miliband’s biopic did reasonably. 
The other main finding is though that the Liberal 
Democrats struggled to gain followers or reach. 
Plaid Cymru, a party standing in only 40 of  the 
650 constituencies and courting anelectorate 
of  3.064 million gained more views for their 
campaign video despite the Liberal Democrats 
standing across England, Scotland and Wales. 
Twitter is used to push messages out and 
create momentum through retweets. Table 2 
shows the number of  tweets, follower numbers 
and change in follower numbers over the cam-
paign, and an interactivity index score that shows 
relative levels of  follower interaction (tweets x 
retweets) over the period of  the campaign.  
The headlines here are that there is little 
overall change in followers, and most parties 
send around 30 tweets per day. The Liberal 
Democrats tweeted most but did not get the 
best return. Labour, UKIP and the SNP had the 
highest interaction suggesting they have the most 
engaged followers, though the Conservatives, 
Liberal Democrats and Greens are only slightly 
behind in this respect. 
Facebook is a key battleground, with great-
est numbers of  fans and a greater propensity 
for interactivity between followers and the party. 
We display data (Table 3) for number of  posts, 
replies by the party, number of  fans and change 
during the campaign, an interactivity index (party 
posts x likes, shares and comments) to indicate 
potential reach and the percent of  engaged users 
(those who performed some activity within the 
profile during the campaign). 
All parties post reasonably frequently, from 
the verbose Labour to the more parsimonious 
Liberal Democrats. Replies are less frequent; the 
Greens and SNP excel, the Conservatives and 
UKIP perform poorly. Despite this, the Con-
servatives and UKIP have most fans, and earned 
the most during the campaign, but Labour, 
Greens and SNP all gained also. Of  the national 
parties the Liberal Democrats perform worst. In 
terms of  earning a highly engaged audience, we 
find Labour outstrip their opponents, followed 
by UKIP and the Greens. This data might sug-
gest that these parties were destined for good 
results in the contest. 
Breaking down the forms of  engagement, 
SoTrender categorises the engaged as Occasion-
als (lurkers who interact very rarely), Likers (who 
only like), Debaters (who comment only and 
may include trolls), Writers (who comment or 
publish only) and Activists (who like, share and 
comment and may be ambassadors). The data 
(Table 4) shows percentages of  engaged users 
who fit each category. 
While the numbers do not differ significant-
ly per party, the most interesting finding is that 
UKIP hasthe highest percentage of  activists 
2.75%, representing 7,025 people, their clos-
est rival is Labour with less than half  of  that. 
If  some Debaters are trolls then the Liberal 
Democrats would seem the biggest target, they 
also languish behind the major parties in gaining 
activists. The Scottish and Welsh Nationalists 
gain the least Debaters. 
Comparing online performance with results 
suggests two things. Firstly social media is only 
a partial microcosm of  the broader electorate; 
here we can see the collapse in Liberal Dem-
ocrat support only. Secondly it may reflect the 
commitment of  activists, and which parties 
successfully mobilise, but thiscannot secure vic-
tory in itself. Despite the scale of  visible support 
online, UKIP made a net loss in the election 
campaign, though the scattered support gained 
across the UK may be reflected online. Similarly 
the Green’s reach may have contributed to the 
increased vote share but could not overcome tac-
tical voting and they flatlined. The conundrum 
is Labour. Despite their highly engaged activist 
base, ‘Millifandom’ (young women proclaiming 
love) and the ‘#JeSuisEd’ meme (pictures of  
ugly eating) that demonstrated connection and 
sympathy, the party did badly in vote share and 
seats. Labour won the battle online overall, but it 
seems this battleground is far removed from the 
battle that secures electoral victory.
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Table 1: The YouTube campaign 
Table 2: The Twitter campaign
Table 3: The Facebook campaign
Table 4: Differential engagement on Facebook
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This election cycle there have been some 
good examples of  traditional and new media 
synergising in an attempt to get young people 
engaged. People are increasingly using multi-
ple screens at the same time: watching a show 
on TV, whilst tweeting along on their phone, 
and occasionally checking their tablet for news 
updates. For a number of  years now, TV shows 
have prompted viewers to use specific hash-
tags so that they can interact with the show. 
This election we have had a deluge of  political 
programming and the TV channels aimed to 
link the old with the new, both in terms of  
platforms and demographics. This election, 
there was a clear distinction between two types 
of  social media engagement with TV. 
There were many examples of  programmes 
that promoted their own hashtags. BBC Daily 
Politics had #BBCdp, for example, and the ITV 
Leaders’ Debate had #BattleForNumber10. 
These however, can be seen as a somewhat 
passive engagement with the audience. Whilst 
the shows were keen to know what their view-
ers were thinking, it did not drive or alter the 
content of  the shows. Having people talk about 
your show is good for publicity and in terms 
of  the formal debates, gave journalists and 
academics something to analyse and talk about. 
Real social media engagement with traditional 
media could only be found on a handful of  
political TV shows, that were created specifical-
ly with the notion of  social media engagement 
in mind.
Channel 4 staged an If  We Ran Things event 
in which young people were able to express 
their views regarding their own priorities in the 
country both in studio and via the hashtag #If-
WeRanThings. The live event, which was run in 
partnership with Twitter, provides evidence of  
the coming together of  old and new media in a 
more active, agenda setting way that other TV 
programs did not have during the election.
On BBC 3, as part of  their Free Speech 
series, they were encouraging use of  the 
hashtags like #AskUkip and #AskATory for 
their audience to put questions towards their 
various panels. This is clearly an active relation-
ship between social media and TV in that the 
questions being asked on Twitter were being 
put forward to the guests on the show. How-
ever, in using such hashtags, there is a danger 
of  summoning the online satirists. As one of  
the shows panellists asked on Twitter before 
the show, “What could go wrong?” During the 
program, the hashtag was flooded with ques-
tions like “What’s the best way to clean the 
moat around my duck house?”. This, among 
many other examples highlights how hashtags 
that are designed with a purpose always run 
the risk of  being commandeered by cynics and 
satirists, thereby rendering the purpose of  the 
hashtag moot. 
To mis-quote the philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes, the life of  a hashtag is solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short. This should not dis-
courage TV in future elections from attempting 
to use social media in a more active way. It just 
means they will have to plan and think more 
carefully about when and where they choose 
to passively or actively engage with the social 
media audience.
Steven Buckley
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Twitter response to televised political debates in 
Election 2015
The advent of  social media such as Twitter 
has revolutionised our conversations about live 
television events. In the days before the Internet, 
conversation about television programmes was 
limited to those sitting on the sofa with you and 
people you met the next morning – so-called ‘wa-
ter-cooler conversation’. Now, however, it is pos-
sible to discuss events on the screen in real time 
with people all over the country - three out of  
five UK Twitter users tweet while watching tele-
vision (Nielsen, 2013). Thus it is not surprising to 
find that the General Election’s television events 
generated debate and discussion on Twitter.
A team at Robert Gordon University is 
running a longitudinal study investigating Twitter 
response to televised political debates, including 
both the Scottish Independence Referendum 
and the 2015 General Election (Pedersen et al 
2014). For the General Election we collected 
and analysed tweets sent during the ITV debate 
between seven party leaders on 2 April 2015 
and the BBC debate on 16 April between the 
five challengers. The tweets collected were those 
containing the hashtag promoted by the two pro-
grammes - #leadersdebate and #BBCdebate. We 
then conducted preliminary qualitative analysis, 
investigating the issues and leaders that stimulated 
the most activity on Twitter and the geographical 
spread of  tweets. 
Looking first at individual leaders, it will 
come as no surprise to learn that the name of  
Nigel Farage dominated our sample’s discussion 
during the first debate. In particular, there was 
a peak of  Twitter discussion directly after his 
statement that ‘health tourists’ with HIV and 
AIDS were coming to the UK for treatment. 
His name also dominated in the first half  of  the 
second debate, with another peak after his attack 
on the studio audience. Thus Farage’s policy of  
inflammatory statements led to his name domi-
nating Twitter discussion. However, in the second 
half  of  the Challengers’ debate, discussion of  the 
UKIP leader declined and instead our sample’s 
focus turned to Nicola Sturgeon and Ed Miliband 
after Sturgeon’s challenge to Miliband to agree to 
work with her and other progressive party leaders.
Throughout both debates, Twitter discussed 
‘the women’ – the three leaders, Nicola Sturgeon 
(SNP), Leanne Wood (Plaid Cymru) and Natalie 
Bennett (Greens). Whilst it was only Sturgeon’s 
name that occurred with high frequency in our 
sample, Twitter was stimulated by the sight of  
three female party leaders, with words such as 
‘civilising’, ‘transforming’ and ‘refreshing’ recur-
ring throughout. As far as UK General Election 
debates were concerned, this was the first time 
that any women at all participated – in 2010 even 
the moderators of  the debates had been male 
– and so it is not surprising that this stimulated 
discussion. In addition, this would have been the 
first time many outside their own countries saw 
the leaders of  Plaid Cymru and the SNP.  In par-
ticular, there was a peak in tweets after Sturgeon 
suggested that they were breaking up the old 
boys’ network at Westminster and both Sturgeon 
and Wood saw peaks in the use of  their name 
after they criticised Farage. It should be noted, 
however, that not all in our sample saw the inclu-
sion of  three women in the debates positively and 
at least one tweeter complained that ‘three women 
agreeing with each other’ was not a debate.
Finally, it should be noted that, despite not 
taking part in the second debate, David Cam-
eron’s name was still discussed by our sample 
throughout the debate, although that of  Nick 
Clegg was mostly absent. As far as geographical 
spread of  tweets is concerned, initial findings 
suggest that the majority of  leaders’ names were 
discussed throughout the country during the two 
debates. However, during the first debate, Ed 
Miliband’s name appeared very infrequently in 
tweets geo-tagged as from Scotland, which may 
be connected to the problems Scottish Labour 
faced during the campaign.
This is an ongoing project that will con-
tinue to analyse the data collected, in particular 
focusing on the role of  women politicians in 
the debates; humour and cultural referencing; 
information sources; and direct comments and 
abuse on the subject of  the leaders’ personalities, 
appearances and personal lives.
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Why so few female tweeters before #GE2015? 
The gendering of public discourse on Twitter
It is a mistake to assume that public discourse 
can ever be gender-neutral. Although Twitter 
is sometimes held up as an inherently inclusive 
participatory tool for self-expression in reality 
it perpetuates the same gender dynamics and 
silencing of  women that has existed since the 
Odyssey, when Telemachus informed his mother 
that “speech will be the business of  men,” as 
classicist Mary Beard reminded us after facing 
gender-motivated abuse on Twitter.
The gendered nature of  political public 
discourse was highlighted this April when BBC 
Trending released research showing a dispar-
ity between the numbers of  men and women 
engaging with the General Election on Twitter 
based on instances of  the use of  hashtags as-
sociated with each of  the main political parties. 
An analysis of  the hashtags #Libdems #Libdem 
#UKIP #Conservative #SNP #Labour #Plaid-
Cymru #Greens among UK users revealed that 
75% of  tweets were by men, while 25% were 
from women - a damning indictment of  the 
neutrality of  the platform. 
Although it is possible to argue that that the 
lack of  engagement in political discussions on 
Twitter is representative of  women’s disengage-
ment with politics more broadly, this perspective 
overlooks the wider context of  mysogyny and 
sexist trolling (abusive language from strangers) 
on Twitter which has resulted in many women 
being afraid to voice their opinions. The horrify-
ing abuse JK Rowling received on Twitter after 
the election from UKIP and SNP supporters as 
a result of  her pro-Labour stance is for many 
women a warning to not engage politically on 
the platform. 
It’s no secret that women have been dispro-
portionately affected by trolling on Twitter and 
that there has been a failing by the company to 
adequately respond. In a leaked memo, Twitter 
CEO Dick Costolo admitted “We suck at dealing 
with abuse and trolls on the platform and we’ve 
sucked at it for years… it’s nobody else’s fault 
but mine, and its embarrassing” after a staff  
member questioned Twitter’s response “as a 
collective of  human beings” to cyberbullying. 
Twitter has since introduced measures 
to respond to gender-based abuse including 
partnering with Women, Action and the Media 
in November 2014 to investigate harassment 
against women, and it released policy and prod-
uct updates last month to ensure “voices are not 
silenced because people are afraid to speak up”. 
It’s likely that these reforms were at least partly 
influenced by its engagement with a team of  re-
searchers at Lancaster University working on the 
ESRC funded project The Discourses of  Online 
Misogyny. Will these measures be enough or will 
social media remain trapped in discussions of  
freedom of  self-expression vs. preventing online 
abuse? Will the anonymity of  Twitter prevent it 
from ever escaping the misogynist culture that 
it finds itself  in, where people voice threats they 
would never express in real life?
The results from this election will see the 
UK’s highest number of  female MPs in office, 
although still under-represented at 29%, and 
as they engage and feature in public discourse 
there’s hope that they will encourage more 
women to express themselves politically online. 
However this achievement needs to be celebrat-
ed alongside a recognition that safer spaces for 
women to engage in online dialogue need to 
be created. The social media platforms where 
debate takes place, not incidentally male-dom-
inated tech companies, need to work harder to 
take gender into consideration if  we are to see 
more equal online engagement with politics in 
the run-up to #GE2020. 
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UKIP Facebooking the Tories in General Election 2015
The rise of  populist parties has played a signif-
icant role in public discourse in the run-up to 
General Election 2015 (GE2015). Fuelled by 
misleading polls, the GE2015 campaign nar-
rative focused on coalition politics; and pre-
dictions about the impact that parties like the 
UK Independence Party (UKIP) could have on 
post-election negotiations. 
In 2010, the presence of  the smaller parties 
was more muted and less pronounced. In the 
run-up to GE2015, UKIP appeared to be 
capitalizing on the splintering of  disaffected 
Conservative Party participants and supporters. 
This phenomenon was being exhibited online 
in interesting and observable ways, especially in 
Facebook networks.
Facebook functionality is rooted in con-
necting ‘friends’ in its online venue. The social 
network actively and prominently promotes 
‘friend suggestions’ to its users. This has little to 
do with whether one user knows another in the 
offline world. It has much more to do with the 
number of  mutual Facebook friends two users 
might share. 
In political Facebook networks, it has be-
come increasingly likely that Facebook friends 
either will have had their first meeting online 
rather than offline; or not met in the offline 
world whatsoever. In 2008, it was more likely 
to be the reverse. The Conservatives have been 
actively growing political networks on Facebook 
since that time (Ridge-Newman 2014).
The manner in which Facebook connects 
people is highly useful for political networking. 
Political participants are increasingly using their 
Facebook profile photo to symbolize their asso-
ciation with a particular party or cause. 
The more one’s friend networks grow with-
in the Facebook community of  a political party, 
the more Facebook will suggest friends from 
that political network to the Facebook user. 
The party symbols displayed on profiles makes 
it easy for the user to identify potential new 
Facebook friends associated with their party’s 
political network.
Between 2010 and 2015, Tory participants in 
the larger political networks on Facebook might 
have observed more and more of  their once 
Tory-affiliated friends decorating their social 
media pages with the purple and gold branding 
of  UKIP, often with prominent displays (profile 
and cover photos) of  UKIP symbolism – espe-
cially the pound sterling sign (£) and images of  
Nigel Farage, the UKIP leader in GE2015. 
Moreover, in the run-up to GE2015, Con-
servative Facebookers experienced an increasing 
frequency of  friend requests from participants 
exhibiting prominent UKIP symbols on their 
profiles. Therefore, a number of  questions arise 
from this observation. For example, was there 
a UKIP strategy to target Tory participants, or 
other political participants, in social networks; or 
did this behaviour develop organically at UKIP’s 
online grassroots? Furthermore, what impact did 
UKIP’s social media activity have on the signifi-
cant national GE2015 vote for UKIP?
Although the British electorate voted deci-
sively for a majority Conservative government, 
UKIP increased its share of  the national vote by 
9.5%, with 3.9 million votes and 12.6% vote share. 
This significant support for UKIP result-
ed in one UKIP Member of  Parliament (MP), 
Douglas Carswell, being returned to the House 
of  Commons. In contrast, 56 Scottish National 
Party (SNP) MPs were elected with 1.5 million 
votes and 4.7% vote share. 
In researching this article, it would ap-
pear that some Ukippers have been left feeling 
bruised and disheartened by their GE2015 
outcome. It has led some to call for electoral 
reform and others to seek a route back to the 
Conservative Party.
One informant explained that there are 
those in UKIP who feel they would like to 
‘return home’ to the Tory fold. However, they 
fear they are now viewed as offensive and dis-
criminatory individuals, and feel, therefore, that 
they would not be accepted as Tories by existing 
Tory participants.
Facebook activity has demonstrated that 
there is a reasonably strong familial relationship 
between UKIP and the Tories in social networks. 
Therefore, Facebook might act as an online 
bridge, providing a route back for some Ukip-
pers (those that were once disaffected Tories) 
and facilitate their subtle reintegration into the 
Conservative fold – especially if  David Camer-
on’s delivery of  an EU Referendum results in 
increasing political redundancy for UKIP. 
Dr Anthony Ridge-
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One of  the defining characteristics of  the 2015 
UK General Election was the use of  social 
media to build support for the Conservatives 
and Labour in the run up to what was widely 
(and inaccurately) predicted to be the closest 
electoral contest for decades. This consisted of  
both positive messages, such as the use of  #Mili-
fandom to indicate support for Labour Leader 
Ed Miliband, and negative ones, such as the 
US-style attack ads suggesting that the Scottish 
National Party would exert undue influence on 
any Labour-led coalition that emerged after the 
election. There was also some evidence to sug-
gest that online media might disrupt the estab-
lished broadcast and print journalism during the 
campaign. Most notably, Ed Miliband’s interview 
with Russell Brand for The Trews, the comedian 
and activist’s YouTube channel, was viewed more 
than 1.2 million times in the week before polling 
day. This prompted much debate in the news 
media about whether such “alternative” online 
platforms might help the main politicians reach 
out to young people who often choose not to 
vote and consume media in very different ways 
from older generations.  
Smaller parties are likely to benefit from 
online exposure, especially given that they often 
lack visibility in the traditional news media. 
Besides social media, search engines such as 
Google have a crucial role in this process as they 
represent the primary channel through which 
people in the UK access online content (Dutton 
and Blank, 2013). We used Google Trends to ex-
plore the level of  interest among British Internet 
users in the populist United Kingdom Independ-
ence Party (UKIP), which had finished in first 
place in the 2014 European Parliament elections 
and looked set to build on this landmark result 
in 2015. We analysed the search trends between 
February and May 2015 for UKIP and its leader, 
Nigel Farage. These trends were then compared 
to those relating to the three main parties (the 
Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Demo-
crats) and their leaders1. 
While UKIP received much less coverage 
in traditional broadcast and print media than the 
other parties, Farage’s party dominated Google 
searches, consistently generating more search 
queries than all the other parties and their leaders 
throughout the campaign (Figures 1 and 2). This 
would appear to validate Farage’s post-election 
claims that the party was a social media force 
that had “suddenly [become] the party for the 
under 30s,” a group that is perhaps best reached 
online. Moreover, while TV debates continued to 
influence Google searches in elections (especially 
on 26nd March, 2nd and 16th April), most search 
peaks did not appear to be directly related to 
such mass media events. One interpretation of  
this finding might be that a more independ-
ent-minded electorate is emerging that sets its 
own information agenda instead of  simply fol-
lowing traditional news coverage.  However, the 
protracted negotiations over the number, format 
and composition of  the TV debates almost cer-
tainly played a part here too. 
Crucially, UKIP appeared to generate more 
interest amongst British Google users than any 
of  the party leaders, including Farage. Although 
this focus on UKIP as a group may seem at odds 
with a political system that is increasingly lead-
er-focused, as well as with Farage’s own flamboy-
ant style, it suggests that UKIP’s strength among 
Internet users lies in its collective “brand.” For 
example, Google searches for UKIP at the time 
of  the BBC leaders’ debate (26 April) far out-
numbered those for its leader. This suggests that 
UKIP may be slowly shedding its tag of  being a 
“personal party,” unlike other populist and eu-
ro-sceptic forces in Europe such as the Five Star 
Movement in Italy. This was further illustrated 
by UKIP’s performance in the 2015 General 
Election. Despite delivering only one seat due 
to the first past the post system (which inciden-
tally also shows how Google Trends data may 
be a very poor predictor of  election results), the 
party received 3.8 million votes across the UK 
and achieved 119 second places in England. This 
best ever performance in a Westminster Election 
did not prevent the resignation of  Farage as 
leader shortly after his failure to win in Thanet 
South, although he has since refused to rule out 
running for the leadership again. Yet, irrespec-
tive of  the identity of  the next leader, UKIP’s 
focus on issues such as Europe and immigration 
looks likely to resonate with wired voters (and 
non-voters) in Britain.  
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This election saw a host of  new digital-born web-
sites making their presence felt for the first time. 
Buzzfeed, the Huffington Post and Vice News now 
have significant UK based news operations that 
weren’t around in 2010. Home-grown new kids 
on the block include UsVsTh3m and Ampp3d 
from Trinity Mirror and i100 from the Independent. 
These brands do not need printing presses, 
trucks or newsstands but are powered instead by 
the virality of  the social web and by young crea-
tive journalists armed with new tools for a digital 
age. They have pioneered the use of  new visual 
formats like games, lists, gifs, data-viz, vines, 
boos, and raw videos to connect and engage with 
young people wherever they are.  
Changes to distribution, formats and discovery
By way of  background all this is now possible 
because the web itself  has changed fundamentally 
over the last five years – with a new emphasis on 
mobile, social and visual media. 
In this election many publishers reported 
more than half  of  traffic to online election stories 
from mobile phones and tablets – much higher 
for sites like Buzzfeed aimed at young people. 
Our Reuters Digital News Report 2015 shows 
that going into the election more than two thirds 
(70%) of  under 35 were using smartphones for 
news on a weekly basis – a huge uplift on 2010.
Equally significant is the growth in social 
discovery. Half  (49%) of  under-35s use social 
networks like Facebook and Twitter to access 
political news compared with around a quar-
ter (26%) four years ago. For young people in 
particular Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have 
become new gateways to the internet bumping 
into news that appear in their feeds and networks. 
Coverage 
Capitalising on these trends a number of  digital 
newcomers set out to shake up what Vice UK 
has called the ‘dull stranglehold’ of  mainstream 
media coverage in this election. Partly by design, 
partly by necessity these companies looked to 
avoid the predictable press conferences, battle 
buses and stage-managed photo-calls and to fo-
cus instead on something fresh that might engage 
a younger audience. 
Vice offered a series of  hard-hitting films on 
issues of  concern to young people like housing, 
food banks and student debt and backed this up 
with a range of  satirical reports from the cam-
paign trail. This was reporting with a viewpoint 
and felt fresh and different – in part because the 
reporters were young, in part because digital born 
companies are not bound by Ofcom’s require-
ments for political balance.
For Buzzfeed, which has doubled its audience 
in the UK over the past year, stories had to be 
‘different, funny or shocking’, according to Dep-
uty Editor Jim Waterson in an interview with the 
Press Gazette just ahead of  the campaign. With 
limited resources at their disposal there was little 
point writing up manifesto launches or covering 
the set pieces. An irreverent webcast with David 
Cameron set the tone while former Sun political 
correspondent Emily Ashton focussed on original 
reports such as the story behind Liam Byrne’s in-
famous note about how the money had run out. 
But the weight of  Buzzfeed coverage remained its 
trademark skills of  capturing and repackaging the 
best bits of  the social web.
Curating the conversation was the Huffington 
Post’s key focus – capturing as many page views as 
possible along the way. The Huffington Post appeals 
to a much wider audience than Buzzfeed and its 
well-honed mix of  blogs, videos and roundtable 
discussions consistently produces the most shared 
content on Facebook.
A more partisan approach came from the 
Mirror’s UsvTh3m – brought into the heart 
of  the main website for the first time for this 
election. An honourable mention too for Politico, 
which only began publishing in Europe as the 
campaign began, and ran excellent on the ground 
pieces such as the story of  Ben Judah’s terrifying 
encounter with supporters of  George Galloway 
and excellent post match analysis on the implica-
tions of  Brexit.
Impact and the future
In terms of  audience numbers, money spent and 
weight of  reporters on the ground, traditional 
media outgunned digital newcomers by a country 
mile.  But the central narrative of  mainstream 
media coverage - that this was a deadlocked 
race with a coalition to follow - turned out to be 
plain wrong. Digital born sites were able to think 
differently and apply their considerable wit and 
ingenuity to engage with less engaged voters in 
a way that the BBC and broadsheets have always 
found hard. 
The fact that turnout amongst the young was 
the highest for years may be a co-incidence – but 
new digital sites played their part in registering 
new voters and keeping them interested through 
a long campaign. Political correspondents and re-
porters in their twenties may not have the gravitas 
of  David Dimbleby but they have left their im-
print on this election and on the media landscape 




It is perhaps a little unfair that The Spectator’s 
Brendan O’Neill labelled Russell Brand the big-
gest loser of  the general election. As a late con-
vert to Miliband’s cause, Brand’s change of  heart 
over whether or not to vote in this election came 
as an endorsement for Ed Miliband announced 
on his YouTube channel The Trews on May 4th. 
Within 24 hours more than 600,000 people had 
watched this video, while double that number had 
seen his interview with Ed five days earlier. 
To give Brand’s critics their dues, it did seem 
an odd thing to do for a man who, back in  
November 2013, had provoked a media con-
troversy by insisting to Jeremy Paxman on 
Newsnight that he wouldn’t vote, had never vot-
ed, and saw it as irrelevant to a genuine democ-
racy. Paxman’s response (‘You are a trivial man’ 
he declaimed) encapsulated how Brand’s political 
opponents denigrate him, a sentiment echoed by 
David Cameron who dismissed him as a ‘joke’. 
What makes Russell’s story interesting for 
students of  both politics and the media is how 
he repurposed a sophisticated fame machine for 
radical political ends. Contemporary celebrity is 
a key implement of  capitalist propaganda selling 
the myth that anyone can “make it”. Through a 
series of  interventions across a number of  media 
platforms, Brand turned this logic on its head, not 
only by highlighting that most people do not find 
wealth and fortune by working hard and instead 
many struggle under modern capitalism, but also 
by arguing that celebrity itself  is hollow, a false 
aspiration. Brand did this through the very logic 
of  celebrity: he consciously harnessed the mythic 
tropes of  celebrity culture through a powerful 
personal narrative of  rise and fall, redemption 
and transformation; he exploited his publici-
ty apparatus of  agents, fellow celebrities and 
understanding of  what is “newsworthy” to gain 
mainstream media coverage and then funnelled 
those audiences to his YouTube channel, films, 
books and twitter feed to convey, guru-like, his 
pedagogic message of  grassroots organising and 
revolution from below. 
The most striking thing about the Milib-
and-Brand interview is that they both make a 
visible effort to listen and learn from each other. 
Away from the full glare of  a hostile media in the 
more intimate space of  Brand’s Shoreditch flat 
and fixing Ed with his gaze, Brand leans forward 
to find out whether he is a man he can trust, 
acting as a proxy for his followers and frequent-
ly reverting to monologues on subjects that he 
wants Miliband to respond to – unethical banks, 
inequality, housing, confronting the powerful cor-
porate interests. Miliband listens and meets Brand 
half  way where he can, committing to working 
with communities and responding to their con-
cerns rather than imposing top-down policy initi-
atives. But in response to Brand’s assertions that 
politicians are powerless to bring about change, 
Ed says: “You’re wrong, you are just wrong”… 
How does progress come? It comes from people 
pushing and politics responding”. The following 
endorsement suggested that Brand was persuaded 
– he has learnt something new from his mate Ed 
and then shared this learning with his followers. 
But if  Russell and Ed demonstrated an admi-
rable ability to listen and learn from each other, so 
too were both unable to cope with their dismay 
once the results came in. Just as Ed immediately 
resigned the Labour leadership rather than over-
seeing a smooth transition to the next leader, so 
too did Brand in his post-election Trews abdicate 
any further role in electoral politics having been 
falsely persuaded that his influence was such that 
he could swing the election for Labour. Just as 
Miliband is grossly undervalued (by himself  as 
much as the rest of  his party) for his ability to 
hold together a fractious and back-biting parlia-
mentary Labour party, so too has Brand’s political 
significance been misunderstood. It is not in de-
feat but in the creation of  a new political alterna-
tive that must surely follow it that the success of  
Brand’s interventions must be judged. His shame 
is misplaced. 
One of  the more rapidly circulated re-
sponses to the election result came from public 
intellectual Dougald Hine who claimed on the 
morning after the election result that Brand 
understands the key thing that was absent from 
Miliband’s campaign, that politics is a ‘battle for 
the soul’. Hine looks to EP Thompson’s the 
Making of  the English Working Class to suggest 
that Brand may be the contemporary equivalent 
of  the narcissistic and influential 18th century 
firebrand William Cobbett and as serious a threat 
to the status-quo. Ed Miliband may have lost his 
campaign, but Russell Brand’s compassionate 
revolution may have only just begun. 
After Milibrand: Russell Brand and the politics of 
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Celebrity politics have become common-place in 
UK elections. In 2015, the Labour Party secured 
the endorsements of  Eddie Izzard and Ben 
Elton who appeared with Coronation Street actress 
Sally Lindsay at a rally in Warrington. Izzard 
campaigned in over fifty constituencies and was 
confronted by Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) 
activists with the ‘Scot Lab’ leader Jim Murphy. 
Ed Miliband also received the backing of  Ste-
phen Hawking, Paul O’Grady, Sir Ian McKellan, 
Matthew Horne, Robert Webb, Charlotte Church 
and Delia Smith. The former Eastenders star Ross 
Kemp canvassed his home constituency of  Ilford 
North, while Steve Coogan spoke in targeted 
marginals including Bermondsey and Old South-
wark and Hornsey and Wood Green.   
Coogan, Jo Brand and Ronnie O’Sullivan 
starred in Labour Party Election Broadcasts 
(PEB) concerning fairness and the National 
Health Service (NHS). Moreover, The Hobbit’s 
Martin Freeman appeared in the party’s first PEB 
(with a voice-over by David Tennant) to promote 
social justice. However, Freeman received the 
approbation of  the right-wing media due to his 
affiliation with Arthur Scargill’s Socialist Labour 
Party and his son’s private education. In tandem, 
the Scottish actor Brian Cox transferred his sup-
port to the SNP. 
Such difficulties meant that the Conservative 
Party shied away from celebrity endorsers. In 2010 
it had trumpeted Sir Michael Caine and Gary 
Barlow (who was later castigated as a tax dodger) 
as supporters. Conversely, in 2015, with the excep-
tion of  Andrew Lloyd Webber, Simon Cowell and 
Sol Campbell, the party’s endorsements remained 
limited. 
2Moreover, when The Sun columnist Katie 
Hopkins tweeted that if  the Labour Party won 
she would leave the country, some argued that her 
intervention would be a vote winner for Milib-
and. In the event, she may well have been more 
attuned with public opinion. 
Sir David Attenborough, Joanna Lumley and 
Billy Bragg were among forty signatories who 
called for the re-election of  the Green Party’s 
Caroline Lucas while avoiding any endorsement 
of  the party.  To demonstrate that she had no 
partisan bias, Lumley backed the Liberal Dem-
ocrat MP Lynne Beaumont with whom she had 
worked with in the Gurkha Justice Campaign. It 
was reported that the Liberal Democrat Party 
leader Nick Clegg enlisted John Cleese to play a 
version of  the United Kingdom Independence 
Party’s (UKIP) Nigel Farage in TV debate re-
hearsals. However, Colin Firth and Daniel  
Radcliffe turned their backs on the Lib-Dems.  
Well-known black figures including Campbell, 
the actor David Harewood, the musician Tinie 
Tempah and the television presenter Ade Adepitan 
‘whited up’ for Operation Black Vote. Addition-
ally, Harewood starred in a video appealing for 
minorities to register to vote. In tandem, Arman-
do Iannucci, Michael Sheen and Christopher Ec-
cleston supported public registration campaigns. 
The geneticist Richard Dawkins informed his 1.15 
million Twitter followers that Liberal Democrats 
should vote tactically to form a ‘Left Coalition’, 
while Damon Albarn, Irving Welsh and Massive 
Attack signed an online petition against Trident. 
Pop singer Will Young condemned the ‘First Past 
the Post’ electoral system. 
Some celebrities facilitated a populist 
response to the parties’ leadership. The anti-cor-
porate comedian Russell Brand, who had decried 
voting, interviewed Miliband on his YouTube 
channel The Trews with its 1,000,000 subscribers. 
The Labour leader spoke to Brand about the 
inequities of  global capitalism, the protection 
of  working rights, media owners and the lasting 
value of  voting. When David Cameron castigat-
ed ‘Milibrand’ as a joke, the Labour strategists 
misguidedly hoped that Brand’s endorsement with 
his 9.5 million Twitter followers could provide a 
conduit to young, disengaged voters. 
ITV signed up the reality television star Joey 
Essex to appear in a programme wherein he 
met the leaders (with the exception of  Camer-
on) to give his ‘insights’ on the election. Having 
already shared a ‘selfie’ with Miliband ahead of  
the campaign, Essex met Clegg who he mistook 
for ‘Leg’ and called the leader of  the ‘Liberal 
Democats’ while tweeting that Clegg was an 
‘honest guy.’ Subsequently, he appeared with 
Farage in Grimsby harbour and described him as 
being ‘reem’ (cool). To protest against Farage in 
his failed bid to become MP for Thanet South, 
the comedian Al Murray stood as an independent 
candidate under the moniker of  the ‘The Pub 
Landlord.’ Murray’s Free the United Kingdom 
Party’ (FUKP), with its outlandish manifesto 
written on the back of  cigarette packet, was a play 
on Farage’s ‘ordinary bloke’ image.  
The electorate’s consumption of  celebrity 
campaign politics has grown due to the rise of  
‘infotainment’ styles of  news coverage and viral 
social media discourses. In the UK, this has 
meant that the parties gave some credence to ce-
lebrity engagements. However, despite the Labour 
Party’s celebrity endorsements, they had little 
impact on the electoral outcome. Consequently, it 
appears that the British public remains equivocal 
in its judgment upon the worth of  such a mobili-
zation of  celebrity supporters.
Celebrity endorsements and activities in the 
2015 UK General Election campaign
Prof Mark Wheeler 
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In a manner largely consistent with recent trends 
in election campaigns, the lead up to the 2015 
UK General Election was marked by a range of  
interventions from those who came to public 
prominence through their work in the entertain-
ment industries – celebrities. While certain estab-
lished traits of  celebrity involvement in election 
campaigns persisted, new features have emerged 
which suggest both the changing necessities of  
parliamentary democracy and the means by which 
celebrity can be used to serve such needs, while 
illuminating new potential relationships between 
celebrity, power and the role of  the individual in 
political discourse.
In many respects the 2015 election cam-
paigns resembled on-going patterns in British 
parliamentary politics as the three ‘mainstream’ 
neoliberal parties (Conservative, Labour and Lib-
eral Democrat) continued their long-standing tra-
jectory of  consolidating or acquiescing to private 
power. In a similar fashion, some of  the most 
prominent celebrity spokespeople who routinely 
profess strong party allegiances continued to en-
dorse their chosen party. For example, the actor, 
comedian and  broadcaster Tony Robinson called 
upon the electorate to vote Labour in a move that 
signalled his continuing support of  the party for 
which he once served on the National Execu-
tive Committee. Robinson was present during 
the election campaigns of  a number of  Labour 
candidates, including those in the constituencies 
of  Stroud and North Swindon. Such unequivocal 
party allegiances from the likes of  Robinson sat 
alongside statements of  party endorsements from 
Robert Webb, Jo Brand and Martin Freeman (for 
Labour) or Peter Stringfellow (for Conservative), 
among others. 
However, this type of  party endorsement 
among celebrities did not seem as common in 
2015 as previous elections, particularly consider-
ing the Blair years. This is interesting as celebrities 
are becoming increasingly politicised. That said, 
this roughly reflects trends among the wider 
population who are also increasingly turning away 
from political party membership. This, coupled 
with the expectation for a relatively low voter 
turnout and the possibility of  a hung parliament, 
caused concern for much of  the corporate media, 
as it potentially questioned the validity of  the 
type of  representative democracy practiced in the 
UK, and the legitimacy of  the governing party 
and centres of  state and corporate power with 
which it is bound. In relation to this need of  the 
political orthodoxy, celebrity-inclusive campaigns 
emerged which sought to engage apparently dis-
enfranchised members of  the electorate with the 
democratic process. 
In distinction to, and often as a response to, 
Russell Brand’s arguments in favour of  turning 
away from the current frameworks of  repre-
sentative democracy in favour of  direct action 
- campaigns encouraging voter registration and 
promoting party membership sought to under-
mine Brand’s anti-establishment ethic by framing 
party membership as a quasi-rebellious act. In 
this light, comedian Robert Webb announced he 
had rejoined the Labour Party as a reaction to 
Brand’s guest editorial of  the New Statesman. Ce-
lebrity support was also elicited to engage on an 
emotional level with the 18-24 demographic and 
encourage voter registration among that group. 
For example, actor Christopher Eccleston im-
plored the public to “trust their own instincts and 
listen to their own heart” and simply “believe in 
the process”. This, and similar campaigns, allowed 
celebrity endorsements to come to the service of  
the political system more generally, legitimising it 
is as a system of  governance while circumventing 
specific allegiances.
Other celebrities used the election to high-
light key issues and, in doing so, encouraged 
engagement with ‘the system’ not as a general 
safeguard of  public interest, but as something 
through which individual issues could be con-
tested and individual people promoted. This 
was perhaps put most eloquently by Bez who 
opined, “I could have joined the Greens but I 
didn’t want to be restricted by party politics. I 
wanted to have a free hand to say what I wanted 
and do what I wanted really”. In a similar vein, 
a group of  well-known public personalities, in-
cluding David Attenborough, Joanna Lumley and 
Billy Bragg, signed a statement of  support for 
incumbent Green Party MP Caroline Lucas. For 
these celebrities, Lucas’s inclusion in parliament 
was a vital component of  plurality within the 
House of  Commons. Importantly, this statement 
did not endorse the Green Party in general, but 
rather Lucas personally. Moreover, the signatories 
added their names in a personal capacity. This 
suggests an emphasis on the individual - cleaved 
of  institutional and professional affiliations - as a 
political agent and shows a consistency with the 
increasing prominence of  single issue political 
campaigns and online petition groups such as 38 
Degrees (the founder of  which was a signatory of  
the statement endorsing Lucas). Additionally, it 
also demonstrates how the 2015 General Elec-
tion represents a key moment when the celebrity 
political endorser - as an icon of  individuality - 
became engaged with the political process while 
being noncommittal to party politics.
Celebrity interventions in the election campaign 
and party affiliation
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While news coverage of  General Elections can be 
argued to ‘crowd out’ other topics of  public inter-
est in the public sphere, some saw the election as 
an opportunity to attract publicity to a cause. The 
artist Bob and Roberta Smith stood in Michael 
Gove’s Surrey Heath constituency in protest at 
the coalition government’s changes to the educa-
tion curriculum downgrading the importance of  
art. While the comedian Al Murray’s ‘Pub Land-
lord’ candidacy in South Thanet was presented, 
perhaps more ambiguously, as a satirical criticism 
of  fellow candidate Nigel Farage (the initials of  
Murray’s ‘Free United Kingdom Party’ (FUKP) 
illustrating the blunt nature of  any ironical intent). 
Murray’s manifesto pledged to brick up the chan-
nel tunnel using British bricks and Polish workers; 
Smith’s platform was built around placing art at 
the centre of  the curriculum.
Towards the end of  the campaign, and 
notwithstanding the final outcome, legitimacy - in 
the sense of  the various potential parliamentary 
combinations of  the main parties - became a key 
media topic. To what extent was the legitimacy of  
candidates such as Murray and Smith questioned?
Mainstream media coverage of  Smith 
was limited, but some supportive niche media 
emphasised his artist-activist credentials. This 
is perhaps partly due to the ‘safe’ seat he was 
contesting, which was never likely to change 
hands; he could not be argued to be disrupting 
‘legitimate’ electoral politics. The campaign was 
also constructed around a positive, niche single 
issue - the importance of  art education both 
culturally and in economic terms - which could 
be treated by other candidates and the media as a 
legitimate (but marginal) topic. One profile piece 
compared the ‘serious point’ of  Smith’s cam-
paign compared with Murray’s, and Smith was 
acknowledged as a ‘vocal advocate’ for the arts, 
debating with Gove in constituency hustings.
On twitter, Smith’s supporters tweeted 
images of  his artworks, in particular those linked 
to the ‘vote art’ campaign intended to encourage 
voter registration. By contrast, Murray attract-
ed (and often engaged with) criticism primarily 
from UKIP supporters attacking his motives in 
standing (for publicity and personal or commer-
cial gain).
The announcement of  the Pub Landlord’s 
manifesto in January generated substantial media 
coverage, in part as an amusing alternative (a ‘bril-
liantly bonkers satire’) to the dry limitations of  
the main party campaigns, and further coverage 
was generated by stunts such as a failed attempt 
to parachute into the constituency.
There was also some criticism of  Murray. 
While some saw him as part of  an ‘honourable 
tradition of  protest politics’, others considered 
the possibility, in a three way marginal constituen-
cy, of  the FUKP and its logo acting as a ‘spoil-
er’ for those misreading the ballot paper while 
attempting to vote UKIP. The Press Association 
reported the comments of  the outgoing Con-
servative MP that the constituency should not be 
‘taken lightly’ and that Murray was ‘trivializing’ 
the contest. 
Newspapers emphasised Murray’s privileged 
boarding school and Oxford background, in 
order to suggest a deceptive hypocrisy in the pub 
landlord’s man of  the people character. He was 
accused of  running ‘at the expense of  people’s 
futures’, hijacking the democratic process for 
publicity purposes and ‘mixing up satire with the 
reality of  a ballot’, while the Green candidate was 
quoted as fearing that such irony can inadvertent-
ly lend credibility to its intended target. Online 
critics suggesting he was trying to resurrect a 
failing career were pointed in the direction of  the 
webpage offering tickets for his upcoming Royal 
Albert Hall appearance.
The performative aspects of  both candidates’ 
campaigns could suggest they were involved in 
electoral guerrilla theatre, making parodic incur-
sions into the liberal democratic electoral process.  
The interpretive agency of  the audience for irony 
means however that it can be taken in multiple 
ways, and these candidacies could be interpreted 
as a vindication of  a liberal electoral system which 
allows anyone, however misguided or eccentric, 
to stand for office. In any case, Smith’s Art Party 
campaign, in its emphasis on policy change and 
educational opportunity was perhaps more ear-
nest than playful, more modern than postmodern.
Both campaigns could have been entirely 
presented as risible self-publicity, but neither was 
denigrated as such. Instead, while Murray was 
largely welcomed as an entertaining sideshow 
(with some concern around the impact on the 
South Thanet election in particular and polit-
ical debate in more general terms), Smith was 
considered a worthy if  marginal addition to the 
democratic process.
Both candidates lost their deposits - Smith 
winning 273 votes, (behind five main parties and 
the Christian Party), Murray gaining 318, (beating 
all the other single issue/protest candidates) - but 
the resulting publicity may well be seen by both 
candidates as a vindication of  their respective 
electoral strategies.
Legitimacy and the celebrity single-issue candidate
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Ukip Leader Nigel Farage (left) and FUKP candidate The Pub Landlord, listen to the Conservative candidate Craig Mackinlay 
(right) receive his declaration results for the South Thanet Constituency at the Winter Gardens in Margate, Kent.  
(Picture by: Gareth Fuller / PA Wire/Press Association Images)
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In the 2015 General Election fans of  politics 
moved to the centre of  campaign coverage 
through the emergence of  ‘milifandom’ (see 
Wahl-Jorgensen’s article in The Conversation, 
2015). Yet, those who interpreted the popular-
ity of  Ed Miliband among social media savvy 
teenagers as a premonition of  electoral success 
were soon to be disappointed. And yet, I want to 
suggest that Fan Studies have a case for stepping 
on psephology’s toes in offering explanations of  
the 2015 General Election result.
In voting, as elsewhere in the consumption 
of  popular culture, we are asked to make choices; 
choices which we make through a mixture of  
consideration and affect. Such affect, in turn, is 
rooted in the appropriation of  texts and on fans’ 
ability to make a given text their own, to rework 
it into a space of  immense textual significance, a 
transitional object, or a space of  self-reflection. 
The more polysemic given texts, the greater the 
number of  fans with varying appropriative needs 
– i.e. backgrounds, experiences and beliefs – it 
can attract. 
In football the global appeal of  super-clubs 
such as Manchester United or FC Barcelona lies 
in the fact that as textual formations they are pol-
ysemic to an extent that they become almost ‘neu-
trosemic’, freed of  any meaning in and for itself  
(as I have written elsewhere). It is this absence of  
a denotative core in varying social and regional re-
ception contexts that allow these clubs to become 
focal points of  partisanship, as illustrated in fans’ 
talk about their clubs which promptly shifts to 
their own identity and values articulated through 
their reading of  the club. 
Much as sports, parliamentary democracy 
also calls for such singular, partisan identifica-
tion; and as in sport such partisanship commonly 
draws on exiting lines of  social distinction, with 
few (still) more prevalent than nationality. It was 
such partisan nationalism with its simplistic ‘us 
versus them’ dichotomy that allowed UKIP to 
attract 3.8 million voters. However, in mediated, 
indirect democracies – especially of  the First 
Past the Post (FPTP) variety   electoral success 
is dependent on constructing such partisanship 
through the greatest degree polysemy. UKIP’s 
failure to win more than one seats reflects the too 
clear connotative core of  the party. It too clearly 
signifies certain ‘values’ to the electorate – values, 
the large majority of  voters in the UK reject. 
The successful fan texts - or, as political 
advertisers would have it, the successful ‘brand’ - 
is one that is as neutrosemic as possible and thus 
functions as a space for reflection for as many 
potential voters’ aspirations. It is thus that the 
strategy and success of  the Conservative Party in 
this election is less surprising. The winner of  the 
much anticipated television leaders’ debates was 
the man who wasn’t there – desperately seeking to 
stay above the fray in the first debate and not par-
ticipating in the second. Indeed, David Cameron, 
to use Robert Musil’s highly fitting title, as ‘man 
without qualities’ succeed in the Merklian art of  
‘asymetric demobilisation’ in England, while the 
spectre of  nationalism was successfully employed 
by the Conservatives in shaping many English 
voters’ reading of  a Labour party potentially 
working with the SNP as a party of  ‘them’, not 
us. While Labour had itself  irrevocably, and from 
its viewpoint catastrophically, positioned as part 
‘them’ to many Scottish voters.
All such readings, of  course, reflect the 
particular horizon of  experience and expectations 
of  individual voters and the way in which they 
construct texts / party brands of  the vast textual 
fields of  political coverage. Those who are fans 
of  politics, who are most familiar with politi-
cal discourse and whose affective attachments 
to given political parties are the deepest, will 
find the suggestion that, for example the Tories 
stand for little in and for themselves as absurd as 
committed football enthusiasts are aware of, for 
instance, the history of  Barcelona FC as a bastion 
of  Catalan culture and independence aspirations. 
But much as it isn’t fans, but the casual viewers, 
who decide the fate of  television shows, those 
whose affective investments in politics is the most 
fleeting, are most likely to decide elections. 
Whatever we make of  the election results, fan 
studies thus remind us of  two obvious, but rarely 
addressed issues of  mediated, indirect democracy. 
Firstly, the blunt measure of  a singular vote fails 
to capture the vastly different investments in the 
political process by different voters and, indeed, 
non-voters. Secondly, while the legitimacy of  
democratic, parliamentary representation is based 
on a sense of  parties as intersubjectively recog-
nised, connotatively unambiguous texts, it is the 
very opposite form of  near neutrosemic textual 
formations that promise electoral success. 
It’s the neutrosemy, stupid!: fans, texts and 
partisanship in the 2015 General Election
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As a recent transplant from the US, I must con-
fess that I’m still suffering from an inferiority 
complex that plagues many of  my countrymen. 
When it comes to cultural matters, we yanks du-
tifully genuflect at the feet of  the mother coun-
try, seduced by her voluptuous soft power and 
posh accent. Hell, white Americans didn’t even 
value black American music until we heard it 
sung with a British accent. In many respects, we 
just can’t resist aping British culture. High, low, it 
doesn’t matter. We even secretly think your flag 
looks cooler than ours. So when it comes to the 
pernicious spread of  lifestyle politics, one has 
to accept that the mother country is once again 
leading the cultural dance and, in this instance, 
to an especially tawdry tune. 
This is not to suggest that UK and US pol-
iticians pander in quite the same way. In British 
lifestyle politics there are less guns, and more 
pints, less God, more Queen. In a sense, the 
reality show that US politics has devolved into is 
a dumbed down knock off  of  the more absurd 
and delightfully ruthless British version. Consid-
er the morning of  May 8th when the leaders of  
three British parties resigned in rapid succession. 
Milliband, Clegg and Farage, out the door with 
no cab fare home. Worse, they had to conduct 
their awkward walk of  shame before a phalanx 
of  reporters and photographers. Now that’s 
good television! 
Some Brits mistakenly believe that Ameri-
cans don’t get irony, but actually we’re drowning 
in it. What we don’t get is whimsy, and British 
politics is full of  that. In the US, the fear mon-
gering tends to be rabid and humourless. Where-
as in the UK, reactionary louts like Nigel Farage 
mug for the cameras and gleefully play the fool. 
Best photo op of  the UK 2015 election: two 
members of  the Monster Raving Loony Party 
flanking Boris Johnson as he accepted his par-
liamentary seat, bedecked in ribbons and badges 
with outsized hats that even gave Johnson’s 
silly yellow fright wig a run for the money. The 
Loony’s had just one campaign policy: a call 
for the abolition of  gravity. As absurd as that 
sounds, at least it was a clear legislative agenda 
that they were all too happy to discuss, unlike 
the other candidate who spent most of  the 
election staying on message and far away from 
concrete details.  
But enough about that. What really matters 
is who’s hotter, Cameron’s wife, or Milliband’s? 
I have to go with Cameron’s. Not that I would 
ever vote for her husband. Still, I have to say, 
he’s my kind of  right-winger, none of  this 
cracker barrel good ol’ boy billionaire nonsense 
that’s such a hit with US republicans (see George 
W. Bush). No, the Tories like their conservatives 
to act like actual conservatives. If  Chancellor of  
the Exchequer, George Osborne, had a heart, he 
would wear it on his velvet sleeve and it would 
be full of  contempt for the unwashed masses. 
Osborne doesn’t hide the fact that he comes 
from an old aristocratic family and that his 
haircut cost more than your house. He doesn’t 
have to. In the US, such an obvious elitist would 
struggle to get elected. The illusion of  a classless 
society acts as a cloaking device that populist 
greedheads hide behind, while struggling to con-
ceal their ivy league pedigrees and dropping the 
“g’s” from the ends of  enough words, as in, “I’m 
just bein’ a regular guy, soundin’ more salt of  the 
earth ‘n’ such, y’all.” Impressively, and somewhat 
depressingly, UK lifestyle politics has a more 
pragmatic dimension. 
There is a sense of  resignation that old 
money will inevitable rule, so it only makes sense 
to vote for the posh twit with deep pockets and 
entrenched connections to steer the ship.  Forget 
rustic charm, Brits want polish. That was the big 
objection to Labour leader Ed Milliband after 
all. The press didn’t fixate on the fact that he 
was an atheist raised by an outspoken Marxist. 
They were more concerned that he didn’t seem 
statesmanlike. Such is the occasionally high tone 
timbre of  British lifestyle politics. In the US, 
politicians steep their speechifying in so much 
holy-roller rhetoric, they often sound like they’re 
running for pope, and even the word “liberal” 
is considered a smear. If  you call someone a 
“socialist,” you might as well accuse them of  
mugging old ladies and stealing their pensions, 
not that old ladies deserve pensions. That would 
be socialism! Such nuances explain why it’s easy 
to mistake British lifestyle politics for actual 
politics, but don’t be deceived.  The absence 
of  bible thumping, gun-toting rhetoric merely 
masks an even more pernicious brand of  politi-
cal pandering based on a tacit acceptance of  the 
class-bound status quo.
Britain’s Got Tories:  
Yank scholar on UK lifestyle politics
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When considering election campaign imagery, 
we tend to think first of  the politicians’ attempts 
to manage their image and how we as voters 
‘see’ them through various mediated lenses. This 
election has certainly involved carefully chore-
ographed party campaigns with the resulting, 
mostly bland, imagery dispersed in a fragmentary 
manner across media platforms, formats and gen-
res. So where are the memorable images of  the 
campaign?: The group-hug of  the female party 
leaders following the opposition leaders’ televised 
debate; the #Milifandom meme on Twitter; or, 
for frequency if  nothing else, the dependable 
photo opportunities involving farm animals and 
fish markets. 
During a period when politics is at its most 
tribalist and combative, it might seem counter-in-
tuitive to focus on the images from a concurrent 
campaign that actually brought together political 
parties, civil society groups, media commenta-
tors and interested members of  the public. Truly 
democratic in scope and ethos, I refer here to the 
campaign to encourage those not yet registered 
to do so before the 20 April deadline. The move 
to Individual Electoral Registration (IER) in 2014 
requires each eligible elector to personally register 
to vote, rather than relying on a single person to 
register the entire household. In February 2015 it 
was reported that ignorance of  the new system 
had possibly disenfranchised around 1 million 
people, with the young, some ethnic minorities, 
and people who rent or move house frequently 
particularly vulnerable to falling off  the register. 
The old system certainly required modernisation, 
but was IER the best system, and were local 
authorities given enough time and resources to 
implement the changes? 
The 5 February National Voter Registration 
Day provided a small boost, but the cross-media 
campaign in the run-up to the 20 April deadline 
appeared to mobilise the nation for a common 
democratic cause and saw almost half  a million 
people register on that final day; almost three 
times the amount of  those who signed up on 
National Voter Registration Day. 
This was a campaign encompassing all types 
of  media – television, magazines, newspapers, 
advertising – and which saw numerous groups 
promote the meaning of  the right and responsibility 
to vote – including various unions, the citizen’s 
advice bureau and the woodcraft folk, to name a 
few. Clearly this short piece cannot consider all 
elements, but it takes one of  these fragments and 
explores the striking imagery of  the #Register-
ToVote campaign as observed on Twitter. The 
message is direct, has urgency and participatory 
power at its very core – the kind of  appeal that 
fits perfectly with the qualities of  social media. 
But what kinds of  images were created and 
shared to convey this message visually, and what 
might their design reveal?  
One striking aspect was the prominence 
of  the female vote. Women were central to this 
phenomenon at individual and collective levels: 
they led the sharing of  images; women directly 
addressed other female voters, especially with the 
statistic that 9 million women had not voted in 
2010; and the pictures tended to depict women. 
In contrast to the misstep of  the Labour Party’s 
‘Woman to Woman’ pink bus, and the militaris-
tic style of  the Daily Mirror’s 20 April front page 
(‘Your country needs you….TO VOTE’), the 
campaign on Twitter enabled a multi-vocal (or 
rather multi-visual) creative expression to emerge. 
Amongst the infographics, humorous memes 
and personalised messages, photographs of  
suffragettes featured heavily. The black and white 
pictures of  arrests and force-feeding emphasised 
the radical and violent nature of  their struggle 
but one very different image appeared again and 
again. A photographic portrait of  Emily Davison 
- beautiful, pensive and feminine. In the portrait, 
she looks over her shoulder, a classic formal pose 
that accentuates her profile and hairstyle whilst 
encouraging a downward, thoughtful gaze. In 
sharing such an image, Twitter users perhaps 
hoped to associate the virtues of  this old-fash-
ioned elegance with themselves and their follow-
ers. The image conveys something which would 
not easily be supplanted by words: an ideal of  
beauty, bravery and dignity. 
There were other historical reference points 
– such as photos of  voting queues in South 
Africa’s first multiracial election of  1994 – but 
the favoured remediations of  the past placed the 
dignity and sacrifice of  the suffragettes pictured 
alongside the casual disenchantment of  young 
women today. In addition to asking people to 
remember the past, other tweets implored people 
to imagine what they’d feel like when they couldn’t 
vote on 7 May. Through vivid imagery, emotive 
appeals, and evocations of  the past, present and 
future, both citizens and institutions rallied many 
to register at the very last moment. This partic-
ipatory and creative fervour arguably gives us 
something to celebrate, but questions remain on 
whether these latecomers actually voted, and the 
wider consequences when certain groups in socie-
ty remain less likely to be registered at all.
#RegisterToVote: picturing democratic rights and 
responsibilities on Twitter
Dr Katy Parry




The emergence of  Milifandom suggests some-
thing important about the 2015 General Election. 
Sufficiently integrated into mainstream media 
coverage for Ed Miliband to namecheck it in his 
resignation speech, Milifandom represented its 
own moment of  mainstreaming – one where the 
languages and experiences of  fandom definitively 
collided with political awareness and enthusiasm. 
The hashtag #Milifandom was reinvigorated 
by 17-year-old Abby Tomlinson during the cam-
paign, taken up by Buzzfeed and conveyed into 
the wider media ecology. Interviewed by The 
Guardian after Ed’s resignation, Abby argued – 
contra the man himself  – that “Milifandom was 
(and still is) the most deserved cult of  the 21st 
century”. For Abby, despite being too young to 
vote herself, Milifandom was a way of  challeng-
ing extremely negative Miliband representations 
produced in Murdoch-owned newspapers. 
Scholarship has wrestled with the relation-
ship between politics and fandom for a while: 
Liesbet van Zoonen notes parallels between fan 
communities and political constituencies in En-
tertaining the Citizen. Jonathan Gray observes 
that fandom may not be “a magic tonic for 
citizenship […] but […] a constitutive element of  
it.” And Cornel Sandvoss has explored ’political 
fandom’ in studies of  Barack Obama and Lib 
Dem supporters. Yet there is an implication in 
Sandvoss’s work that ‘political fandom’ belongs 
somehow to transient support – these are voters 
caught up in an emotional hope for ‘change’, 
who then punish their fan object when it fails to 
live up to expectations (Cleggmania seems a long 
time ago).
All these academic perspectives share some-
thing with the UK media’s bemused and often 
implicitly mocking coverage of  #Milifandom – 
namely that politics and fandom are incongruous 
bedfellows, and hence that a case specifically has 
to be made for conceptually integrating them. 
Fandom does not, according to much political 
media coverage, allow for ‘proper’ engagement 
with politics; it is blinkered rather than open to 
debate, and allegedly hysterical rather than ra-
tional, especially where teen girls’ fandom is con-
cerned. It is this still-powerful discursive separa-
tion of  ‘fans’ and ‘citizens’ that made Milifandom 
newsworthy. Here was something that seemed to 
violate deeply held cultural categories. ‘Fan likes 
Ed’ was a variant on ‘man bites dog’, a quirky 
story that could break up the monotony of  pre-
dictable, professionalised media-controlling spin, 
and a locked-down election campaign. But as 
politics becomes ever more mediated, if  not me-
diatized, then perhaps it should not be surprising 
that fandom emerges as one response. And not 
fandom analytically imposed as a scholarly label/
metaphor, but self-branded Milifandom, emer-
gent in a social-media-ready and memetic form. 
What struck professional pundits and satirists 
– from This Week to Ballot Monkeys – as a rich 
source of  comedy, could instead be interpret-
ed not as human-interest oddity or ‘improper’ 
female teen sentiment, but rather as a marker of  
authenticity in an often inauthentic election. 
Milifandom wasn’t pre-programmed and 
focus-grouped. Nor was it about tribal politics 
cleaving along predetermined lines of  nationalist 
or party-based affective investment (surely also 
kinds of  ‘political fandom’ that deserve the name 
as much as shorter-lived performances of  trust 
and hope). Instead, Milifandom felt emergent, 
contingent and authentic, unlike the ‘West Ham 
question’ regarding which football team David 
Cameron actually supported. Cameron knew that 
fandom was useful, but seemingly only as a tool 
to instrumentally manipulate others. Milifans 
also knew that fandom was useful, but within a 
wholly different structure of  feeling and genera-
tional logic of  practice – one where fandom and 
politics were not alien territories, and could start 
to become seamlessly connected and productive. 
This isn’t only grassroots empowerment, boost-
ing youth-cultural engagement with politics 
and speaking back to media and political elites. 
More specifically, it challenges the very separa-
tion of  fandom and politics taken for granted by 
an older generation. 
As an outlier and an incongruity – as a chal-
lenge to the discursive power of  ‘common sense’, 
rationally debated politics – Milifans demonstrate 
that ‘political fandom’ can be much more than 
an academic category, and that fan-citizens can 
perform their identities and their ‘affective in-
telligence’ via social media in ways that have left 
the old(er) guard uncertain whether to interpret 
all this as ironic, earnest, or semi-ironic. Mili-
fandom’s authenticity and unpredictability have 
opened the door to future coalitions between 
political commitment and fandom, and perhaps 
even to new ways of  thinking about how politics 
can occupy the terrains of  popular culture. 
‘Political fandom’ is an argument for taking 
seriously the lived experience of  citizen-fans who 
no longer see any meaningful distinction between 
how they consume and engage with media, and 
how they consume and engage with mediatized 
politics. #Milifandom may be a joke to some, a 
moment of  levity for seasoned broadcasters, and 
an apparent gift to satirists, but it also potentially 
indicates a tipping point in the emergent struc-
ture of  feeling linked to a new generation – one 
who, next time, will be old enough to vote.
The ‘most unlikely’ or ‘most deserved cult’: 
citizen-fans and the authenticity of Milifandom
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Barack Obama’s hugely experienced aide David 
Axelrod – who advised Ed Miliband on his cam-
paign – was unequivocal about the press hostility 
which he faced in the run-up to this election: 
“I’ve worked in aggressive media environments 
before but not this partisan.” He pointed in 
particular to the manner in which national news-
papers served as ciphers for party propaganda. 
While Fox News in the US is notorious for its 
conservatism, “there isn’t a kind of  lockstep 
between them and the Republicans”. 
It is indisputable that the right-wing press 
went to town during this election campaign, 
not only in launching a furious, brutal and very 
personal vendetta against Ed Miliband, but in 
relaying Conservative Party messages with an 
almost fanatical zeal. Raucous partisanship has 
always been an integral element of  British news-
paper campaigning at the red-top end, and the 
Daily Mirror was every bit as partisan as The Sun. 
But this time, it was more relentless and more 
one-sided. One study by the Media Standards 
Trust concluded that The Sun was more virulent 
even than in 1992, with 95% of  leader columns 
anti-Labour (mostly vilifying Miliband personal-
ly) compared to 79% in 1992. 
This virulence also infected the previous-
ly less tainted broadsheets. Apart from daily 
reminders in the Sun, Mail, Express and Star of  
the “chaos” that would ensue from a Miliband 
government propped up by a “far left” SNP – a 
message emanating directly from Tory HQ – The 
Telegraph regularly feature front pages (such as 
the letter from small business leaders) which 
were masterminded by Tory strategists. This was 
accompanied by an unprecedented letter from 
editor Chris Evans to all those registered on The 
Telegraph’s marketing database urging them to 
vote Conservative. 
But did they really influence the elector-
ate? The conventional wisdom is that newspa-
pers have little or no influence, as evidenced 
by apparently flatlining polls throughout the 
campaign. We now know the polls were wrong, 
possible from the very beginning, which raises 
an interesting question: did they miss a slow 
but steady drift amongst unaligned or uncertain 
voters, partly dictated by the barrage of  adverse 
headlines from the press? 
We will never know because any kind of  
voter “effects” research is notoriously questiona-
ble. But to those who insist that rapidly declining 
newspaper circulations mean waning influence 
in a digital environment, we can point to at least 
four contrary factors. First, through their online 
sites, these news brands reach vastly more voters 
than their hard copy readership. According to 
2015 data from the National Readership Survey, 
the Daily Mail’s monthly readership is well over 
23 million, followed by the Daily Mirror on 17 
million, The Telegraph and Guardian on 16 million 
and the Sun on nearly 14 million (relegated to 
fifth place because its online offering is behind 
a paywall). There is a major issue about whether 
an online “view” counts as readership, but these 
reach figures are astonishingly high. 
Second, the reach of  individual newspaper 
columnists who have a licence to be raucous and 
opinionated is magnified again through social 
media, especially through their huge Twitter 
followings, and reinforced by their appearances 
on broadcast panels, press review shows and 
political programmes. While the left have capa-
ble and passionate advocates, the right’s print 
columnists such as Littlejohn, Kavanagh, Staines, 
and MacKenzie are more numerous, more 
aggressive, and have access to more high-reach 
online platforms because of  the preponderance 
of  right wing publications. 
Third, while broadcast media are bound 
by strict impartiality rules, the sheer weight and 
ferocity of  press comment places enormous 
pressure on them – and particularly the BBC – 
to follow the press agenda. This was confirmed 
by Media Standards Trust online analysis during 
the campaign, and the broader principle was 
endorsed both by the BBC’s Robert Peston and 
Sky News’ John Ryley in speeches last year. 
Fourth, while social media offers new 
approaches to distribution and communication, 
most analysts now accept that they operate more 
as an echo chamber for like-minded people. 
They still cannot compete with the sheer collec-
tive power of  the traditional mass media’s one-
to-many model. In the UK, this is exacerbated 
by the structural of  our national media, in par-
ticular a national press which is almost unique in 
large democracies in terms of  its reach, ubiquity 
and one-sidedness – even allowing for circula-
tions halving in the last 20 years. 
Despite all the predictions about the demise 
of  the press and grand statements about a 
“truly social media election”, the UK national 
press therefore still dominates Britain’s national 
conversation and was instrumental in setting 
the campaign agenda. Its influence operates in 
inchoate and intangible ways which defies em-
pirical measurement, but I have little doubt that 
it played a significant part in determining the 
electoral outcome.
Four reasons why a partisan press helped win it 
for the Tories
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Maybe it should come as no surprise that in the 
aftermath of  the Hacking scandal and the Leveson 
enquiry that followed media policy was to be an 
election issue. Labour, the Liberal Democrats 
and the Green party pledged substantive media 
reforms in their election manifestos. Not that 
you would have known it from the media. The 
Loughborough study noted that the media as 
an election topic received only 1.1% of  coverage 
across broadcast and press and when it did appear 
it continued in the vein of  post-Leveson hysteria 
whereby implementing Leveson’s recommenda-
tions became ‘sinister state censorship’ (The Sun). 
Media owners made no attempt to disguise 
their political allegiances in election coverage that 
has been called the most partisan since 1992. 
Opinion rather than news dominated. On the 
21st April the Independent newspaper reported that 
Murdoch had told journalists at The Sun that if  
Miliband got into power then the future of  the 
company was at stake. He then directed them to 
be more aggressive in their attacks against Labour 
and more positive about the Conservative Party. 
Since 1979 no British government has been 
elected without the support of  Rupert Murdoch 
but this does not mean it was the “sun wot won 
it”. However, politicians fear that the power of  the 
popular press may be decisive and therein lies the 
problem. In this election however, the Leveson 
enquiry gave Milliband the confidence to stand 
up to the likes of  Murdoch. And when he did his 
popularity soared. Plus, this time Milliband had 
nothing to lose – his vilification by certain sections 
of  the press had been relentless: he is weird 
looking; a geek; clumsy; is terrible at eating bacon 
butties; his Dad was a Marxist; he did one over his 
brother and he even had the temerity to have oth-
er girlfriends before he got married – what a cad.
There will be much analysis over whether the 
massively pro-Conservative/anti-Labour press 
influenced the outcome of  the General Election. 
These investigations will likely be inconclusive – it 
is too complicated a matter to whittle down to 
a simple correlation. But we should not only be 
looking at the few weeks immediately preceding 
the election for answers. 
Early indications suggest that people voted 
Conservative largely on economic grounds – 
they felt the financial crash was partly due to an 
incompetent Labour Party that was now being 
cleaned up by Tories; that getting the deficit down 
is the route to economic recovery not Labour’s 
spending plans. Legitimacy of  particular politi-
cal-economic approaches does not happen over 
weeks but years. Paul Krugman notes that the 
austerity ideology that everyone believed five 
years ago as the means to economic recovery has 
collapsed almost everywhere. Everywhere that is 
bar the Conservative Party in the UK and most 
of  the British media. He points out that on the 
very day the Centre for Macroeconomics an-
nounced that the great majority of  British econo-
mists now disagree with the notion that austerity 
leads to growth, the Daily Telegraph published a 
letter from 100 business leaders on its front page, 
declaring the opposite.
So it would seem it is still “about the econo-
my, stupid” whereby massive global media corpo-
rations are very much part of  and who stand to 
benefit from an approach that preaches deregula-
tion, privatization and taxation that supports their 
interests.  It is not the “sun wot won it” but the 
culture of  press-politician mutual interest in which 
media executives and party leaders work together 
to ‘push the same agenda’ in the words of  our 
Prime Minister, that gives powerful corporate me-
dia interests excessive influence over and inappro-
priate interference in the political public sphere.
Meanwhile, despite the desire of  the Gov-
ernment to put the issue of  press regulation to 
bed we still have a Leveson framework in place 
with a Press Recognition Panel (PRP) ready to 
receive applications from potential regulators 
this Autumn. The Independent Press Standards 
Organisation (IPSO – the old Press Complaints 
Commission with fresh lipstick) will not apply for 
recognition but another potential regulator, IM-
PRESS probably will. If  a relevant publisher joins 
IMPRESS then financial incentives for others to 
follow will kick in. The PRP have a year before 
they must report whether or not the system for 
regulating the press has failed. So somewhere 
around Autumn 2016, if  nothing has changed, 
then Parliament will have to decide what to do 
next. The Conservative’s slim majority may not 
be enough to kick an issue with large cross-party 
support and huge public backing, into the long 
grass yet again.
It is also worth noting that while the Con-
servative vote increased by 400,000 (0.8%), 
Labour’s went up by 800,000 (1.4%) – increasing 
their vote for the first time since 1997. Issues of  
media reform did not lose Labour the General 
Election but without it on their agenda they may 
not win the next.
Media policy, power and politics
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Heading into the 1992 election, polls pointed 
towards a hung parliament. The Sun turned up 
the heat on election day with a front page ask-
ing that: ‘If  Kinnock [the then Labour leader] 
wins today will the last person to leave Britain 
please turn out the lights.’ The Tories duly won 
the election with 42% of  the popular vote lead-
ing Britain’s best-selling title to boast ‘It’s the 
Sun Wot Won It’. 
Within two years Labour had a new leader, 
Tony Blair, and a totally new approach to the 
right-wing press: appeasement, not confronta-
tion. Blair immediately went on a charm offen-
sive to make peace with proprietors like Rupert 
Murdoch who were, in turn, equally keen to 
impress on Blair the need to scrap Labour’s 
manifesto commitment to a monopolies and 
mergers investigation into media concentration 
(which, naturally, the party agreed to). 
Are we set for a re-run of  this story and is 
there any truth to the idea that Murdoch has 
‘won it’ again for the Conservatives? 
First, the argument that Labour’s defeat 
in 1992 was due to tabloid hostility has been 
decisively rejected. Leading electoral research-
ers including Professor John Curtice ‘found no 
support for this theory’. Backing for the Tories 
fell amongst readers of  pro-Tory newspapers 
and rose slightly amongst readers of  the La-
bour-supporting Daily Mirror. Pro-Tory press 
bias was, in the end, seen to be less significant 
than a more generalized fear of  a Labour vic-
tory, helped by LibDem voters switching to the 
Tories to keep Labour out. 
Second, seeking the support of  billionaire 
media moguls is a dangerous and often coun-
ter-productive game. True, New Labour was 
able to count on the support of  the Murdoch 
press for its pro-business stance and its rush to 
war in Iraq in 2003, but this is hardly a stable 
base on which to build a left of  centre party. 
Third, it was a wider distrust of  Labour 
and a confusion about its political soul that 
explains the party’s inability to significantly 
increase support in this election. It cannot 
be that anti-austerity politics are an electoral 
liability given the SNP’s astonishing landslide 
in Scotland but it may well be that many voters 
were simply turned off  by a Labour campaign 
that combined support for ‘austerity-lite’ with 
occasional promises to ameliorate the worst 
excesses of  the Tory government. 
Confusion and fear do, however, need to 
be transmitted somehow and a pro-Tory press 
– still setting the broader news agenda despite 
repeated claims of  its imminent demise – set 
about its task to demonise both Labour and the 
SNP with palpable zeal. While the Daily Mail 
raged about Nicola Sturgeon as the ‘most dan-
gerous woman in Britain’, the Sun was obsessed 
by the threat of  ‘Red Ed’ and ran an even 
more partisan anti-Labour campaign that in 
1992 with some 95% of  its editorials attacking 
Labour and Ed Miliband. Overall, Labour won 
support from 11% of  the national newspaper 
market in contrast to the Tories’  57%. 
Of  course, one of  the motivations for the 
Tory press’ sustained attack on Labour was the 
latter’s decision to back independent press reg-
ulation and to ‘protect the principle of  media 
plurality, so that no media outlet can get too 
big’. Indeed, on the day of  the election itself, 
an editorial in the Sun referred to a ‘witch-hunt 
into tabloid journalism’ led by Labour and ac-
cused the party of  wanting to protect ‘left-wing 
politicians from criticism in the tabloids’. 
Partly in response to this negative coverage 
and following the catastrophic election result, 
we are now hearing calls for a return to Blair-
ism – and to New Labour’s accommodation to 
right-wing media proprietors. This would mean 
dropping any commitments to media reform 
and to challenge to the power of  vested inter-
ests inside the media.  
But Labour – and the Green Party – were 
absolutely right to make manifesto commit-
ments to tackle media concentration and it 
would be a huge mistake to backtrack on these 
promises. You do not turn attack dogs into 
watchdogs simply by continuing to feed them. 
This was an election in which the political 
views of  billionaires and corporations con-
tinued to set the agenda. Yet public opinion 
seems to be hardening up in its attitude to the 
abuse of  media power. A recent opinion poll 
conducted by YouGov for the Media Reform 
Coalition found overwhelming majorities in 
support of  action to protect editorial independ-
ence from proprietors and to place limits on 
concentrated media ownership.  
For many years, politicians have remained 
cowed by the ability of  some of  our largest me-
dia organisations to decide on what issues we 
should discuss and what parties we can trust. 
It’s more important than ever that we con-
tinue to campaign for a media that confronts 
power instead of  simply bowing down before 
its representatives. Without this, parliamentary 
elections will continue to be pallid reflections 
of  real democracy.
Election 2015: it’s the press wot won it?
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Well there was one reason, at least, why we should 
have all been grateful to Tony Blair. 
For the 20 years or more since he took over 
the Labour reins, that angry beast ‘the Tory 
press’ – red (so to speak) in tooth and claw – has 
lain dormant in its lair. Some of  us might have 
thought that it was dead, but it wasn’t, merely 
sleeping only to be awoken by the nightmare that 
we were about to be engulfed by a Labour victory.
I guess we shouldn’t have been surprised by 
its resurrection, but even seasoned press observ-
ers, well this one at least, were taken aback by the 
sheer ferocity of  the 21st century incarnation of  
the beast - had it all not seemed so ludicrously, 
even comically, dated.
The Daily Mail had been frothing at the 
mouth about ‘Red Ed’ for the past two years or 
more. One had to hand it to the paper for its 
sheer determination in trying to plant the concept 
into the mind of  the general public at every op-
portunity – Lynton Crosby eat your heart out. But 
the failure of  the campaign to find any sort of  
resonance among the man or woman in the pub, 
wine or coffee bar, was one of  the more edifying 
aspects of  the election campaign.
The Sun was equally ridiculous with its  ‘Save 
our Bacon’ front page on the eve of  the election 
– reprinting for the umpteenth time the picture 
of  Miliband struggling, and failing, to eat a bacon 
butty with dignity. 
Perhaps it’s me, but I didn’t find that front 
page particularly funny, at least not compared to 
the laugh I got a few days before when the Sun in 
England and Wales told its readers to vote Tory, 
on exactly the same day as the Sun in Scotland 
told its readers to vote SNP.
The Times presented a very mixed bag. Its 
coverage of  the campaign had been very com-
prehensive and fair, especially its special ‘Red 
Box’ section which contained additional coverage 
for subscribers, not found in the newspaper or 
website. But then, two weeks before polling day, 
coincidentally following reports that Rupert Mur-
doch had instructed its sister paper the Sun to put 
the boot into Mr Miliband, The Times changed.  
Its ‘news reports’ suddenly became tainted with a 
strong dose of  Tory bias and its choice of  front 
page leads, all based on unnamed sources, became 
risible  – such a pity.
But when it came to besmirching the repu-
tation of  a once-proud newspaper, no one did it 
better to itself  than the Daily Telegraph, perhaps 
because the paper had not one angry proprietor 
but two, the Barclay brothers; although one might 
have hoped that there were enough decent jour-
nalists left at the paper to stand up and say ‘Up 
with this we will not put’ – evidently not. 
In particular the Telegraph ran two front page 
‘stories’ – and I use that word advisedly – that 
were essentially advertisements (but not paid for) 
on behalf  of  the Conservative Party, containing 
the names of  business (mostly) men from large 
and small companies alike, expressing their fear 
of  a Labour Government. Worryingly, the first 
of  these front pages was run as a major story by 
the broadcasters for the following 24 hours, the 
second was ignored.
Front pages such as these, in essence party 
propaganda pure and simple, were once the ex-
clusive preserve of  the Daily Mail – which has an 
ignoble tradition along these lines, stretching from 
the forged Zinoviev Letter of  the 1920s to the 
fictional  ‘twelve Labour lies’ used to undermine 
the Labour Party of  Neil Kinnock 70 years later. 
Telegraph journalists always used to boast 
that whilst they were clearly a Tory-supporting 
newspaper, they were fastidious in separating 
their news coverage (which was generally seen as 
fair) from their comment pages (which were not). 
Those days have clearly gone, which coinciden-
tally or not, coincides with the Barclay Brothers 
proprietorship of  a once proud newspaper. 
The extent to which this venomous avalanche 
actually affected the result, remains to be seen 
but there is no doubting that the traditional Tory 
press still has the means, and the will, to continue 
to dominate the election news agenda.
But let me conclude this avalanche of  brick-
bats with one bouquet for the Tory-supporting 
press. For despite arguing in its editorial columns 
for a continuation of  the current Conserva-
tive-led government, the Financial Times’ election 
coverage was superb. Every day it ran a volumi-
nous array of  election articles, interviews and 
analysis and, having subjected them to my special 
bias-detecting algorithm, I have come up with a 
zero reading.  
The ‘Tory Press’ rides again
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Post 2008, electoral politics and the 2015 elec-
tion itself, was always bound to be dominated by 
debates about ‘the economy’. However, what we 
manifestly lacked was a debate about ‘the econo-
my’ to be replaced instead by a discursively limited 
narrative about the fiscal deficit in which econom-
ics is assumed to be the equivalent of  accountancy.
Since 2010, the national economy has been 
almost entirely narrated via the ‘we maxed out the 
credit card’ analogy. However, like all analogies, 
what they gain in (apparent) clarity and ease of  ex-
planation, they lose in precision or accuracy. What 
remains important in political communication 
though is their ‘use-value’. It is a use-value that has 
served the Conservative Party well. 
The election campaign officially began on 
30th March 2015, but the main parties had been 
establishing their electoral position way in advance 
of  any official start. Boosted by the power of  in-
cumbency, Osborne – the most ‘political’ of  chan-
cellors – always had his eye on the prize of  the 
next election and had, for five years, been carefully 
crafting the ‘clearing up the mess left by Labour” 
message. Beginning with the ‘Business Leaders’ 
letter to The Telegraph and culminating in the chal-
lenge of  Ed Miliband on the final BBC Question 
Time debate the urgency of  ‘cutting the deficit’ – 
blamed on ‘Labour overspending’ – dominated the 
2015 election political economic discourse.
Why was this never challenged by a) the 
Labour opposition? b) the political media? The 
first question (a) might be partly explained by the 
post-2010 search for a new leader of  the Labour 
party. The four-and-a-half-month gap between 
the installation of  the coalition Government and 
the election of  Ed Miliband left a vacuum at the 
heart of  the official parliamentary opposition. 
Given the centrality of  ‘the economy’ said vacuum 
was easily filled by the coalition Government with 
willing (or unwitting) support from political media. 
Save for one Ed Balls speech in August 2010, the 
Labour opposition were unwilling to challenge this 
narrative too fully. Having embraced the neoliberal 
economic project, Labour effectively ceded the 
political and economic narrative to neoliberalism’s 
‘natural’ Conservative Party bedfellows. In so 
doing, the epistemology of  ‘the economy’ and the 
discourse of  ‘Labour overspending’ were estab-
lished. The Labour Party thus locked themselves 
into fighting the 2015 election on economic terri-
tory established by their opposition.
The second question (b) though requires 
more critical interrogation. Why did this imprecise 
and inaccurate explanation, this narrow discourse 
of  the ‘fiscal deficit’ gain momentum? How was 
it so easily established and seamlessly reproduced 
in the media narrative? How was it that ‘cutting 
the deficit’ became the only economic question; 
the only frame through which ‘the economy’ was 
‘narrated’? Political editors, and economics cor-
respondents may rightly claim that if  the Labour 
opposition are not challenging the discourse, then 
why should they? It is, after all not the job of  
journalists to be the de-facto opposition. But this 
narrative and discourse, even if  only by way of  
an adherence to economics expertise (they really 
ought to know better the workings of  the national 
economy) and professional obligations (scrutinis-
ing the accuracy of  public statements by elected 
officials) ought to have been challenged. That it 
was not, went some way to effectively sealing the 
election narrative, and, perhaps, the election itself. 
“I was leaning towards Labour…but then when I 
heard Ed Miliband, in the Question Time debate, 
unwilling to admit that Labour overspent when 
in Government, I just knew then I couldn’t trust 
him on the economy. So I voted Conservative for 
economic security”  
(BBC Television Election night live coverage; 05:40am 
08/05/2015). 
While the ‘fiscal deficit’ is fetishized, the real finan-
cial time-bombs, the national current account 
deficit; chronic productivity problems; and per-
haps most alarming, the unprecedented, increasing 
levels of  private household debt remain unexam-
ined. What coverage appeared – in the financial 
pages – was dislocated from the election coverage. 
It was, to coin the phrase of  my own academic 
specialism, beyond the discursive formation. But 
with private unsecured debt rising by £1.25b per 
month the prospects are alarming. Further, when 
one adds in the Government backed scheme to 
re-inflate the assert bubble – via the ‘Help-to-Buy’ 
scheme, and the – hardly radical – OBR predict-
ing that household debt will rise to 182% of  
income by 2019 we have an eerily familiar scenario 
unfolding. The ‘message discipline’ imposed by 
Lynton Crosby meant that the Conservative Party 
were able to focus attention exclusively on the 
least pressing economic conditions and scenar-
ios. Oriented around an economic message of  
‘fiscal credibility and security’ The Conservatives 
returned to office. The possibilities of  the next 
enormous, even fast-approaching economic crash 
remains unexamined. The neoliberal project accel-
erates. While the fiscal deficit might be cut, society 
must be sacrificed, the population must be finan-
cialised, so that capital may flourish. Our political 
media must take some share of  the blame.
The festishization of the ‘fiscal deficit’:
a media discourse
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‘This is cloud cuckoo’: 
radical alternatives to public debt
It was clear from 2009 that the Big Lie about 
the economic crisis would gain hegemony. The 
transmogrification of  the financial crisis into a 
debt crisis is one of  the most successful propa-
ganda campaigns in history. Capitalists mobilised 
their resources to convince publics around the 
world that it was they, not capitalists that caused 
the crisis. 
Approaching the election, capital, the state 
and their media servants would allow no chal-
lenge to the Big Lie of  a debt crisis. There Is No 
Alternative. So effective has been the prior 30 
year Great Moving (Far) Right Show that on one 
of  the very few occasions that the BBC allowed 
broadcast of  an alternative – Greg Philo’s fully 
costed one-off  ‘wealth tax’ that would enable a 
tiny proportion of  the population to pay a small 
amount of  tax to clear the national debt, a pro-
posal supported by ¾ of  the population – it was 
laughed out of  the studio: “this is cloud cuckoo” 
the presenter informed him.
Should there be talk of  another option, 
whether represented by Philo, the Greens, Russell 
Brand or of  course any of  the plethora of  protest 
movements, it would be at best ignored, at worst 
ridiculed and discounted as if  reflective of  some 
kind of  mental instability.
We know from history that under conditions 
of  crisis, elites close ranks – consent precedes co-
ercion through discursive closure. One is minded 
of  Burke’s analysis of  Hitler’s rhetoric:
“People so dislike the idea of  internal division that 
[…] their dislike can easily be turned against the 
man or group who would so much as name it, let 
alone proposing to act upon it. Their natural and 
justified resentment against internal division itself, 
is turned against the diagnostician who states it as 
a fact. This diagnostician, it is felt, is the cause of  the 
disunity he named.” (1939/1984, pp. 70-71)
It was relatively safe for diagnosticians such as 
Paul Krugman to question the lie of  a debt crisis 
to a small number of  Guardian readers. But the 
majority of  the population was to be insulat-
ed from such alternative explanations. Russell 
Brand’s treatment by The Sun was clear evidence 
of  this.
Such was the acceptance of  the public debt 
lie that on one of  the few occasions where Ed 
Milliband noted that there was a global financial 
crisis that started in the sub-prime housing mar-
ket in the US and spread, he was told off  by the 
audience members who effectively accused him 
of  rewriting history. No amount of  short-term 
campaigning would overturn 7 years of  full-spec-
trum propaganda. 
Despite the hegemonic grip that the Big Lie 
has gained, a significant number of  oppositional 
movements had grown in communities, repre-
sented by parts of  the trade union movement, the 
People’s Assembly network, Left Unity, UK Un-
cut, Occupy, a plethora of  direct action groups, 
and of  course, the Green Party.
Despite the talk of  the progressive potential 
of  a social media election, there is little evidence 
that such mediations change people’s vote. In-
deed, it is more likely an echo chamber for the left 
and right, but for the latter it is far more extensive 
as it feeds off  hegemonic preoccupations of  the 
corporate media and political system.
Just as Murdoch had so successfully turned 
the frustrations of  the working class against itself, 
so now years of  priming enabled UKIP to be pre-
sented as the radical alternative. The party of  the 
City trader, backed by business and the far right of  
the corporate media, came to be positioned as the 
anti-establishment party! A postmodern perversity 
that would have had the Mad Hatter bemused.
Despite left activists responding to laments 
about the corporate media with ‘but we’ve got 
YouTube/Twitter/Facebook’, beside the contin-
ued dominance of  corporate media online, UKIP 
has 17 times the number of  followers as the Peo-
ple’s Assembly, and Britain First more than four 
times the number.
Insofar as there was a radical election alterna-
tive, in England at least, it was the Green Party. It 
was the Greens rather than Labour that became 
the main rallying point for many of  the anti-aus-
terity activists. This was in large part because the 
Green Party remains somewhat anti-bureaucratic 
and retains something of  a non-hierarchical and 
open structure, with deep roots in activist circles.
At the same time, however, and given the 
geographical distribution of  support for the 
Greens, its success might reflect middle-class 
disillusion with Labour more than anything else: 
middle class professional members of  the party 
outnumber working class members by almost 2-1. 
The only significant party with majority working 
class support was in fact UKIP, the party backed 
by and working for the wealthy.
If  the former News of  the World journalist 
Graham Johnson is right in suggesting that Mur-
doch’s project has been to confuse the working 
classes into self-hating bemusement, the election 
was clear evidence that his victory is complete.
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Immigration and the 2015 election:  
the banal, the racist, and the unspoken
The day after the election, just hours after the 
Conservatives secured a majority of  seats in 
parliament, an email message was sent out by 
Kate Allen, director of  Amnesty International 
UK, stating that “with the election results now 
in it is likely that the Human Rights Act will 
be under threat like never before.” The Tory 
pledge to scrap the Human Rights Act has 
since been confirmed, with the stated aim being 
to restrict the appeal rights of  those facing de-
portation. Such wide political implications for 
the institutional fabric of  democracy, however, 
have hardly been a major subject of  the immi-
gration debate staged by the mainstream media 
during the election campaign. 
This case signals a much bigger and rather 
persistent problem with regard t o the coverage 
of  immigration issues – the narrow spectrum 
of  opinions it tends to include, its largely 
exclusive and elite-orientated agenda, and, most 
importantly, its common-sensual, or, perhaps 
more accurately, banal character, in the sense 
of  Michael Billig’s discussion of  the media role 
in the construction of  nationalist attitudes (Ba-
nal Nationalism, London: Sage, 1995). In what 
concerns the immigration debate, a newspaper 
with the journalistic status and left-of-centre 
credentials such as The Guardian, for example, 
may critically report the strong anti-immigrant 
rhetoric and stunts put forward by the Con-
servatives in the aftermath of  Ukip’s rise in the 
European election; and yet, at the same time, 
uncritically reproduce the term ‘illegal immi-
grants’, despite the latter’s rejection by academ-
ics and NGOs alike.
This type of  banal endorsement of  polit-
ically problematic concepts in the context of  
the election campaign may be exemplified by 
Jeremy Paxman’s persistent questioning of  Ed 
Miliband on Channel 4 with regard to controls 
on immigration; unsurprisingly, Labour also 
endorsed such a policy under pressure stem-
ming from Ukip’s success. Paxman’s exclusively 
pragmatic focus on specific ‘figures’ and ‘num-
bers’ was sustained by an interplay between, on 
the one hand, his openly performative facial 
gestures and vocal tonality, and, on the other, 
interpolating shots of  members of  the audi-
ence laughing, nodding and exclaiming in a 
compliant fashion. The infotainment style and 
post-democratic flair (Colin Crouch, Post-De-
mocracy, Cambridge: Polity, 2004) of  this 
programme constitute the visual and discur-
sive components of  an underlying consensus 
over immigration controls. In other words, it 
is immigration that was in effect being given 
the full-on panto villain Paxman routine; the 
only remaining question is the degree of  the 
entrenchment of  restrictive measures. 
On the other hand, the case of  Katie 
Hopkins, whose rhetoric dehumanized mi-
grants in a fashion disturbingly reminiscent 
of  Nazi propaganda, is evidently an example 
of  overt, rather than inferential racism, if  we 
are to revisit Stuart Hall’s classic distinction 
(The Whites of  Their Eyes: Racist Ideologies 
and the Media, in Alvarado, M. and Thomp-
son, J. O., eds., The Media Reader, London: BFI, 
1981/1990, 7-23). As such, it was effectively 
criticised by major humanitarian and journalis-
tic figures. Susan Moore’s argument, in par-
ticular, that the language of  genocide has thus 
entered the mainstream is to the point; and yet, 
what remains unspoken in both far right and 
liberal arguments is that the migrant popu-
lation, from Lampedusa to Yarl’s Wood and 
Harmondsworth, has long been entrapped in 
what Giorgio Agamben addresses as the realm 
of  bare life: their rights, as well as their very 
lives, have become expendable (Homo sacer: 
Sovereign power and bare life, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1998; and State of  
Exception, Chicago: The University of  Chicago 
Press, 2005). 
The inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric 
of  the far right, illustrated in this case by Ukip’s 
populism, may then be seen as constituting an 
unsurprising contribution to the discursive defi-
nitions that accompany the policies producing 
migrants as the contemporary homines sacri. 
The entrenchment of  such policies is similarly 
guaranteed by the alarming electoral rise of  the 
far right in many European countries, so effec-
tively pointed out by Michael Löwy. Apparently 
the mainstream media have been too occupied 
with the conventional distribution of  seats to 
notice that Ukip, despite the – temporary – 
resignation of  its leader, has now consolidated 
itself  as the third biggest party in Britain. 
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Nigel Farage: celebrity everyman
“I don’t break my word, so I shall be writing to 
the national executive in a few minutes saying 
that I am standing down as leader of  UKIP,” said 
Nigel Farage, on learning of  his failure to win 
election as MP for South Thanet. The announce-
ment of  his resignation didn’t come within ten 
minutes of  losing, as he had promised during 
electioneering. But it was close enough. Even 
in failure, Farage was intent on cultivating his 
straight talking, man-of-the-people persona. 
It turned out, however, that this was merely 
the build up to the big punch line: “I intend to 
take the summer off, enjoy myself, not do very 
much at all, and then there will be a leadership 
election for the next leader of  UKIP in Septem-
ber and I will consider over the course of  this 
summer whether to put my name forward and do 
the job again”. This piece of  theatre was typical 
of  Farage’s modus operandi: at once rhetorically 
positioning himself  as distinct from the average, 
slippery career politician, while simultaneously 
acting like the average, slippery career politician. 
This kind of  tactic has been key in the rise 
of  his celebrity status over the last few years. 
Farage has been almost unique in the contempo-
rary political landscape in manipulating the media 
into sympathetic representation, and eliciting a 
range and depth of  emotional responses from 
the public. Aside from Boris Johnson, who is 
similarly savvy to the affective power of  eccentric 
performance, no other recent English politician – 
perhaps since Tony Blair in the mid to late 1990s 
– has been so successful in this regard. 
While Johnson’s performance of  buffoonery 
sets him apart from the Westminster automatons 
in managing to convince a significant number of  
people that he is funny and/or cute, it is large-
ly in keeping with idiosyncratic habits of  the 
landed classes who have a long history of  power 
and leadership in Britain. By contrast, Farage’s 
performance of  the Everyman has little tradition 
in this country, and is more in keeping with right-
wing politicians from America, such as George W. 
Bush. As such, the excessive performativity of  his 
pint-swilling, cigarette-smoking populism is in-
teresting on a number of  levels. While it is clearly 
historically and culturally specific, framed within 
the wider UKIP rhetoric of  anti-EU English 
nationalism, its more fascinating aspect is its ap-
peals to ‘authenticity’. In this sense, as everybody 
knows Farage’s background as a wealthy com-
modities broker, it is less to do with masking the 
‘real’ Nigel Farage, who is clearly not your average 
punter, than a performance of  class solidarity 
that allows him to voice the feelings and opinions 
of  disenfranchised ‘real people’: some of  which 
are controversial, and which other politicians are 
not permitted to articulate within the frame of  
acceptable political discourse. 
As a self-styled anti-establishment figure 
working within the establishment, Farage has thus 
far proven highly adept at working the system. 
But, as time passes, the vulnerability of  his, and 
his party’s, position is becoming more obvious. 
This is clear in three key ways. 
First, Farage’s celebrity – and to a large ex-
tent, UKIP success – depends on the mainstream 
media’s complicity. And, as the election cam-
paign showed, this is an unbalanced relationship. 
Having been used as a means to sell papers, boost 
viewing figures, and act as a mouthpiece for val-
ues shared by the Tory-supporting press, Farage 
had the rug pulled out from underneath him in 
early April 2015 when the notion took hold that 
UKIP votes may cost a Conservative victory at 
the General Election. 
Secondly, as the election itself  illustrated, the 
FPTP electoral system is stacked against UKIP (as 
it is the Greens). While UKIP harvested a single 
seat from nearly four million votes spread across 
the electorate, the SNP acquired 56 seats from 
less than half  the number of  UKIP ballots. The 
new government’s proposed boundary changes 
will surely only serve to entrench this situation. 
Finally, although Farage had been adept at 
professionalizing a ragtag outfit comprising what 
David Cameron once famously called “a band of  
fruitcakes, loonies, and closet racists”, while man-
aging to mobilize the support of  a mass of  the 
disenfranchised electorate – developments out-
lined expertly in Ford and Goodwin’s The Revolt 
of  the Right (Routledge, 2014) – the announce-
ment on 11 May that his resignation as leader 
had been rejected by UKIP members unleashed 
a torrent of  discontent from factions within the 
party, much of  which focused on Farage’s style of  
leadership and the cult of  personality on which 
it is based. Therefore, while UKIP has for the 
moment ensconced itself  as a “legitimate” polit-
ical force in UK politics, with over 12% of  the 
popular vote, depending on his fate we might get 
a better sense over the next few months to what 
extent the party’s success has been down to the 
charismatic celebrity Everyman, Nigel Farage. 
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When the readers’ pen is just another sword
A wealth of  data dissecting the coverage of  the 
electoral campaign has punctuated the run-up 
to the election. The weekly reports released by 
Cardiff  University, Loughborough University 
and the Media Standards Trust have consistently 
documented the centrality of  party leaders, the 
focus on strategy over policy, and the overreli-
ance on polls (together with the related debate 
around the possible coalition deals around the 
election) that have dominated the coverage. 
These findings somehow indicate the sub-
sidiary part played by citizens in the coverage, 
particularly in a moment in the political cycle 
when citizens should arguably play a central role. 
The role played by social media in the campaign 
has generated some media attention, although 
the coverage focussed more on how parties used 
these tools, and on ‘best social media bits’. Karin 
Wahl-Jorgensen, in three different posts for The 
Conversation, analysed how citizens were repre-
sented in the news (mainly through voxpops), 
the energising potential of  #Milifandom, and 
the powerful role played by citizens in the spe-
cial edition of  Question Time. 
But citizens were also represented in letters 
to the editor. Although scholars have previously 
discussed whether this genre can be considered 
a forum for public debate, it could be expected 
for letters to the editor to constitute a platform 
for citizens to advance debates and engage in 
the discussion of  electoral policies and propos-
als put forward by parties. A systematic analysis 
of  the letters to the editor published in British 
national newspapers in the run-up to the elec-
tion, however, shows a rather different picture. 
Consistent with the partisanship and the negativ-
ism of  the newspaper coverage, the published 
letters constituted yet another bastion urging 
readers to support the very party endorsed by 
each newspaper. This was done through the 
publication of  letters explicitly asking for the 
vote, advocating for tactical voting, ridiculing 
and vilifying candidates and opposing some of  
their policies too. Instead of  the homogeneous 
discourse put forward by most newspapers, a 
slightly more diverse range of  political options 
could be found in the letters published by The 
Independent and The Guardian (including explicit 
opposition to The Independent’s endorsement of  
the Liberal Democrats and the Coalition govern-
ment). Newspapers published letters by promi-
nent political figures David Blunkett (The Sun, 4th 
May), Caroline Lucas, or Nigel Farage (The Times, 
6th May). This effectively reduces the only news-
paper space reserved for citizens to proactively 
express their political aims and aspirations. 
Letters published in The Guardian and The 
Independent after the 8th May tried to find an 
explanation to the results obtained by Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats. In contrast, the 
policy debate intensified after the election in the 
letters to the editor published in the newspa-
pers that had endorsed the Conservative party. 
In addition to the numerous letters celebrating 
the Conservative victory, there was a plethora 
of  letters trying to influence the agenda of  the 
newly elected government. The main propos-
als included negotiating with Brussels so that a 
referendum on the British membership to the 
EU could be held before 2017; reforming the 
constitution (so that only English MPs can vote 
on English laws), and reforming the electoral 
system (so that the anomalies generated by the 
first past the post system could be corrected). 
It is to a certain extent revealing that news-
papers showing such a monolithic support for 
the winning party (including stories and tools 
promoting tactical voting in their coverage), and 
exercising such a degree of  editorial control 
in the selection of  reader contributions during 
the campaign, started publishing letters to the 
editor pushing some policies eminently champi-
oned by UKIP during the campaign as soon as 
the Conservative victory was confirmed. One 
wonders what prevented these newspapers from 
using letters to the editor during the campaign 
as a means of  advancing the debate around the 
policies that any government should develop af-
ter the election: What was the risk? Why did they 
wish to limit the exposure of  their readers to a 
wider range of  ideas and policy proposals? 
Whilst some respected commentators argue 
that the market somehow regulates the parti-
san nature of  newspaper coverage, my analysis 
shows an imbalance between the editorial logics 
followed by The Guardian and The Independent 
and the editorial strategies of  other national 
newspapers, at least when it comes to letters to 
the editor. On the one hand we have something 
resembling a marketplace of  ideas. On the other, 
an attempt to restrict supply with the aim to 
dominate the market.
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Discussions on the digital economy were 
marginal to this election. Insofar as the digital 
economy was referred to, it was in overwhelm-
ingly positive terms. This reflects the common 
disposition among the UK’s leading politicians 
that this type of  economy and its associated 
industries are where wealth creation will be 
mainly concentrated in the future. But, if  it is 
a commonly held belief  that the digital econo-
my is so important, then why did it not feature 
more prominently in the election campaign? 
Part of  the answer must surely lie in this 
uniformity of  the political class’s thinking, 
which means that there is little to debate on 
many of  these issues. For example, the mani-
festos of  the Conservative, the Labour Party 
and the Liberal Democrats all emphasised the 
importance of  continuing broadband roll-out 
to the point where all households have good 
access, a position that has not changed since 
the 2010 election. On digital skills too, all par-
ties agree that the universal provision of  formal 
training will transform the UK’s citizens’ use of  
digital technologies. 
But there are, nonetheless, significant 
points of  departure between the parties as well 
as ambiguities in their respective policies that 
deserved a fairer hearing in this election. The 
Labour Party’s independent review of  the cre-
ative industries released just over a month be-
fore election day included an observation that 
there is a significant degree of  monopolization 
in many digital markets and a recommenda-
tion thatcompetition authorities should be 
given powers to address this. However, despite 
highlighting in its campaign the need to address 
widening inequality, no commitment to tackling 
digital monopolies appeared in its manifesto. 
After David Cameron’s suggestion earlier in 
the year that the security services should be 
able to read encrypted communication was 
widely ridiculed, this measure was absent from 
the Conservative manifesto. However, while 
recommendations to prevent ‘extremists’ ac-
cessing the Internet is consistent with the views 
of  a party whose leader mused after the 2011 
London riots that he wanted to do the same 
to rioters, it is at odds with the Conservatives’ 
deregulatory and libertarian instincts elsewhere, 
as well as its former coalition partner’s pledge 
to introduce a digital Bill of  Rights.  
Even the seemingly least controversial 
matters on which all three parties agree are not 
free from contention. In a House of  Lords 
select committee report on the digital economy 
released earlier this year, most of  the experts 
consulted on digital skills argued that cognitive 
skills, including basic literacy and numeracy, are 
much more important in enabling people to 
adapt to rapidly changing software and plat-
forms. This is reinforced by experts like author 
and entrepreneur Martin Ford who argue that 
acquiring new digital skills alone is unlikely to 
prevent one from being a victim of  the increas-
ing automation that the House of  Lords report 
recognises is an ongoing central feature of  the 
digital economy. 
After the Conservative victory, concerns 
about monopolization of  digital markets and 
of  citizens’ rights to privacy are unlikely to be 
at the top of  the government’s agenda. All the 
more reason why the UK’s media and commu-
nication scholars should continue to be at the 
forefront of  debates about the digital econo-
my and of  economic activity, like the creative 
industries, dependent on it.
Political discourse on the digital economy fails 
to reflect the concerns of the electorate
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A newspaper proprietor donates £1.3m to 
UKIP, and his paper, the Daily Express, carries 
eleven leader columns supporting the party. 
The paradox of  media policy is that issues 
are never more palpable than during elections 
yet discussion is peripheral. For campaigners 
trying to make the media an election issue, the 
results in GE2015 were predictable, laced with 
the unpredictability of  a more mobile media 
scene. The prize for the most impactful airing 
was arguably Russell Brand asking Miliband: 
‘Can’t you just go, right, I am Prime Minister 
now, we are passing some legislation that means 
that monopolies are going to be significantly 
broken up... so Rupert Murdoch, it’s been great 
but now you can only own 10 per cent or 15 
per cent of  total media. Is that kind of  thing 
a possibility, because people want it?’ With 
Miliband promising to act, their 90-second ex-
change featured in an online interview accessed 
1.2m times, 500,000 in the first 24 hours. So, 
if  it was Brand wot won it, second prize might 
go to John Cleese and Steve Coogan, or rather 
the successful mobilisation of  celebrities by 
Hacked Off  to prise open even hostile papers 
to report their call for action on the stalled 
Leveson agenda. Alongside, there was online 
campaigning and petitioning by groups like 
Avaaz, while the Media Reform Coalition and 
Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom 
(CPBF) secured modest coverage for their Me-
dia Manifesto and a poll showing 71 per cent 
public support for media ownership controls. 
Set against a highly partisan daily press, 
backing the Tories by a margin of  five to one, 
public service discussion of  media policy, 
outside Radio 4’s The Media Show, was negligi-
ble, with no questions in the set-piece election 
debates. Yet the BBC faces an existential threat 
from Conservative policies to top-slice the 
licence fee and tackle the BBC’s ‘monopoly’. 
During the campaign the Tories, UKIP and 
the DUP (furious about exclusion from TV 
debates) all alleged BBC bias, flailing flak, with 
Culture Secretary Sajid Javid telling the Dai-
ly Mail he wanted BBC bias addressed in the 
Charter renewal process. 
The other standout Manifesto issues were 
press regulation and ownership, both prom-
inent amongst the list of  Labour policies 
opposed by press magnates, and many of  their 
higher salaried staff. Murdoch berated journal-
ists on the Sun for not doing enough to stop 
Miliband. A Sun editorial (24th April) attacked 
Labour as ‘sworn to use the law to dismantle 
News UK if  it wins power’, describing this as 
‘Sinister State censorship’. Yet, media policy 
barely featured in newspaper election coverage, 
with no substantive mention of  the term itself. 
Between 30th March and 7th May, 36 newspaper 
stories featured ‘Leveson’ with ‘regulation’ but 
most were in The Guardian/Observer (15), Mail 
group (4), or regional titles, with only one each 
in The Times, Sun and Mirror. Media were mobi-
lised against Labour, as the excellent analyses 
by the Media Standards Trust, Open Democra-
cy and others show, but rarely engaged directly 
with media policy issues to do so, except for at-
tacks on the BBC. Nevertheless, press partisan-
ship was back, showing how media owners act 
against reforms to create a more diverse and 
democratic media that their behaviour makes so 
necessary. The Mirror’s pro-Labour partisanship 
might soften concerns for some, but it is worth 
noting that it gave negligible space to media 
issues. The Guardian/ Observer’s coverage was 
extensive but included Peter Preston’s twin-bar-
relled assault on Labour’s plans for press and 
ownership reform. 
The new Conservative government will 
park Leveson, supporting IPSO as a resurrect-
ed PCC. It will create a minimalist system to 
monitor media plurality, seeking to neutralise 
demands that strengthened over the last five 
years. It will freeze, cut and shift the BBC 
licence fee to benefit commercial providers, 
shrinking the BBC towards American PBS-type 
marginality. All these policies will serve the 
media megaphones mobilised on their behalf, 
although that unstable bloc may divide too, 
notably if  the Conservatives grant Murdoch 
full control of  BSkyB before GE2020. These 
policies will be opposed; the SNP, for instance, 
seeks devolved governance of  broadcasting and 
greater funding for BBC Scotland. Yet Labour 
may heed those advocating Blairite accommo-
dation over confrontation with dominant media 
groups, massaged into policies to stimulate 
Creative Britain. New media have aided and ral-
lied counter-narratives but the core demand for 
meaningful plurality across the most influential 
public-facing media remains more important 
than ever, even if  further out of  reach.
Media policy as an election issue: ever present, 
yet absent
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